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Abstract 
 
 
This thesis explores the role of states in propelling financialisation. The neoliberal 
period has been characterised by two interrelated phenomena: financial markets 
have expanded at a seemingly inexorable rate, while productive output has stagnated 
across much of the advanced capitalist world. States have acted to further these 
processes through discrete financial de- and reregulations. The existing literature 
has theorised states’ roles in this process by pointing either to the power of financial 
lobbyists and laissez-faire ideology or arguing that the state pursued these policies 
as an automatic reaction to the stagflation crisis. This thesis evaluates these claims 
by examining the governing motivations underpinning four key British financial 
regulatory transformations – the 1971 Competition and Credit Control measures, 
the 1977-79 abolition of exchange controls, the 1986 Big Bang, and the 1986 
Financial Services Act – through the analysis of declassified government, Bank of 
England, and other documents. The findings presented in this thesis disconfirm both 
explanations advanced in the financialisation literature: state policy-makers were 
not dominated by financial lobbyists, entirely beholden to laissez-faire ideology, nor 
were their actions a reflexive, functional reaction to crisis. Instead, policy-makers 
employed financial de- and reregulatory measures as pragmatic instruments to 
strategically navigate the contradictory pressures of the global profitability crisis 
and the demands of domestic groups. This thesis theorises these findings by drawing 
from the value-form reading of Marx’s writings and Open Marxist state theory. 
 vi 
During periods of crisis, states are forced to reconcile the impersonal domination of 
global value relations with the tangible demands of the electorate that their 
immediate needs be met. To do so, policy-makers create statecraft strategies that 
attempt to either discipline national social relations in line with global imperatives, 
often in a depoliticised manner, or delay the effects of the crisis through palliative 
measures in order to maintain political legitimacy. The financial regulatory changes 
studied in this thesis should be conceptualised as elements of these broader 
strategies of crisis governance. The British state’s propulsion of financialisation 
constituted a strategic attempt to govern the crisis- and struggle-ridden nature of 
capitalist social relations.
 1 
CHAPTER ONE 
Introduction 
 
 
The cover of Time magazine in May 2016 was an image of the word 
‘CAPITALISM’ overrun and strangled by an invasive vine with leaves that 
resembled those found on a US one dollar bill. The illustration embedded in the 
feature article was even more stark, reading simply: ‘SAVING CAPITALISM’. 
Capitalism is presented as something in the process of destruction by an external, 
out-of-control pathology. The existential threat represented by these creeping vines, 
the article’s author explains, is ‘financialization’ (Foroohar, 2016).  
 
 
Figure 1. Time magazine, 12 May 2016. Illustrations by Lon Tweeten. 
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Any number of jarring statistics can be presented to demonstrate the 
tremendous growth of the global financial sector since the 1970s. The Bank for 
International Settlements (2017) estimated the value of outstanding derivatives 
contracts to be $542 trillion in 2017, or almost five times global GDP. In Britain 
alone, the banking sector’s total assets stood at 450 per cent of national GDP in 
2014, up from 100 per cent in 1975 (Bush et al., 2014: 386). Indeed, the UK has 
been at the forefront of financial expansion since the 1970s: by 2009, Britain had a 
larger financial sector relative to GDP than any other major economy (Banks et al., 
2014: 14-5). These statistics are even more glaring when compared with the paucity 
of non-financial economic performance in the post-1970s era. Rates of GDP growth, 
non-bank profits, investment, and wage growth in many advanced capitalist 
economies have remained significantly lower than during the postwar boom (The 
Economist, 2014). Britain, again, has exemplified this trend, with the share of GDP 
generated by ‘production industries’ falling from 41 per cent in 1984 to 14 per cent 
in 2013 (ibid: 9). It is for this reason that the term financialisation has faced 
competition from another, less glossy, descriptor – ‘secular stagnation’ – in defining 
our economic epoch (Davidson, 2016; Hansen, 1939). 
The simultaneous expansion of finance and stagnation of production1 has 
elicited both popular and academic scrutiny. The initial excitement with the alchemy 
of contemporary finance that allowed Larry Summers (at the time Deputy Secretary 
of the US Treasury) in 1997 to remark ‘[f]inancial markets don’t just oil the wheels 
of economic growth – they are the wheels’, evaporated following the 2008 financial 
                                                        
1 ‘Production/productive’ is used in this thesis to refer to the non-financial sectors 
of the economy, rather than to denote a normative judgement on social usefulness. 
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crisis (Mirowski, 2013: 222). Financial elites have been increasingly identified as 
the culprits for a range of social ills and, more generally, there appears to be rising 
concern that our economies and polities have become subject to domination by 
financial capital (Streeck, 2017). This sentiment has united both left and right 
politicians and populist movements in recent years. For example, in Western 
Europe, the two politicians who have been most vocal in advocating for the potential 
reimposition of capital controls (for quite different purposes) are the British Labour 
Party’s John McDonnell and the French Front National’s Marine Le Pen (Parker et 
al., 2015; Melander et al., 2017). Leftist and rightist accounts also mirror one 
another in their insistence that money has been increasingly manipulated by 
financiers and their political collaborators, such that it no longer acts as the lifeblood 
of the ‘real’ economy, but has instead become an instrument of speculation and 
avarice. In her book Occupy Money (2012), Margrit Kennedy, a leading activist in 
the Occupy movement, called for the creation of a ‘sustainable monetary system 
[that] will reflect real wealth rather than the smoke and mirrors of speculative profit’ 
(my emphasis); while the right wing of the US Republican Party has seen a post-
2008 resurgence in calls for a return to the gold standard as a remedy for financial 
malpractice (White, 2015). ‘The gold standard is real money’, states The Gold 
Standard Now, a website associated with Donald Trump’s economic advisor Judy 
Shelton, and thus a return to gold is crucial to stamp out the ‘insidious monetary 
process of political manipulation of the value of national currencies’ that have 
engendered ‘systematic financial disorder’ (my emphasis). Such initiatives – 
ranging from the more reasonable to the absurd – reflect a broader social 
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phenomenon, namely the fundamental anxiety with the synthetic nature of financial 
wealth and the desire for the recreation of an economy that serves tangible purposes.  
In the academic sphere, processes of financial expansion and productive 
stagnation have fed a growing body of literature that can be gathered under the label 
of financialisation studies. Spanning a range of disciplines and fields, this literature 
has pointed to the myriad ways in which financial logics and practices have come 
to dominate modern economic life. While certain studies have focussed on the 
macro dynamics of regimes of financial accumulation (Arrighi, 1994; Boyer, 2000), 
others have examined the everyday practices and subjectivities that constitute and 
are constituted by financialised capitalism (Langley, 2004; De Goede, 2005; 
Watson, 2009a). For the most part, accounts of financialisation have employed the 
term in an almost pejorative manner (Schmidt, 2015: 13); that is, while the concept 
is used for its analytical traction, it nevertheless generally signifies a set of 
developments that are seen to be profoundly negative and socially damaging. ‘At 
stake’, Natascha van der Zwan (2014: 101) writes in her influential survey of the 
financialisation literature, is ‘not only a deeper understanding of the financialization 
process, but also the question how we can create a more stable and equitable 
capitalist system in the context of expanding financial markets’.  
However, before any answer can be given to Lenin’s question ‘what is to be 
done?’, it is essential to develop a sophisticated understanding of precisely how the 
contemporary financial order came to be. If financialisation constitutes an 
immutable stage in the development of national economies, as Giovanni Arrighi 
(1994) suggests, then attempts to combat the domination of finance capital and 
reinstitute a form of production-oriented capitalism would appear to be wishful 
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thinking. On the other hand, if financialisation has resulted from the hegemony of a 
pernicious ideology, such as shareholder value (Lazonick and Sullivan, 2002; 
Stockhammer, 2004), then attempts to propagate counter-hegemonic ideas of 
economic value, and in the process forge a fairer financial system, would appear 
wholly reasonable.  
A central element of any such explanation of the origins of this phenomenon, 
yet one that has been seriously underexplored, is the role of states in propelling the 
dual processes of financial expansion and productive stagnation. Through the 
dismantling of existing financial regulations, the creation of new regulatory 
frameworks that enhance the expansionist tendency of global finance, and the 
restructuring of monetary governance, states have been key catalysts of 
financialisation. As Eric Helleiner (1995: 315) argues, the increasing scale and 
global character of financial markets is not simply ‘a product of unstoppable 
technological and market forces’, but rather state policy initiatives have been of 
‘central importance in encouraging and permitting the process’. Amongst the 
advanced capitalist countries, the British state in particular has been noted for its 
early and intense propulsion of financialisation dynamics (Davis and Walsh, 2017), 
leading to what some have termed Britain’s ‘Finance Curse’ (Christensen et al., 
2016)2. An examination of the reasons for the British state’s actions in furthering 
processes of financial expansion and productive stagnation is thus of crucial 
academic, as well as political, importance. Indeed, most post-2008 campaigns that 
                                                        
2 This article argues that national economies with over-sized financial sectors 
display similar dynamics to the ‘resource curse’, whereby the presence of this 
booming sector results in the crowding out of other economic sectors, increases in 
inequality, and the growing volatility of economic growth. 
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have sought to repress runaway financial expansion have directed their demands 
precisely at the state. With this in mind, this thesis will seek to address the following 
main research question: 
 
Why did the British state act to propel financialisation through 
financial de- and reregulation? 
 
This question will be explored through the following derivative questions: 
 
What were the governing motivations that led successive British 
governments to restructure Britain’s financial regulations? 
 
What was the relationship between the postwar profitability crisis 
and the British state’s overhaul of UK financial regulation? 
 
What is the utility of the concept of ‘domination’ in explaining the 
British state’s furthering of financialisation?  
 
 
Thesis argument  
 
Existing accounts of the role of states in furthering processes of financial expansion 
and productive stagnation can be gathered into two broad groups, which this thesis 
terms expropriation and crisis resolution approaches. Expropriation explanations 
 7 
argue that the expansion of financial markets has acted to depress the growth of the 
productive economy, through a variety of mechanisms (Stockhammer, 2004). 
Within this explanation, it is argued that states have acted to spur financial 
expansion because of a) the lobbying power of financial elites (Duménil and Lévy, 
2004), and b) the enduring power of pro-finance, laissez-faire ideology in the 
neoliberal era (Palley, 2013). Crisis resolution explanations advance the opposite 
causal narrative. The expansion of finance, it is argued, resulted from the pre-
existing malaise in the productive economy (Arrighi, 1994). With regards to the role 
of states, crisis resolution approaches insist that policy-makers deregulated 
financial markets as a way to resolve the crisis of the underlying economy through, 
for example, the expansion of credit. In the case of Britain, the former approach has 
emphasised that the administrations of Margaret Thatcher had extraordinarily close 
ties with the City of London (referred to from hereon as the City) and was 
particularly committed to free market principles (Davis and Walsh, 2016); while the 
latter approach has insisted that the British governments of the 1970s and 1980s 
acted to propel financial expansion as an automatic reaction to the stagflation crisis 
(Brenner, 2006).  
This literature has two key shortcomings: methodological and theoretical. 
Methodologically, examinations of financialisation generally have remained at a 
high level of abstraction, with many accounts making use of global- or national-
level descriptive statistics (Duménil and Lévy, 2002) or sweeping macro-historical 
narratives (Arrighi, 1994) to examine the relationship between financial expansion 
and productive stagnation. With certain notable exceptions (Krippner, 2011), there 
is a profound lack of detailed historical examinations of the political deliberations 
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that resulted in key regulatory transformations. With regards to theory, this literature 
has relied heavily on instrumentalist/pluralist and functionalist explanations of state 
behaviour; that is, policy-makers acted to propel financialisation either due to their 
domination by financial lobbyists and adoption of neoliberal ideology, or as a 
reflexive, automatic reaction to economic crisis. The strategic agency of state actors 
is thus downplayed and the governing contradictions that they faced remain 
unexplored. 
This thesis will seek to rectify the methodological shortcomings by 
advancing an in-depth historical examination of the most important changes in 
British financial regulatory policy in the postwar period. By analysing declassified 
government and Bank of England (referred to from hereon as the Bank) documents, 
as well as a range of other archival sources, this thesis pieces together the policy-
making processes that resulted in crucial financial de- and reregulations. Through 
the employment of this underutilised methodology, unique insights will be provided 
into the reasons for the British state’s actions in propelling financialisation.  
The theoretical shortcomings in the existing literature will be addressed by 
interpreting the archival evidence through a theoretical framework that draws 
heavily from the ‘value-form’ reading of Karl Marx’s mature writings (see Rubin, 
2010). With a few exceptions (see Knafo, 2007; and Konings, 2015), value-form 
Marxism has not been widely discussed in International Political Economy (IPE) 
literature. Nevertheless, certain Open Marxist scholars that operate within the limits 
of IPE – particularly Werner Bonefeld – have consistently engaged with and 
contributed to this theoretical tradition. This approach, like the aforementioned 
pluralist and functionalist state theories, is interested in the dominating pressures 
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experienced by state policy-makers. However, value-form theory neither locates the 
source of such domination within a particular fraction of the capitalist class nor the 
external forces of the mode of production. Instead, domination is understood as 
decentred, impersonal, and deriving from the very money-mediated exchange 
relations that constitute capitalist society.  
The value-form approach interprets Marx’s value theory as a theory of a 
historically specific form of wealth that is simultaneously a form of self-imposed 
social domination. When human socialisation takes place through money-mediated 
commodity exchange – a form of social mediation that only becomes generalised in 
the capitalist epoch – it gives rise to a system of crushing social constraints that set 
individual producers against one another in unending competition over labour time. 
This pressure to produce more in less time, and thus boost labour productivity, tends 
to depress the average rate of profit within the economy as a whole, resulting in 
periodic profitability crises. However, people are not simply marionettes of value 
relations, executing predetermined laws in a mechanical manner; instead, people 
continuously reject the abstract dictates of the value form of wealth, and in its place 
assert their tangible needs and demands. Capitalist development is thus 
characterised by the unruly struggle between a homogeneous form of wealth and its 
dominating tendencies, on the one hand, and people’s everyday assertions of 
heterogeneous, concrete forms of wealth, on the other.  
Within this struggle-ridden society, states are not external regulators, 
smoothing out inconsistencies and resolving contradictions. Rather, states are 
constitutive of capitalist society through – amongst other things – the creation and 
management of national currencies and international monetary regimes, which give 
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rise to global exchange relations and to value as a global principle of social 
organisation. Policy-makers are therefore subject to dominating pressures that, 
while they appear external, are in fact fundamentally self-generated. States are 
forced, especially during times of crisis, to ensure that national productivity and 
profitability meet global averages or else face a range of external sanctions that can 
threaten national economic viability and domestic social stability. Yet policy-
makers must simultaneously ensure that their political legitimacy is not 
compromised in the pursuit of national economic competitiveness, as the 
impersonal dictates of global value relations run up against the tangible politics of 
human need. Thus, during capitalism’s cyclical profitability crises, state managers 
pursue statecraft strategies that fall on a spectrum between two poles: palliation, 
meaning the delaying of the worst effects of the crisis in order to protect governing 
legitimacy; and depoliticised discipline, which refers to the direct confrontation of 
the crisis through disciplining measures in a manner that veils the state’s hand in the 
process and thus insulates policy-makers from political backlash.  
This thesis ultimately argues that the transformations in Britain’s financial 
regulatory structure should be understood as elements of such broader crisis 
governing strategies: whether palliative, depoliticised disciplining, or a hybrid of 
the two. Successive British governments, from 1971 to 1986, pursued financial de- 
and reregulatory measures as attempts to govern the contradictory imperatives of a 
global system of dominating wealth in a period of crisis and the concrete demands 
by the British electorate that their immediate needs and demands be met. By 
archivally tracing the policy-making processes that resulted in key changes in 
British financial regulation, this thesis will demonstrate in forensic empirical detail 
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that such policies are best conceptualised as statecraft strategies designed to 
ameliorate this fundamental dilemma inherent to the political governance of 
capitalist society.  
 
 
Case selection and methodology 
 
Four cases of financial regulatory restructuring are examined in this thesis, namely 
the 1971 Competition and Credit Control (CCC) measures, the 1977-9 abolition of 
exchange controls, the 1986 Big Bang, and the 1986 Financial Services Act (FSA). 
These policies were chosen because of their central role in spurring processes of 
financial expansion and productive stagnation during the critical years of the 1970s 
and 1980s. CCC constituted a radical restructuring of British monetary policy, 
whereby the London clearing bank cartel was abolished, quantitative limits on bank 
lending were scrapped, and Bank Rate (the interest rate at which the Bank loaned 
money to domestic banks) became partly marketised. These changes provoked both 
an enormous credit expansion and increasing financial innovation. The abolition of 
exchange controls consisted of the dismantling of limits on the use of British funds 
for overseas investment and rules regarding the repatriation of profits earned 
overseas. This resulted in a massive flow of investment out of the UK, the 
diversification of British capital’s investment portfolio from industrial to financial 
assets, and the increasing global competitiveness of the City. The Big Bang saw the 
deregulation of the London Stock Exchange (LSE), whereby the exchange was 
opened up to foreign financial firms and fixed commissions on securities trading 
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were abolished. This liberalisation boosted the global status of the City as a world 
financial hub and propelled the expansion of the UK financial sector. FSA forged a 
new regulatory structure to govern the British securities industry, characterised by 
self-regulation within a statutory framework. This reregulation complemented the 
Big Bang in propelling the City’s global prospects, by ushering in a comprehensive 
system of regulations for global actors to follow when operating in London. 
This thesis employs an archival methodology to explain the British state’s 
role in propelling processes of financialisation. The empirical chapters are based 
upon primary documents spanning the years 1968 to 1986 and which are located at 
three main archival repositories in the UK: the National Archives, the Bank, and the 
University of Warwick’s Modern Records Centre. In addition, this thesis also 
consulted, to a lesser extent, the government documents that have been digitised and 
shared online by the Margaret Thatcher Foundation, Hansard (the official record of 
parliamentary debates), and the newspaper archives held at the University of 
Warwick library.  
The majority of documents examined during this PhD are located at the 
National Archives in Kew, London. In 2013, this archival repository changed its 
policy regarding the release of government documents from the 30-year to the 20-
year rule, such that, in 2014, records from 1986 were made available to the public. 
This coincided perfectly with the beginning of this PhD in 2014, as the records 
concerning the Big Bang became accessible for interrogation. Within the National 
Archives, this thesis explored records from the Prime Minister’s office, Treasury, 
Department of Trade (DoT), Department of Industry (DoI), and Department of 
Prices and Consumer Protection. These documents provided insights into the 
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political deliberations between the Prime Minister and senior government ministers, 
as well as allowing for an exploration of the debates taking place within the civil 
service and amongst less senior officials who were nonetheless working at the 
coalface of policy implementation.  
This thesis also interrogated primary documents located at the archive of the 
Bank in London. This archival repository similarly changed its document release 
policy in 2013 to the 20-year rule, allowing for full access to documents related to 
this thesis’ case studies. Within the Bank archives, two types of documents were 
examined. Firstly, the minutes of meetings of the Court of Directors were explored 
– documents that have been digitised and made available online. These meetings, 
which take place at least seven times a year, are attended by the Governor and other 
senior executive and non-executive members. As such, these documents provide 
insights into high-level deliberations concerning the broad direction of monetary 
and regulatory policy, as well as the content of recommendations that will be made 
to the government on policy issues. Secondly, this thesis draws from recently 
declassified, non-digitised documents held at the Bank. These records include letters 
sent from the Governor to the Prime Minister (as well as other government 
ministers), internal memos sent within the Bank, and economic analyses created by 
Bank officials for internal circulation. In combination with the documents in the 
National Archives, these Bank archives allowed this thesis to examine the areas of 
agreement and disagreement between the government and the Bank, the strategic 
manoeuvrings between these two institutions, and the manner in which both bodies 
contributed to the formulation of financial regulatory policy.  
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The analysis contained within this thesis’ archival chapters was 
supplemented by documents interrogated at the Modern Records Centre. This 
consisted chiefly of the archives of the Confederation of British Industry (CBI), but 
certain documents from the Trade Union Congress (TUC) archive were also 
examined. The CBI archives shed light on the British business community’s 
concerns regarding the state of the economy in the 1970s, and highlighted the extent 
of the organisation’s efforts in lobbying the government to create policies that would 
alleviate the pressure on British capital. These documents often provided clear 
insights into the relationship between the demands of British industry and the 
transformations of financial regulation undertaken by the government.  
While archival analysis can offer an unprecedented glimpse into states’ 
policy-making processes, which in turn allows the researcher to both ‘test 
theoretical propositions’ and offer ‘persuasive causal explanations’ (Reuschemeyer, 
2003: 318), this methodology entails certain risks. As Bryman (2016: 546) points 
out, researchers must be wary of the credibility, representativeness, and meaning of 
the documents that they are examining. Credibility and representativeness can refer 
to two interrelated factors: ‘the reliability of the author and the reliability of the 
information on which the author is basing their opinions’ (Wellings, 2013: 131). 
When analysing the recommendations of a Treasury official to the Chancellor of the 
Exchequer on the relationship between exchange controls and inflation, there is a 
danger that the official misrepresents the broad views of the Treasury or that the 
official is basing their recommendation on inaccurate statistical data. This thesis 
attempts to counter these risks by corroborating the opinions found in the archival 
record with a range of secondary sources, including political memoirs, interviews 
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conducted with policy-makers by other scholars, and alternative scholarly analyses 
of the same or similar archival material. Furthermore, where possible, the data 
presented in the archival record is corroborated by other official data sources, 
including the Bank’s statistics branch and the Office for National Statistics.  
Problems of meaning can arise from misinterpretations of the context within 
which the authors of archival materials were situated (Scott, 1990). For example, 
reading the archives of the Prime Minister’s office from the 1970s through a 
presentist lens (i.e. in a context of long-term low inflation) may lead the researcher 
to be confused by the level of political concern over the effects of inflation on 
governments’ re-election chances. These possible confusions surrounding the 
contextual meaning of certain concepts can be rectified through a broad reading of 
the secondary literature – a necessary preliminary stage to archival research. Yet 
certain ambiguities surrounding the meaning and interpretation of archival material 
are unavoidable: as Burnham et al. (2004: 212) write, documents ‘do not speak for 
themselves’, but can only be understood through a framework set by ‘analytical and 
methodological assumptions’. This thesis is transparent about its theoretical 
assumptions and makes clear that it interprets the documentary material through this 
lens.   
Abstract theorisation and a detailed empirical methodology are combined 
throughout this thesis. On the one hand, the analysis put forward draws from a 
highly abstract conceptual tradition that begins with the commodity form of wealth 
and logically unravels the full array of imperatives and tendencies that constitute 
contemporary capitalism. On the other hand, it advances a forensic examination of 
the archival record and insists that this method reveals something novel about the 
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causes of financial regulatory change. This thesis thus insists both that the 
fundamental character of capitalist society cannot be grasped through empirical 
scrutiny of surface phenomena alone and that robust empirical analysis is highly 
valuable for social scientific study (see Burnham, 1990, Kettell, 2004, and Rogers, 
2012 for examples of such a synthesis). This reflects a contradiction at the heart of 
capitalist social life, namely that people’s everyday agency, subjectivity, 
strategising, and practical action appear to confront intangible, abstract barriers that 
are broadly conceptualised as ‘economic realities’ or ‘structures’. This thesis’ 
theoretical framework attempts to grasp these apparently immutable, external 
structures as self-imposed social constraints that define the limits of the socially 
possible – so long as the basic monetised exchange relations are left intact. The 
manner in which these rules of social reproduction are subjectively understood, 
negotiated, challenged, or reinforced by real agents cannot be deduced by abstract 
reasoning, but is rather the domain of empirical discovery. As such, this thesis 
attempts to bridge the abstract and the concrete by archivally tracing how political 
elites employed financial regulatory restructuring as a strategy to navigate the 
impersonal domination of global value relations in a period of crisis. This thesis’ 
concepts of palliation and depoliticised disciplining statecraft strategies act as a 
mediating level of abstraction between these extremes: statecraft strategies are 
clearly visible in the archival record, yet only acquire their full significance when 
understood in relation to the intangible social forces that are distilled through 
theoretical inquiry. 
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Contributions 
 
This thesis makes significant contributions to three bodies of literature: the 
interdisciplinary study of financialisation, and IPE scholarship on state/market 
relations and neoliberal financial liberalisation. 
 
Financialisation 
 
Financialisation literature, as Chapter 2 explains, has spanned a broad range of 
disciplinary boundaries within the social sciences and humanities. Scholars from 
various fields have examined the diverse ways in which the growth of financial 
institutions, logics, and practices have transformed contemporary capitalist life – 
from the increasingly financialised nature of housing, credit, and food (Fernandez 
and Aalbers, 2016; Montgomerie, 2006; Clapp, 2014), to the creation of 
financialised subjectivities and identities (Aitken, 2007; Watson, 2009a), to the 
causal relations between financial expansion and productive stagnation (Arrighi, 
1994; Stockhammer, 2004). To the extent that this literature has examined the 
relationship between financialisation and states, states tend to be understood as the 
subject of processes of financialisation – as in Ian Hardie’s analysis of how the 
financialisation of bond markets has restricted developing states’ borrowing 
capacity (2011) – or as actors that govern through financialised mechanisms – such 
as Andrea Lagna’s study of the Italian state’s employment of derivatives for 
strategic purposes (2016). Far less attention has been paid to the motivations that 
pushed states to actively promote processes of financialisation in the formative 
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years of this phenomenon. Furthermore, those accounts that have examined this 
question have tended to treat states’ behaviour in a pluralist/instrumentalist or 
functionalist manner, as exemplified by the expropriation and crisis resolution 
approaches. 
My research will address this lacuna in the financialisation literature by 
examining the governing imperatives that pressed the British state to propel 
processes of financial expansion and productive stagnation. By focussing on the 
pragmatic and political nature of the British state’s actions in transforming the UK’s 
financial sector, as well as by placing these policy decisions in the context of the 
global economic crisis of the 1970s-80s, this thesis will contribute to the work of 
Greta Krippner (2011) and Wolfgang Streeck (2014) in conceptualising financial 
regulatory restructuring as a strategic response to the political and economic 
dilemmas generated by crises. This theoretical contribution is complemented by this 
thesis’ methodological innovation, namely the employment of archival 
historiography. Studies of states’ roles in financialisation, while providing useful 
descriptive statistics and stylised historical narratives, have generally not 
incorporated the interpretation of primary sources into their accounts. The 
interrogation of documents from the National Archives, Bank archives, Modern 
Records Centre, and other archival repositories will allow this thesis to trace the 
complex political deliberations that ultimately resulted in key financial de- and 
reregulations.  
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States and markets 
 
Within IPE, it has become widely accepted that scholars must advance beyond the 
conception of states and markets as opposed antagonists engaged in a perpetual tug 
of war (Gilpin, 1987; Strange, 1996). Geoffrey Underhill (2000: 808) has attempted 
to transcend such dualism by arguing that ‘the state and the market are part of the 
same integrated system of governance: a state-market condominium’; Foucauldian 
IPE scholars have insisted that power has no ‘central locus’ in either states or 
markets, and instead employ the concept of ‘governmentality’ to suggest that states 
and markets reproduce diffuse power relations through forms of knowledge and 
practice (Aitken, 2007: 18); and Polanyian interpretations have claimed that states 
and markets are ‘mutually constituting spheres of activity’ – both simultaneously 
embedded in civil society (Block and Evans, 2005: 505). While these insights are 
extremely valuable, it is important to ensure that this positing of the mutual 
constitution of states and markets acts as the starting point, rather than conclusion, 
of IPE analyses (Burnham, 2011: 478).  
This thesis contributes to, and also intends to complicate, Open Marxist IPE 
accounts of state/market relations and the broader nature of capitalist society. The 
Open Marxist framework, exemplified in IPE by the work of Peter Burnham, 
attempts to grasp states and markets not as ontologically separate categories but as 
different forms or ‘mode[s] of existence’ of capitalist social relations (Burnham, 
1994: 225). This approach is careful not to subsume all social phenomena under the 
logical workings of capital accumulation, as in structural-functionalist 
interpretations, but rather emphasises that capitalist society is characterised by 
 20 
struggle; and thus states and markets must be understood as rigidified forms of such 
struggle (ibid). While this framework has been successful in advancing a Marxist 
IPE approach that overcomes the pluralist state theory of neo-Gramscian IPE (van 
der Pijl, 1989), it has shown signs of stagnation in recent years as Open Marxist IPE 
scholars have failed to engage with cutting-edge interpretations of Marx beyond the 
Anglophone literature. This thesis will thus follow Bonefeld (2014) in exploring 
value-form Marxism and employing its insights to forge a more sophisticated 
Marxist intervention into IPE debates.  
This thesis’ value-form approach understands that capitalist domination 
does not emanate solely from the realm of market interactions nor is it purely a state 
project. Rather, capitalist social relations are constituted by a network of private 
monetary exchange (Heinrich, 2012) that is participated in, and facilitated and 
enforced by, sovereign states. It is thus correct to characterise states and markets in 
the capitalist epoch as mutually constitutive. However, the value-form interpretation 
pushes this claim further. While private and public actors forge capitalist social 
relations through their everyday activities, these social relations become 
‘autonomised’ (Reichelt, 2007: 5): that is, they take on a rhythmic pattern that is 
independent from the conscious intentions of the active participants who bring them 
to life. As Marx (1993: 157) writes, the ‘general exchange of activities and products, 
which has become a vital condition for each individual – their mutual 
interconnection – here appears as something alien to them, autonomous, as a thing’. 
Both policy-makers and market agents, as such, become dominated by the very 
social relations that they have created.  
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By directly engaging with such definitional categories as value and capital, 
which contemporary IPE literature generally sidesteps, this thesis’ value-form 
approach makes two contributions to IPE’s understanding of state/market relations. 
Firstly, it offers a convincing account of the mutual constitution of states and 
markets as simultaneously creators and subjects of capitalist domination. Secondly, 
it provides an explanation of why this form of self-imposed domination appears as 
external domination. In other words, it explains why certain IPE scholars understand 
states as embattled institutions struggling against external market forces (Gilpin, 
1987; Strange, 1996), and why neoclassical economists have tended to 
conceptualise economic pressures as natural or at least transhistorical forces 
(Davidson, 1991: 33).3 These misapprehensions of the global political economy are 
not simply analytical mistakes, but rather reflect the real appearance of capitalist 
society (Rubin, 2010); a society in which people are ‘governed by the products of 
[their] own hand[s]’ (Marx, 1976: 772).  
 
Neoliberal financial liberalisation 
 
This thesis also contributes to IPE literature on neoliberal financial liberalisation. 
Within IPE, the transformations in financial regulation that took place in the 
advanced capitalist world in the 1970s and 1980s are generally understood to have 
                                                        
3 Paul Davidson (1991: 33) writes that ‘neoclassical theories presume that the 
economic system resembles the mechanical systems analysed by nineteenth-century 
physical scientists. The movement over time of such systems is determined by 
events and laws existing at the initial instant of time’. 
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resulted from two causal factors: dynamics of competitive deregulation between 
states and the growing influence of laissez-faire economic ideas (Helleiner, 1994; 
Andrews, 1994; McNamara, 1998; Gallagher, 2015). The former explanation 
emphasises that the increasing mobility of capital flows in the 1970s created 
powerful sanctions and incentives that motivated policy-makers to pursue financial 
liberalisation. The sanctions refer to the fact that states were increasingly forced to 
compete ‘for the right to regulate capital’ (Andrews, 1994: 199) or else face capital 
flight; while the incentives meant that states could promote their domestic financial 
industries as global financial centres through deregulation (Cerny, 1994; Green, 
2016). The latter explanation, advanced by constructivist scholars, posits that at 
various scales – from national states to international organisations – a fundamental 
ideational transformation took place, whereby Keynesian instruments of demand 
management became stigmatised and were consequently replaced by a new liberal 
policy consensus, often with a monetarist bent (Best, 2005; Chwieroth, 2010). 
Within this IPE literature, Thatcher’s deregulatory agenda – particularly the 
abolition of exchange controls and the Big Bang – is considered the archetypal case 
of the role of competitive deregulation and neoliberal ideology in propelling 
financial regulatory change (Helleiner, 1994; Germain, 1997).  
This thesis fundamentally challenges this consensus by arguing that the 
transformations in British financial regulation in the 1970s and 1980s are better 
understood as strategies to navigate the contradictory forces generated by the 
stagflation crisis. While there is some evidence to suggest that policy-makers were 
concerned with boosting the City’s competitiveness and that certain politicians were 
motivated by ideological commitments to neoliberal and monetarist doctrines, the 
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bulk of archival data points to a more practical, ad hoc explanation. British policy-
makers found themselves torn between, on the one hand, the material imperative to 
discipline domestic social relations in line with a global system of social wealth in 
deep crisis, and the political imperative to meet the immediate needs and ambitions 
of civil society, on the other. This thesis demonstrates that the same financial 
regulatory changes that the IPE literature has generally explained with reference to 
competition and ideology, must be conceptualised as elements of broader statecraft 
strategies of three types: 1) palliation strategies, designed to delay the contradiction 
set out above; 2) depoliticised disciplining strategies, designed to address the 
economic imperative while neutralising the resultant political backlash; or 3) 
hybridised statecraft strategies that incorporate elements of both aforementioned 
strategies. This theoretical schema is able to capture the ideological character of the 
different governments and political actors of this period – particularly the growing 
influence of monetarist economic doctrine at the expense of Keynesianism – yet it 
transcends existing IPE accounts by further explaining how governing norms and 
economic ideas confronted an inescapable policy-making dilemma and were in turn 
warped and instrumentalised for strategic political purposes. 
 
 
Chapter structure 
 
In addressing the research questions set out above, this thesis will be divided into 
two parts. Part I, consisting of three chapters, will provide a conceptual discussion 
of financialisation, the state, and the nature of capitalist domination. Part II, 
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consisting of five chapters, will apply these theoretical insights to the case of the 
British state’s financial regulatory restructuring, and, more specifically, the four 
cases of financial de- and re-regulation outlined above. Finally, this thesis will end 
with a concluding chapter. 
 
Part I 
 
Chapter 2 is this thesis’ literature review. This chapter will examine the existing 
literature on the topic of financialisation, which is organised into three categories. 
The first category refers to a body of literature that this thesis terms ‘the 
financialisation of’ approach. These accounts of financialisation point to the 
increasing role of financial logics in various economic sectors, mechanisms of state 
management, and aspects of everyday life. The second category of this literature, 
which this thesis argues has more analytical precision, understands financialisation 
to denote the corresponding expansion of finance and stagnation of production since 
the 1970s. In explaining these twin phenomena, this literature can be further 
grouped into two approaches, namely the expropriation and crisis resolution 
explanations discussed above. The third category of financialisation literature 
examines the role of states in advancing the simultaneous financial expansion and 
productive stagnation; with expropriation approaches insisting that states unleashed 
the expropriating power of finance due to the role of financial lobbying or neoliberal 
ideology, and crisis resolution approaches arguing that states deregulated finance 
as an automatic reaction to the underlying economic crisis. While this last category 
of financialisation literature has relied on pluralist and functionalist theories of state 
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behaviour, the work of Streeck and Krippner has offered a welcome strategic 
approach to understanding the role of states in propelling financial expansion and 
productive stagnation. This thesis will contribute to these innovative scholars’ 
reconceptualisation of the contested and political nature of the relationship between 
states and financialisation, and move beyond their theoretical deficiencies by 
grounding the empirical analysis of policy-makers’ strategic machinations in a 
comprehensive and internally consistent theory of capitalist domination.  
Chapter 3 is the first stage of a two-part theoretical framework that explores 
the forms of domination that underpinned states’ propulsion of processes of 
financialisation. This chapter will argue that rather than conceptualising capitalist 
domination as deriving from specific sociological groupings, capitalism’s 
dominating tendencies inhere in the very form of social wealth that predominates in 
this society, namely value. This chapter examines the value-form reading of Marx’s 
theory of value, and explains how money-mediated commodity exchange forces 
market participants to compete with one another over labour time, resulting in a 
historically peculiar form of self-generating temporal domination. This in turn 
generates powerful tendencies towards the classification of society into dependent 
and flexible wage-labourers, separated from the means of non-market survival. 
These same dynamics similarly set capitalist development along a cyclical 
developmental trajectory, whereby the pressures to continually raise productivity 
also tend to depress average profitability, resulting in periodic crises. However, 
actual capitalist development is not a pre-scripted affair: the pressures arising from 
the value form of social wealth are perpetually resisted in myriad ways, as people 
assert alternative forms of wealth, societal objectives, and social organising 
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principles. Capitalist society, as such, is characterised by a struggle between a 
decentred, impersonal, and accidentally self-imposed form of temporal domination, 
on the one hand, and people’s everyday assertion of tangible needs and demands, 
on the other. 
Chapter 4, the second part of this thesis’ theoretical framework, integrates 
states into this reading of capitalist domination. Rather than standing outside of the 
capitalist system and regulating it in an objective manner, states are fundamental 
constituents of capitalist society. Through the creation and management of national 
currencies and international exchange rate regimes, states plug their national 
territories into a global system of monetary exchange relations, resulting in the 
foundation of value as a global organising principle and system of impersonal 
domination. In order to avoid a range of economic sanctions, ranging from capital 
flight to payments imbalances to currency crises, states are forced to maintain 
average rates of profit within their territories. Yet the measures necessary to ensure 
the correspondence of national economic performance to global averages can 
threaten to undermine the basis of the state’s political legitimacy, especially during 
times of global crisis. Therefore, policy-makers formulate statecraft strategies, or 
strategies of crisis governance, that allow them to navigate the contradictory 
imperatives of global value relations and the tangible demands of enfranchised 
citizens. These strategies fall on a spectrum between two poles: depoliticised 
discipline, whereby domestic social relations are disciplined in line with global 
averages in a depoliticised manner, and palliation, whereby the underlying crisis is 
not directly addressed but its affects are delayed so as to preserve governing 
legitimacy. This chapter will argue that the policies of financial regulatory 
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restructuring examined in this thesis must be understood as elements of such 
statecraft strategies.  
 
Part II 
 
Chapter 5 marks the beginning of this thesis’ empirical section, whereby the 
preceding theoretical insights are applied to the case of British financial regulatory 
policies during the profitability crisis. In particular, this chapter will act as a bridge 
between the earlier chapters’ abstract conceptual discussions and the in-depth 
archival analysis of the following chapters. This chapter begins by arguing that 
analysts must be careful to differentiate between the long decline of British imperial 
and capitalist dominance, on the one hand, and the immediate and steep economic 
crisis that beset Britain in the 1970s, on the other. This latter crisis was the national 
manifestation of the global profitability crisis that plagued the world capitalist 
economy during this period. This chapter then puts forward a novel historical 
categorisation of the British experience of stagflation, by identifying two distinct 
periods within Britain’s experience of the global profitability crisis. The first, from 
1967 to 1977, was characterised by low rates of corporate profit, rising inflation, 
and repeated current account imbalances that resulted in currency crises. The 
second, from 1977 to 1983, still saw low profitability and high inflation, but the 
rising price of sterling ensured that there were no sterling crises. The chapter then 
details how various governments deployed statecraft strategies during these two 
periods as a way to navigate the contradictory accumulation and legitimacy 
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imperatives. The following financial regulatory policies must be understood 
through the lens of these broader statecraft strategies.  
Chapter 6 is the first archive-based chapter in this thesis. This chapter 
explores the 1971 CCC measures that restructured British monetary and financial 
regulatory policy. While this policy change was a brainchild of the Bank, it 
nevertheless had to gain Treasury assent – and it is this latter puzzle that this chapter 
tackles. In the context of the early stages of the global profitability crisis, Britain’s 
worsening trade performance had resulted in a series of currency crises, to which 
Harold Wilson’s government responded in 1967 by devaluing sterling. In aid of 
devaluation, the government enacted a series of contractionary measures, designed 
to reduce demand for imports and thus promote a balance of payments recovery. 
However, two obstacles stood in the way of this governing objective. Firstly, people 
proved resistant to this reduction in their living standards, and thus endeavoured to 
combat income losses by extending their bank borrowing. Secondly, due to falling 
profitability, companies faced a liquidity crisis that threatened to derail the export 
recovery. As such, the government needed policy instruments that could both 
restrict credit to persons and extend credit to companies: that is, operate a 
simultaneously disciplining and palliative monetary policy. This chapter shows that 
this could not be achieved with the existing monetary toolkit, which had also 
become increasingly politicised and painful for the authorities to operate. The 
Bank’s CCC proposals, in contrast, appeared to offer an arm’s-length mechanism 
that would reallocate credit from persons to companies by allowing interest rates to 
determine access to credit, while shielding the government’s hand in the process. 
The Treasury’s approval of CCC constituted a hybrid statecraft strategy that 
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combined both palliative and depoliticised disciplining measures to respond to the 
political and economic dilemmas churned up by the global profitability crisis. 
Chapter 7 examines the abolition of exchange controls in the years 1977 to 
1979. Exchange controls, which had been in place since the second world war, were 
first partially dismantled by the Labour government of James Callaghan before 
being completely scrapped by the Thatcher administration. This chapter 
demonstrates that exchange control abolition must be understood as a reaction to 
the immediate political dilemmas facing both governments. Following the IMF’s 
1976 seal of approval on British government policy, and the increasing revenues 
from North Sea oil, the pound’s price began to rise. While this aided the 
government’s attack on inflation, it exacerbated the effects of the profitability crisis 
on exporters. This chapter shows that both the Callaghan and Thatcher 
administrations sought to ease the pressure on exporters by dismantling exchange 
controls and allowing investment to flow out of sterling, thus reducing the 
currency’s price. Yet there were two problems with this palliation strategy: the trade 
union movement was vehemently opposed to this deregulation, and there was a 
concern that global financial markets would be startled by this policy and 
orchestrate a run on the pound. While these obstacles ultimately impeded the 
Callaghan administration from pursuing the full abolition of exchange controls, the 
Thatcher government publicly deployed a rhetorical strategy that emphasised their 
laissez-faire ideology in order to convince global markets that this was not a beggar-
thy-neighbour policy, but rather one driven by sheer principle. The dismantling of 
exchange controls should thus be understood as a palliative statecraft strategy to 
delay the political ramifications of the strong pound’s exacerbation of the 
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profitability crisis – a strategy that was pursued in a manner that would veil the 
government’s intentions from global markets.  
Chapter 8 focuses on the Thatcher government’s 1986 Big Bang 
deregulation of the LSE. This policy was the result of a winding institutional 
process, beginning in 1979 when the Restrictive Practices Court (RPC) began a case 
against the LSE for non-competitive practices. Despite the pleas of the LSE’s 
Chairman Nicholas Goodison, the Thatcher government refused to exempt the LSE 
from this court case because it would contradict the government’s laissez-faire, pro-
competition rhetoric. However, the government’s perspective began to change 
following the launching of the Medium Term Financial Strategy (MTFS): a plan to 
discipline the British economy in line with global value relations in a depoliticised 
manner by imposing a rules-based policy straitjacket upon the state. In order for this 
statecraft strategy to be successful, it was essential that the government meet certain 
chosen monetary targets, which would justify the painful deflationary measures. Yet 
this plan went awry immediately upon implementation, as the Thatcher 
administration plunged the British economy into a deep recession and was unable 
to hit the monetary targets. To prevent the complete presentational failure of MTFS, 
the government began to make massive sales of government debt on the LSE as a 
way to soak up excess liquidity in the economy and artificially reduce the money 
supply. This in turn made it crucially important that the RPC case would not disrupt 
the normal functioning of the LSE, which led the Thatcher government to exempt 
the LSE in July 1983 and begin the countdown to the Big Bang deregulation. The 
decision that led to the Big Bang, then, was a pragmatic attempt to rescue the 
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government’s depoliticised disciplining strategy for directly addressing the 
profitability crisis.  
Chapter 9 explores the political deliberations that resulted in the 1986 FSA. 
FSA was a reregulatory measure that acted to create a statutory regulatory 
infrastructure appropriate to the preceding decade and a half of financial 
liberalisations discussed in the preceding thesis chapters. This chapter will explain 
the impetus underpinning this policy and why it assumed its light-touch, arm’s-
length form. Following several financial scandals in the City, the government 
commissioned a legal academic – Laurence Gower – to investigate Britain’s 
securities regulation and make recommendations on future amendments. Gower’s 
initial proposals for a system of self-regulation to be governed directly by a 
government body were met with disapproval by the government and Bank. 
However, the impending Big Bang deregulation changed policy-makers’ opinions. 
This radical liberalisation would invite global actors to operate in the City, which in 
turn necessitated the creation of an impartial and legally-enforced system of rules. 
Yet the Thatcher government was concerned that Gower’s proposals would make 
them politically responsible for future financial crises, while the Bank worried that 
their informal relations with the City would be interrupted by government meddling. 
As such, the government and Bank worked to depoliticise Gower’s plans by 
inserting a private body between the government and the City, and thus insulate 
policy-makers from legitimacy problems that would result from financial crises. 
FSA can thus be understood as an attempt to create a depoliticised framework of 
financial governance that would simultaneously regulate Britain’s newly liberalised 
 32 
financial system and protect the government from the political backlash deriving 
from this financialised pattern of accumulation. 
Chapter 10 is this thesis’ conclusion. This chapter will provide a summary 
of the thesis’ overarching argument, explain the original contributions, and put forth 
a discussion of the limits of this work and the possibilities for developing a future 
research agenda. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
Financial expansion,  
productive stagnation,  
and states 
 
 
Crush the financial sector, end the great stagnation? 
 
Title of Matthew C. Klein’s 2015 article in the Financial Times. 
 
 
Introduction 
 
It is rare that a contemporary political economy concept crosses over into 
mainstream usage. ‘Globalisation’ is the most obvious example, having been 
employed ad nauseam by politicians and commentators since the 1990s. To a lesser 
extent, ‘neoliberalism’ has also gained significant cachet in recent years. It is 
premature to add ‘financialisation’ to this list of cross-over concepts, yet it too has 
displayed the potential to bleed from an originally rather niche set of academic 
debates into broader usage.4 Furthermore, like globalisation, financialisation 
                                                        
4 See, for instance, Bruce Bartlett’s 2013 New York Times article titled 
‘Financialization as a cause of economic malaise’, Steve Dennings’ 2014 Forbes 
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denotes a broad, seemingly tectonic shift in economic life that implies a worrying 
set of limits on the democratic process. Within the social sciences, however, no 
ambiguity exists about the traction of this term. A large and still growing number of 
accounts have attached themselves to this burgeoning literature, which spans a range 
of academic disciplines, including economics, political science, IPE, sociology, 
management studies, and geography. This in turn is reflected in the continuing 
proliferation of conference panels, special issues of journals, and research projects 
that explicitly address the phenomenon of financialisation.  
While this literature can be dissected and examined in myriad ways5, this 
chapter will adopt an innovative approach to characterise the existing accounts of 
financialisation. Moving from general to specific, this chapter is divided into three 
main sections. The first section looks at what is here termed ‘the financialisation 
of…’ approaches. These approaches conceptualise financialisation as the general 
growth of financial actors, practices, and discourses, and seek to apply this broad 
understanding to particular cases, such as insurance or housing. While providing a 
number of valuable insights, this specific branch of the literature risks diluting the 
analytical clarity of the term by stretching it too thinly. Secondly, this chapter 
examines a narrower and more analytically precise branch of this literature that 
understands financialisation to denote a causal relationship between financial 
expansion and productive stagnation. Pointing to the simultaneous occurrence of 
runaway financial growth and the faltering performance of ‘real’ economic 
                                                        
article titled ‘Why financialization has run amok’, and Rana Foroohar’s 2017 
Guardian article that states: ‘Our economic illness has a name: financialization’.  
5 Different attempts to categorise the financialisation literature have gone about this 
task in distinct ways. See, for example, van Treeck (2009), Lapavitsas (2011), and 
van der Zwan (2014). 
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indicators in various OECD countries since the 1970s, these approaches argue that 
some form of directional causation exists between these dual phenomena. 
Expropriation explanations insist that financial expansion has provoked productive 
stagnation, and crisis resolution explanations posit causality in the opposite 
direction. While these approaches have made a crucial contribution to the literature 
by pointing out that financial excess and general economic underperformance must 
be understood as internally related, and in turn contributed towards a more precise 
definition of financialisation, they share a deeply unsatisfactory understanding of 
the role of states in this process. The third section of this chapter, then, examines 
how expropriation and crisis resolution explanations have integrated state action 
into their accounts. The former explanation has relied on a pluralist state theory, 
whereby financial elites captured the levers of state power, directly or through the 
diffusion of pro-finance ideology, and thus utilised the state to facilitate the 
expropriation of productive capital. The latter employs a functionalist state theory, 
whereby states reacted automatically to the crisis of productive capital by 
deregulating the financial sector and boosting credit expansion. Neither explanation 
leaves significant room for an examination of political and social struggle nor the 
strategising of policy-makers. A small but important exception are the crisis 
resolution accounts put forward by Streeck (2011; 2014) and Krippner (2011), both 
of whom have sought to conceptualise states’ roles in propelling financial expansion 
as a matter of the strategic reconciliation of economic imperatives and legitimacy 
concerns.  
This thesis seeks to contribute to the literature on financialisation understood 
as the simultaneous expansion of finance and stagnation of production, by 
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advancing a novel understanding of the British state’s role in mediating these 
processes. Two important gaps currently exist in this literature. Firstly, there has 
been a distinct lack of archival historiography, meaning that state behaviour tends 
to be explained in either abstract logical terms – with reference to statistical 
correlations between economic variables – or by drawing from secondary sources. 
This thesis will attempt to fill this lacuna by putting forward a detailed historical 
account of key British financial de- and reregulations, in order to examine the 
strategic dimensions of the policy-making processes that fuelled financialisation, 
and thus to overcome the simplistic pluralist/functionalist binary that characterises 
the existing literature. Secondly, while Streeck’s and Krippner’s distinctly strategic 
accounts constitute a welcome improvement upon previous explanations of states’ 
involvement in financialisation, they suffer from significant theoretical deficiencies. 
Streeck’s limited and economistic definition of capitalism leads him to point to 
exogenous factors as the cause of the crisis that in turn provoked financial growth; 
Krippner draws from contradictory accounts in developing a conceptual toolkit to 
examine financialisation; and both accounts fail to outline a coherent theory of the 
state – their subject of analysis. In contrast, this thesis will ground its detailed 
empirical analysis in an internally coherent theory of capitalist society, within which 
financialisation, crisis, and the state are fully integrated, rather than understood as 
exogenous factors. In sum, by filling these methodological and theoretical gaps in 
the existing literature, this thesis will shed new light on the state’s role in mediating 
processes of financial expansion and productive stagnation.  
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‘The financialisation of …’ 
 
As Brett Christophers (2015: 186) argues, if the various accounts of financialisation 
share anything in common, it is ‘perhaps only the hazy conviction that “finance” … 
today enjoys a historically unique significance’. Indeed, Gerald Epstein’s widely 
cited definition casts the analytical net particularly wide: ‘financialization means 
the increasing role of financial motives, financial markets, financial actors and 
financial institutions in the operation of the domestic and international economies’ 
(2005: 3). Manuel Aalbers (2015: 214) broadens this definition further still, by 
conceptualising financialisation as ‘the increasing dominance of financial actors, 
markets, practices, measurements and narratives, at various scales, resulting in a 
structural transformation of economies, firms (including financial institutions), 
states and households’. Furthermore, in many cases, financialisation is considered 
to be one third of the triumvirate, alongside globalisation and neoliberalisation, that 
structures contemporary social order (Christophers, 2015: 183). These 
conceptualisations of financialisation as a loosely defined form of processual 
change in the role of finance, understood as either a material, ideational, or semiotic 
phenomenon, on any number of spatial scales, and related to globalisation and 
neoliberalism in some way, has led to a vast research agenda within the social 
sciences. Scholars have analysed the financialisation of different aspects of the 
social world, whether that be specific industries, governance mechanisms, or 
everyday life.  
Literature on the financialisation of different industries is too vast to list 
exhaustively here, but certain accounts are particularly emblematic of this strand of 
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research. Johnna Montgomerie (2006) examines the financialisation of the US credit 
card industry by focussing on how the development of securitisation has boosted 
the profitability of this sector. By moving ‘receivables’ off the balance sheets of 
companies, this financial innovation allowed ‘loan pools to be re-capitalized, 
lowering the cost of borrowing and increasing revenues from payments on securities 
issued’ (Montgomerie, 2006: 316). Similarly, a number of accounts have analysed 
the financialisation of housing, as mortgage markets have been increasingly 
integrated into global arteries of financial accumulation (Rolnik, 2013; Fernandez 
and Aalbers, 2016). Through the advent of mortgage securitisation, credit scoring, 
and ‘risk-based pricing’, housing has gradually been transformed from a social good 
to a vehicle for financial profit-making (Aalbers, 2008: 148). In addition, there is a 
growing literature addressing the financialisation of food commodity chains (Burch 
and Lawrence, 2013; Clapp, 2014). Jennifer Clapp (2014) argues that the increasing 
trade of financial derivatives linked to food commodities has led to the abstraction 
of the exchange value of foods from their physical forms. This process of 
‘distancing’ has obscured the links between prominent financial actors involved in 
agricultural commodity chains and the ecological damage associated with this 
industry, making it difficult for civil society actors to mount coherent critiques of 
the financialisation of food (ibid).  
A further strand of literature has examined how the advance of 
financialisation has interacted with state governance mechanisms. Financialisation, 
for Hardie (2011: 143), denotes the trading of risk on the performance of a financial 
asset. As bond markets have become increasingly financialised, developing 
economies have faced rising borrowing costs, which in turn has heightened the risk 
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of sovereign debt crises (Hardie, 2011). This position, in which processes of 
financialisation stand opposed to successful state economic management, has been 
resisted by Lagna (2016), who has focussed on how governments pursue statecraft 
strategies through financialised mechanisms. Specifically, Lagna (ibid) focusses on 
how Italian neoliberal policy-makers employed financial derivatives so as to gain 
admission to the European Monetary Union and in turn boost their own political 
power. Similarly, Matthew Watson (2009a) has argued that financialisation is not a 
pure market phenomenon that is imposed upon states, but can also be understood as 
a state-promoted form of economic citizenship. New Labour, he argues, actively 
promoted an ‘asset-based system of welfare’, which required the construction of 
financialised economic agents who could counteract the state’s falling pension 
provisions by utilising their home as a financial asset (ibid).  
A third stream of financialisation research has changed focus from the level 
of business and the state to the sphere of ‘everyday life’. This literature has a 
prominently cultural bent, as it seeks to analyse the manner in which the expansion 
of financial practices amongst non-elite sections of the population has led to 
transformations in the lived experiences of contemporary capitalism. As Paul 
Langley (2004: 554) argued, such scholars understand financialisation less as a 
‘logic’ and more as a ‘set of processes constituted in practice through discourses of 
economy’. This approach emphasises the instability, uncertainty, and unevenness 
of financialisation, rather than characterising it as a coherent and all-encompassing 
stage of capitalism. In his book Performing Capital, Rob Aitken (2007) launched a 
critique of notions of capital as an objective or natural force, and instead examined 
the cultural constitution of capital through everyday practices and discourses. 
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Focussing on finance, Aitken analysed how various strategies employed by US 
banks, businesses, and even government agencies have attempted to draw large 
sections of the population into the realm of private finance, and have specifically 
attempted to construct the notion of US citizen as prudent saver and investor (ibid). 
Leonard Seabrooke (2006) has also utilised an everyday approach to examine how 
the US state attempted to imbricate low income groups into credit networks as a 
strategy to boost the US’ position in global financial markets, while also exploring 
how the involvement of non-elite groups can lend legitimacy to financial systems. 
Switching the focus from a broad concern with non-elite groups to capitalist class 
divisions in particular, Randy Martin, Michael Rafferty, and Dick Bryan (2008) 
have conceptualised financialised capitalism as a sort of contemporary dystopia, in 
which the pressures unleashed by financial innovation have both intensified 
competition between capitals and forced workers to approach their everyday life as 
a balance sheet.  
While the aforementioned approaches to financialisation are diverse, shining 
a light on the expansion of financial practices at the corporate, state, and everyday 
level, they have in general avoided directly linking these processes with a second 
glaring feature of contemporary capitalism in the advanced capitalist world: the 
slowdown of productive growth. The following section will introduce a range of 
approaches that attempt to examine the relationship between financial expansion 
and productive stagnation, and to posit causality between these phenomena, in one 
direction or another.  
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Financial expansion and productive stagnation 
 
The somewhat anxious commentary surrounding the Bank’s increase in interest 
rates on 2 November 2017 may appear exaggerated, considering the rate rose by 
just 0.25 per cent to 0.5 per cent. Yet a broader examination of the fundamentals of 
the British economy provides a stronger basis for trepidation. Britain, in line with 
many industrialised countries, has witnessed falling rates of investment that long 
predate not just the Brexit referendum but also the 2008 financial crisis (Thwaites, 
2015). UK fixed capital investment (excluding banks) as a share of GDP has fallen 
precipitously since the mid-1970s (Jowett and Hardie, 2014: 14); the profit rate of 
non-financial firms has stagnated at a level below even the early 1970s, a time of 
serious profit squeeze (Mejorado and Roman, 2014: 102); the current account of the 
balance of payments has remained in deficit since 1984 (HM Treasury, 2007: 152); 
and GDP growth was one third lower between 1973-2009 than between 1949-73 
(Freeman, 2012). The fact that this lacklustre economic performance has coincided 
with a period of falling interest rates makes the extent of the problem even more 
stark. Indeed, former US Treasury Secretary Larry Summers concisely summarised 
the monetary policy dilemma facing contemporary capitalist economies at the IMF 
Research Conference in 2013: ‘we may well need, in the years ahead, to think about 
how we manage an economy in which the zero nominal interest rate is a chronic and 
systemic inhibitor of economic activity’ (my emphasis). In other words, even ‘free 
money’ has proven insufficient to kick-start a spurt in economic growth. 
This phenomenon, which has manifested itself in several advanced capitalist 
economies, has been attempted to be grasped by various concepts, from discussions 
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of Japan’s ‘Lost Decade(s)’, to ‘Eurosclerosis’, to recent debates amongst economic 
policy-makers and commentators about the possibility that we are living through a 
period of what Alvin Hansen (1939) termed ‘secular stagnation’ (Davies, 2017; 
Backhouse and Boianovsky, 2016). While a variety of explanations abound for this 
continued stagnation, there exists a loose consensus amongst mainstream 
economists concerned with this phenomenon that demographic changes, 
particularly slowing population growth, are a key causal factor (Davidson, 2016). 
However, in contrast, several scholars from across the social science spectrum have 
rebelled against this exogenous explanation, and instead sought to locate the cause 
of this persistent stagnation within the makeup of contemporary capitalism. By 
conceptualising the tremendous growth of global finance since the 1970s as 
internally related to the atrophy of the productive economy, these approaches 
contribute to a more precise definition of financialisation than the accounts 
discussed in the previous section. This understanding of financialisation denotes the 
interrelated development of two phenomena: financial expansion and productive 
stagnation.  
This section will divide this literature into two broad camps, which this 
thesis has termed expropriation and crisis resolution explanations, based on the 
direction of causality posited between these twin phenomena. Expropriation 
explanations emphasise that financial expansion has weakened the productive 
economy, while crisis resolution explanations argue that pre-existing weaknesses 
in the productive economy have spurred financial expansion. The literature does not 
split neatly into expropriation and crisis resolution approaches with zero 
remainders, and in fact certain accounts have drawn from both explanations. 
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Furthermore, the scholars that this thesis assigns to expropriation or crisis 
resolution schools would not necessary self-identify in these terms. Nevertheless, 
this characterisation is a useful and novel heuristic device developed in this thesis, 
because it captures the essence of the debate on the relationship between financial 
expansion and productive stagnation in the existing literature. 
 
Expropriation 
 
The title of Financial Times editor Rana Foroohar’s popular book criticising 
financialisation excellently captures the main thrust of the expropriation approach: 
Makers and Takers: The Rise of Finance and the Fall of American Business 
(Foroohar, 2016). Fundamentally, financialisation is said to constitute the 
expropriation of the makers (‘real economy’ or non-financial firms) by the takers 
(finance capital). This explanation has had a large degree of success in capturing the 
imagination of left and populist political campaigns and movements, due to its 
intuitive appeal following the 2008 financial crisis. Elements of this logic can be 
found in the rhetoric of the Occupy movement and Bernie Sanders’ 2016 campaign 
for Democratic nominee. Yet a cruder and often anti-Semitic incarnation of this 
same explanation also has a presence in far right and right populist movements. This 
can be seen, for instance, in authoritarian Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán’s 
recent declaration of war against a shadowy, financial threat:  
 
We are fighting an enemy that is different from us. Not open, but hiding; 
not straightforward but crafty; not honest but base; not national but 
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international; does not believe in working but speculates with money; does 
not have its own homeland but feels it owns the whole world (Walker, 
2018). 
 
According to literature that draws on the expropriation explanation, the expansion 
of the financial sector, at both national and global scales, has directly undermined 
the non-financial sectors of the economy, resulting in stagnant rates of real 
investment. More specifically, these explanations have tended to focus on 
transformations in corporate behaviour and its impact upon the distribution of 
corporate revenues. Corporate management practices, it is argued, have been 
restructured to serve the principle of shareholder value, whereby returns to 
shareholders must be maximised at the expense of all other objectives. Originally 
developed by agency theorists such as Eugene Fama and Michael Jensen in the 
1970s, shareholder value theory emphasises that corporate managers tend to pursue 
their own selfish ends if they are not exposed to the whip of market discipline (van 
der Zwan, 2014: 107). This inefficiency could be rectified, it was proposed, by 
transferring greater corporate control to shareholders, through a variety of 
mechanisms. Such a transfer of control, expropriation explanations insist, is key to 
understanding the relationship between financial expansion and productive decay. 
Crotty (2000; 2003) argued that it is precisely the ascendance of this 
principle of shareholder value that has contributed to the financialisation of non-
financial corporations and resulted in their growing aversion to long-term fixed 
capital investment. This represented, Callaghan and Höpner (2005) argue, ‘a clash 
of capitalisms’, in which shareholder value oriented capitalism has come to 
predominate at the expense of coordinated varieties of capitalism. The rising threat 
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of hostile takeovers in the 1980s and the use of stock options as the dominant form 
of managerial remuneration has transformed the investment strategies of firms, 
disincentivising investment in productive capacities and incentivising short-term 
measures to keep stock prices rising. In pursuit of this objective, companies 
ploughed retained earnings back into their own stock and increased dividend 
payments to shareholders, draining the reserves available for future investment 
(Stockhammer, 2004; Lazonick, 2011). In addition, Duménil and Levy (2002: 61) 
argue that a large fraction of non-financial corporate profits is paid to financial 
actors in the form of interest, such that ‘the profits pumped out of the productive 
sector of the economy do not return to it’ (see also Jayadev and Epstein, 2007). 
Corporate earnings that were invested became increasingly directed towards short-
term financial assets, such as securitised debt. Income streams based on this interest-
accruing activity began to outpace traditional returns from fixed investment 
(Orhangazi, 2008a). The net result of these developments has been the restructuring 
of the non-financial corporation from ‘an integrated combination of illiquid real 
assets’ to a ‘“portfolio” of liquid subunits that … management must continually 
restructure to maximise the stock price’ (Crotty, 2003: 2). The coincidence of 
financial expansion and productive stagnation, then, can be traced to the role of 
shareholder value in the financialisation of the firm.  
Scholars associated with the British social accounting school have advanced 
a somewhat different interpretation of the relations between shareholder value, 
corporate strategy, and financialisation. These accounts contrast the era of 
‘productionism’ in the 1980s, characterised by product market competition and lean 
production processes, with ‘financialisation’ and the creation of ‘coupon pool 
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capitalism’ in the 1990s (Froud et al., 2000; ibid, 2002). Financialised economies 
are characterised by the existence of shareholder value-driven investors, 
mechanisms to enforce shareholder value objectives, such as hostile takeovers, and 
mechanisms that allow managers to quickly shed labour in order to cut costs (Froud 
et al., 2000: 105). In this context, the trading of bonds and shares in capital markets 
gains a new significance. Rather than simply acting as intermediaries between 
saving households and investing firms, capital markets become ‘a regulator of firm 
and household behaviour and a regulator of macro economic trajectory’ (Froud et 
al., 2002: 126). This approach advises scepticism towards the straightforward causal 
claims of shareholder value accounts that directly link shareholder control with 
declining long-term investment, instead arguing that coupon pool capitalism does 
not always result in an ‘invariant set of consequences’ in all national cases (Froud 
et al., 2006: 4). Nevertheless, more recently, these scholars have more firmly 
emphasised the negative effects of financialisation upon corporate investment, 
citing the perverse implications that shareholder value has had for infrastructural 
investment in the British telecommunications industry (Bowman et al., 2014: 27).  
While expropriation explanations share a common identification of the 
financialised pursuit of shareholder value with falling rates of long-term fixed 
investment, there is less consensus on the cause of shareholder value’s ascendance 
in the first place. Engelbert Stockhammer (2004; 2016) has conceptualised this 
transformation in corporate behaviour by drawing on the Post-Keynesian theory of 
the firm. At the heart of this theory is the notion that corporate accumulation 
strategies are shaped by a struggle between the managerial and shareholding classes. 
Corporations are not driven by competition to maximise profits, but rather managers 
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‘retain a large degree of autonomy’ and thus investment decisions ‘are shaped by 
social conventions, mass psychology and the historically specific institutional forms 
of the firm’ (Stockhammer, 2016: 368). While shareholders do have a single-
minded interest in profits, managers ‘aspire to power and prestige, that might be 
expressed in high market share and fast growth, luxurious offices and many 
subordinates’ (ibid, 2004: 724). The balance of power between these two classes 
determines whether nonfinancial firms will adopt long-term, growth-oriented 
strategies, or short-term, share price maximising strategies. In the last forty years, 
the embedded liberal fetters on the shareholding class have been gradually repealed, 
allowing them to subordinate management’s plurality of interests to financial 
market-oriented strategies (ibid). The back and forth motion described above almost 
invokes Polanyi’s double movement, but rather than the market battling society, the 
rentier’s thirst for profit is pitted against the varied desires of egotistical managers. 
Stockhammer implicitly adopts Berle and Means’ (1991) classic analysis of the 
corporation originally published in 1932, while reversing their normative 
conclusions. It is the concentration of power in the hands of shareholders, not 
managers, that constitutes the social threat – in this case by depressing 
growth. While Stockhammer is vague on the precise historical details of this 
transformation, it is generally associated with institutional firm-level changes that 
allowed for hostile takeovers and stock market linked pay incentives for managers 
(2004: 726). Yet the origin of these institutional changes is not explained in turn.  
Lazonick and O’Sullivan (2002) have advanced a more historically sensitive 
explanation of the rise of shareholder value. In the postwar period, US corporations 
operated on a ‘retain and invest’ basis, whereby profits were retained, instead of 
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distributed to shareholders, and invested in research and development, fixed capital, 
and other long-term productive ventures. However, in the 1960s and 1970s, these 
firms began to grow too large, with the result that management became increasingly 
divorced from the actual production process and thus lacked the technical know-
how to make informed investment decisions. In addition, Japanese competition 
began to undermine the market positions of these oversized US firms. Japanese 
firms proved formidable in the field of mass production, due to ‘development and 
utilisation of integrated skill bases that were broader and deeper than those in which 
their American competitors had invested’ (ibid: 13). This factor, combined with the 
rise of institutional investors and the gnawing effect of inflation on the profits of 
large financial companies, led to a series of transformations. Corporate strategy 
shifted from ‘retain and invest’ to ‘downsize and distribute’, whereby companies’ 
labour forces were reduced and profits increasingly distributed amongst 
shareholders. Lazonick (2011: 22) argues that while US firms could have responded 
to Japanese competition by redoubling their efforts to innovate and restructure 
production, ‘there was no commitment on the part of those who managed US 
industrial corporations or the Republican Administrations that ruled in the 1980s to 
invest in the new capabilities and opportunities required… to reestablish a regime 
of reasonably equitable and stable economic growth’. Thus, we are left with a 
tautology: preferences for long-term investment fell by the wayside because of the 
lack of commitment to long-term investment. Shareholder value is both the 
explicandum and explicans.  
Finally, several Marxist and Post-Keynesian economists have examined the 
rise of shareholder value and the financialisation of nonfinancial firms as 
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inextricably linked to the onset of neoliberalism. Gérald Duménil and Dominique 
Lévy (2004) begin their narrative with the structural crisis of the 1970s, which was 
characterised by perilously falling rates of profit. This crisis was rectified, they 
insist, by a combination of capital strategies, including wage cuts, decreases in state 
social spending, and technological improvements. However, despite a recovery in 
the rate of profit, investment and capital accumulation remained depressed. This, 
Duménil and Lévy argue, is due to a lack of retained profits. The case of the missing 
retained profits is solved by highlighting the role of financiers in extracting rents 
from productive capital in the form of interest payments and dividends: ‘No other 
feature of neoliberalism shows so clearly that its ruling classes are parasitic’ 
(Duménil & Lévy, 2002: 62). Finance – defined as ‘major financial institutions and 
the superior and active segments of the dominant classes’ (Duménil & Lévy, 2004: 
208) – ‘used the crisis of the 1970s on an ideological and political level to launch a 
kind of society reflecting its image’ (ibid: 17). The neoliberal revolution, as such, 
was constituted by a parasitic financial coup against ‘workers, company managers, 
those responsible for economic and social policies in governments, and public and 
semipublic institutions, both national and international’ (ibid: 9). Similarly, Thomas 
Palley (2013: 1) claims that financialisation is a form of neoliberalism, characterised 
by the ‘domination of the macro economy and economic policy by financial sector 
interests’. Yet, in contrast to Duménil and Lévy, Palley does not simply associate 
financialisation with the material interests of financial capital, but rather conceives 
of ‘laissez-faire financial ideology’ as an enduring norm that is relatively 
autonomous from particular financial actors (ibid: 7). The rise of financialisation, 
then, must be understood as an ideational shift amongst economists and policy-
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makers – a shift provoked by the dislocations of the 1970’s inflation crisis. These 
accounts, as such, insist that the present financial expropriation of productive capital 
was arrived at through two mechanisms essential to neoliberal restructuring: the 
material and political struggle by financial rentiers for hegemony, and the diffusion 
of ideological norms that favour financial over productive capital.  
Expropriation explanations emphasise that financial capital has 
systematically expropriated the wealth produced by productive capital through 
mechanisms related to shareholder value and rent-seeking. The origins of this 
parasitic state of affairs have been explained in a variety of ways, from a focus on 
firm-level struggles between managers and shareholders (Stockhammer, 2004), to 
the inability of US firms to compete with Japanese rivals (Lazonick and O’Sullivan, 
2002), to the global capture of power by financial elites and the diffusion of pro-
finance economic norms (Duménil and Lévy, 2002; Palley, 2013). The crisis of the 
1970s plays a role in certain expropriation accounts, chiefly as a moment of severe 
economic, political, and ideological dislocation, after which a new coherent material 
and ideational framework of power relations was reconstructed – namely, one 
dominated by financial capital. Yet the following explanations, termed crisis 
resolution, have a different conception of the role of crisis in the relationship 
between financial growth and productive atrophy. The crisis of the postwar period, 
these accounts insist, was not simply a contingent event or exogenous shock, but 
was rooted in a deep contradiction in the prevailing form of capital accumulation. 
This contradiction was resolved, in either a lasting or fleeting manner according to 
different perspectives, precisely through the expansion of the financial sector.  
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Crisis resolution 
 
In their simplest form, crisis resolution explanations are diametrically opposed to 
expropriation accounts. Rather than financial expansion hindering productive 
capital accumulation, underlying problems with productive capital accumulation 
have given rise to spiralling financial growth. This latter explanation has rather 
unsettling political consequences, as it suggests that attempts to quash contemporary 
financial excesses – through, for example, a shift in corporate ideology away from 
shareholder value, or the imposition of a strict regime of financial regulations – 
would not necessarily reignite productive investment and accumulation, but instead 
reveal the unresolved contradictions in the productive sector, which in turn must be 
addressed. For this reason, crisis resolution explanations have achieved 
considerably less cachet amongst progressive social and political campaigns in the 
wake of the 2008 financial crisis. While such explanations share a common causal 
narrative, there is significant divergence regarding the definition of the underlying 
crisis, and the sustainability of financial expansion as a resolution.  
Arrighi (1994) was amongst the first political economists to employ the term 
‘financialisation’. Concerned with capitalism’s ‘longue durée’, Arrighi attempted 
to grasp the macro-historical cycles that characterised capitalist development from 
the early modern period on. Far from constituting an anomalous phenomenon, 
financialisation should be understood as a recurring process that coincides with the 
decline of a hegemonic capitalist power. In fact, four cycles of capitalist hegemony, 
decline, and financialisation have occurred thus far, namely the Genoese, Dutch, 
British, and US cycles (ibid: 6). During periods of hegemonic decline, the world 
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capitalist system is cast into crisis, due to the overaccumulation of capital and 
‘intense interstate competition for mobile capital’ (Arrighi and Silver, 1999: 31). 
Drawing on Ferdinand Braudel, Arrighi and Beverly Silver (1999: 32) argue that 
capital reacts by ‘shedding its commodity form in favor of its money form’: 
nonfinancial corporations respond to the dearth of profitable productive investment 
opportunities by investing in financial assets, which offer higher rates of return 
(Orhangazi, 2008b). This results in a system-wide growth of financial markets, 
beyond the borders of the declining hegemon. While financialisation appears to 
resolve the crisis by ‘temporarily inflating the power of the declining hegemonic 
state’, it also creates new instabilities, as hoarding and speculation increase the 
likelihood of financial crises, and rising inequality sets the stage for political 
resistance and social upheaval (Arrighi and Silver, 1999: 33). Ultimately, 
financialisation marks the ‘autumn’ of a hegemonic cycle, and coincides with the 
transfer of hegemony to a new state or alliance of states. Thus, according to Arrighi, 
financial expansion is a systemic mechanism that results from the cyclical and 
recurrent hegemonic crises that are hardwired into capitalist development. The crisis 
emphatically originates in the productive sector and in turn provokes a flight of 
capital to the financial sector, stimulating the latter’s growth.  
Building upon Arrighi’s insights, regulation theory and the Social Structures 
of Accumulation (SSA) approach have attempted to conceptualise financialisation 
as part of a new regime of accumulation that emerged to resolve the crisis of 
Fordism. Regulation approaches examine the ‘ensembles of complementary 
economic and extra-economic mechanisms and practices which enable relatively 
stable accumulation to occur over relatively long periods’ (Jessop, 1997: 503). Such 
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ensembles constitute ‘regimes of accumulation’ or SSAs – coherent economic, 
legal, institutional, and cultural frameworks within which capital accumulation can 
proceed. However, despite the relative durability of such regimes, they suffer from 
internal contradictions, which lead to generalised crises and their supersession by a 
new accumulation regime. For these approaches, the expansion of the financial 
sector in the 1970s constituted one aspect of the resolution of the crisis of the Fordist 
accumulation regime, characterised by slowing productivity and accelerating 
inflation (Boyer, 2000: 112). As William K. Tabb (2010: 148) argues, the 
breakdown of Fordist productive accumulation pushed investors ‘deeper into an 
array of financial speculations made potentially quite profitable by such departures 
as floating exchange rates and rapid growth in new centers of the semi-periphery’. 
Indeed ‘confronted with limited investment opportunities that are viewed as being 
sufficiently profitable …  capital looks for highly liquid capital placements’ (Becker 
et al., 2010: 227). Such financial developments, David Kotz (2011) insists, 
constitute one dimension of the contemporary ‘neoliberal SSA’, which is also 
marked by free trade, economic deregulation, privatisation, regressive taxation, and 
labour flexibilisation. Against Duménil and Lévy (2002), Kotz (2011) argues that 
neoliberalism was not provoked by a coup by financial elites, but rather 
neoliberalism – itself an attempt to fix the crisis of Fordism – unleashed the financial 
growth that had previously been held in check by postwar regulations. While 
regulationist and SSA accounts do highlight the contradictions inherent to the 
contemporary financialised neoliberal regime, by pointing in particular to financial 
instability (Boyer, 2000: 112), they emphasise the overall coherence and durability 
of financialisation as a resolution to the crisis of the preceding regime.  
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A third collection of approaches, employing the terms ‘privatised 
Keynesianism’ or ‘house price Keynesianism’, similarly identify financial 
expansion as a remedy to the breakdown of the postwar growth model (Crouch, 
2009; Hay et al., 2008; Watson, 2010). Yet rather than emphasising capital’s escape 
to the realm of financial assets in lieu of profitable productive investment 
opportunities, such accounts instead focus on consumption and aggregate demand. 
The central contradiction of capitalist economies, according to Colin Crouch (2009: 
320), is the need to reconcile ‘the uncertainties and instabilities of a capitalist 
economy with… [the] need for confident mass consumers’. During the postwar era, 
the Keynesian model emerged to suspend this contradiction ‘through demand 
management processes activated via the transfer payments system of the welfare 
state … The Foucauldian ‘fear of the future’ was therefore mitigated’ (Watson, 
2010: 419). This consensus broke down with the inflationary crisis of the 1970s and 
was replaced by an increasingly fragile political economy, in which capital mobility 
and anti-inflationary measures were sacrosanct. In this context, a new policy 
framework emerged to provide stable consumption, which Crouch labels privatised 
Keynesianism. This consisted chiefly of the extension of credit instruments to 
working people and the extension of derivatives to elites (Crouch, 2009: 390). The 
stimulation of demand through debt (hence Keynesianism) was carried out not by 
the state, but by private individuals (hence privatised). Watson (2010), alternatively, 
places specific emphasis on the role of homes as assets in stimulating demand. 
House price Keynesianism signifies the growth model whereby rising loan-to-value 
mortgages boosted consumptive demand, premised on the assumption of rising 
house prices resulting in capital gains for homeowners. Such a growth strategy was 
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actively encouraged by New Labour, who attempted to construct a new form of 
economic subjectivity that prioritised home ownership, resulting in a ‘reinvent[ion 
of] the private space of the home as part of the public space of the national economy’ 
(Watson, 2009a; Watson, 2010: 420). These approaches eschew the grand historical 
claims of Arrighi and the emphasis on structural coherence typical of regulation and 
SSA approaches, instead contending that the expansion of lending to households 
constituted an imperfect and fragile resolution to the crisis of postwar 
Keynesianism.  
A last set of crisis resolution explanations place even less emphasis on the 
coherence and general functionality of financialisation. Redefining ‘resolution’ as 
‘postponement’, such approaches insist that while financial expansion was 
stimulated by productive stagnation, such financial growth has only temporarily 
alleviated the enduring crisis facing productive capital, rather than stabilising or 
fixing it. Within the Marxist-Kaleckian tradition, Paul Baran and Paul Sweezy 
(1966) developed the theory of monopoly capitalism – a phase of capitalist 
development in which production becomes dominated by a few massive firms. Such 
is the extraordinary output by these economies of scale that demand struggles to 
match supply, creating a tendency towards capacity underutilisation. Vast swathes 
of fixed capital lie unused, which constructs powerful barriers to market entry and 
new investment, resulting in both massive profits (for the monopolies) and general 
stagnation (Sweezy, 1997). In the face of dwindling investment opportunities, 
capitalists began to shift their ‘immense surpluses’ into financial assets, while 
financial institutions responded with myriad new financial instruments (Bellamy 
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Foster, 2007). As Harry Magdoff & Sweezy (1985) write, in a bold statement of the 
causal relationship between financial expansion and productive stagnation:  
 
There is no reason whatever to assume that if you could deflate the 
financial structure, the talent and energy now employed there would move 
into productive pursuits. They would simply become unemployed and add 
to the country’s already huge reservoir of idle human and material 
resources... What growth the economy has experienced in recent years … 
has been almost entirely due to the financial explosion (quoted in Bellamy 
Foster, 2007: 4). 
 
Against the monopoly capital thesis, a number of approaches insist that the 
crisis of the 1970s was provoked not by too much profit, but rather by too little. 
Advancing an idiosyncratic theory of crisis, Robert Brenner (2006) argues that 
intense competition between the US, Japan, and West Germany in the postwar 
period, combined with massive industrial excess capacity that deterred new 
investments, brought down the average profit rate. In opposition, orthodox Marxist 
economists have instead explained dwindling prosperity with reference to the ‘law 
of the tendency of the rate of profit to fall’ that is outlined in volume three of Marx’s 
Capital. According to this reading, falling profitability is the result of a rise in the 
value of fixed capital compared to labour power, which created a downward 
pressure on commodity prices (Kliman, 2012; Shaikh, 2011). Faced with a declining 
profit rate on real investments, capital reacted by fleeing to the realm of financial 
speculation (Kliman, 2012: 21-22). This results in what Samir Amin (2003: 43) 
terms ‘financial hypertrophy’, whereby capital markets inflate, there is a 
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proliferation of financial instruments, a growing financial influence over corporate 
decision-making, and the simultaneous globalisation of these processes. 
Furthermore, Anwar Shaikh (2011) argues that not only did capital gravitate 
towards the financial sector due to its higher profitability, but the state actively 
exacerbated this process. By continually lowering interest rates after the Volcker 
shocks, the US Federal Reserve expected to discourage the hoarding of money on 
which to earn interest, and to boost active investment. As such, they increased the 
difference between the rate of profit and the rate of interest – what Marx called the 
‘rate of profit of enterprise’ – fuelling the credit boom (ibid: 46). Fundamentally, 
and common to all the aforementioned approaches, this financial expansion simply 
papers over the cracks in the underlying productive structure, without offering a 
lasting solution. 
Within the ‘postponement’ subsection of crisis resolution literature, there is 
a final strand. This consists of approaches that conceptualise financial growth as a 
mechanism to postpone not just the economic symptoms of the underlying crisis, 
but also to assuage the social conflict and political upheaval arising from the 
breakdown of capital accumulation. Streeck (2011; 2014) suggests that ‘democratic 
capitalism’ – the attempt to reconcile the governing principles of marginal 
productivity and social need – is a contradiction in terms. Yet it is a contradiction 
that can be postponed temporarily. For Streeck, inflation, public indebtedness, and 
private credit expansion are not simply the results of crisis, but also constitute 
political strategies to alleviate crises by ‘pulling forward future resources into [the] 
present’ (ibid, 2011: 12). Financial expansion is thus not conceived of as a solely 
functional response to productive stagnation, but also as a mechanism to assuage 
 58 
the social conflict arising from this crisis. Similarly, Krippner (2011) has analysed 
US financial expansion precisely as a political strategy to allay social unrest. 
Focusing primarily on the development of the US Federal Reserve’s monetary 
policy and financial deregulation from the 1970s to the 2000s, she explores the 
motives behind the US state’s fostering of financial growth. Rather than 
highlighting a coherent ideology of ‘Reaganomics’, Krippner insists that state actors 
only arrived at monetarism and deregulation after a long period of trial and error. 
She concludes that policy-makers were motivated by two overriding (and linked) 
concerns: firstly, to suspend the impact of long-term economic stagnation by 
temporarily alleviating the struggle for increasingly scarce resources through credit 
expansion; and secondly, to do so in as covert and depoliticised a manner as 
possible. This approach is perhaps the most nuanced form of crisis resolution 
explanation: history is not neatly segmented into ideal-type regimes of accumulation 
or SSAs, nor is financial expansion merely an automatic mechanism triggered by 
economic crisis. Instead, financial expansion is conceived of as a political strategy, 
without being necessarily coherent, to delay the myriad problems arising from 
stagnating capital accumulation.  
Crisis resolution explanations insist that productive stagnation has resulted 
in financial expansion, not vice versa. Beyond this basic premise, there is a 
significant degree of variation. While Arrighi and regulationist and SSA scholars 
point to financialisation as heralding a new structured form of accumulation, 
provoked by the breakdown of postwar Fordism, privatised and house price 
Keynesianism approaches focus on the role of private debt-fuelled demand stimulus 
in constituting a unique growth model. In contrast, several accounts characterise the 
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aforementioned explanations as wishful thinking, by arguing that what appears to 
be a functioning (albeit fragile) financialised accumulation regime is merely a 
delaying mechanism to postpone the underlying crisis of productive capital – and, 
others insist, the social and political fallout that such a crisis entails. Nevertheless, 
despite the various important insights provided by both expropriation and crisis 
resolution explanations of financialisation, understood as the relationship between 
financial expansion and productive stagnation, they share one common 
shortcoming: a systematic neglect of the constitutive role of states in this process. 
The following section will demonstrate the extent of this foundational deficiency as 
it exists in various strands of financialisation literature.  
 
 
Financialisation and the state 
 
Van der Zwan’s criticism of the everyday finance approach’s conceptualisation of 
the state also applies to both the expropriation and crisis resolution explanations 
detailed above. While these accounts ‘consider the state complicit in 
financialization processes … their work lacks an analysis of the different interests, 
motivations and strategies behind this political agenda’ (van der Zwan, 2014: 114). 
The state does not simply need to be ‘brought back in’ (Evans et al., 1985; Helleiner, 
1995). In fact, these explanations consider state action to be a crucial mechanism 
through which financial expansion and productive stagnation are causally related; 
either via financial de- and reregulation, monetary policy, or as a lender of last resort 
to the banking sector. Rather, the role of the state in financialisation is implicit but 
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under-theorised. State action in furthering the ballooning of the financial sector is 
explained in either pluralist or functionalist terms; that is, the state is conceived of 
as either a mere conduit for different elite factions, or as a reflexive, automatic 
regulator of capital accumulation. In both cases, little space is left for an analysis of 
the political and strategic dimensions of state behaviour in relation to 
financialisation.  
Expropriation explanations of the state’s role in financialisation have been 
resoundingly pluralist and instrumentalist. This theoretical tendency appears to 
derive from this approach’s understanding of financialisation as a process driven 
primarily by finance capitalists. The state is understood as another instrument 
wielded by these financial elites in their expropriation of productive capital in the 
neoliberal period. This ‘capture’ of the reins of state power was effected in two 
ways: directly, through political lobbying; and indirectly, through the propagation 
of pro-finance ideas. The ‘radical deregulation’ of the 1970s and 1980s, Crotty 
(2009: 564) argues, was ‘pushed by financial institutions and justified by efficient 
financial market theory’. Duménil and Lévy (2004: 69) are even more explicit, 
labelling US Federal Reserve Chairman Paul Volcker’s 1979 drastic interest rate 
increase as a ‘coup’ to restore ‘the hegemony of finance’: ‘One should not see here 
the hand of a mysterious market, but, in fact, a centralized decision, a deliberate 
policy’. Palley (2013: 7) differs from Duménil and Lévy in this respect, insisting 
that financial deregulation ‘was not part of a grand plan’. Instead, it was the ‘laissez-
faire financial ideology’ associated with the ascendant financial elite that created a 
political climate favourable to deregulation (ibid: 8). The state, as such, is conceived 
of as a more or less passive vehicle for specific elite interests, depending on the 
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balance of class forces, or as a receptacle for economic ideologies. Despite the 
boldness of these claims of state capture, there has been a dearth of empirical 
evidence provided in support.  
Several accounts have taken steps to bolster these claims with historical 
argumentation, with specific attention paid to the UK case. An important early 
intervention, in this regard, was made by Frank Longstreth (1979), who argued that 
it was important to decompose the capitalist class into its component fractions when 
examining state behaviour. ‘[T]he state can be, and in the case of Britain has been, 
dominated by a particular fraction of the dominant class’, Longstreth (ibid: 160) 
proposed, ‘which by no means exercises power consistently in the general interest 
of the dominant class taken as a whole’. This fraction was identified generally as 
financial capital, and specifically the City. Explicitly drawing from Longstreth’s 
work, Leila Talani (2012) advances a more historically informed expropriation 
account of the British state’s role in financialisation. The City’s ‘institutional nexus 
with the Bank of England and the Treasury’, Talani (2012: 65-6) claims, has 
resulted in state policy that favours the British financial sector, resulting in ‘the 
definitive submission of productive capital to financial capital’. Similarly, Andrew 
Baker (1999) attempts to lend more precision to neo-Gramscian theories of state 
transformation through an analysis of the British Treasury’s and Bank’s penetration 
by internationally mobile capital. The British state’s deregulatory agenda, Baker 
(ibid: 84-6) argues, is best explained by reference to the ‘reconfiguration of the 
social basis of the state’, whereby groups such as the CBI were ‘increasingly 
excluded from policy discussions’ at the expense of City institutions. Perhaps the 
most detailed analysis of the manner through which financial capital has come to 
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expropriate productive capital through the mechanism of British state policy has 
been provided by Aaron Davis and Catherine Walsh (2016; 2017). Drawing on 
interview and archival data, they argue that the state’s pro-finance stance in the 
1980s was a constitutive element of the City’s ‘slow, staged coup’ against domestic 
industry (Davis and Walsh, 2016: 679). The ‘exogenous shocks’ of the 1976 IMF 
bailout and 1979 Conservative victory led to a change in both the Treasury and DTI: 
‘senior ministerial positions in the Treasury were taken by a succession of 
politicians with City backgrounds and/or networks’, while the DTI was essentially 
demoted within macroeconomic policy-making (ibid: 36). The result was that the 
state ‘actively organized the economy according to a particular financialized 
economic epistemological framework’, and thus ‘its interventions were in favour of 
global finance and financial elites and against national industry and industrial elites’ 
(ibid: 45).  
If expropriation explanations have smuggled messy state strategising out of 
the analysis through a pluralistic vision of policy-making, crisis resolution 
explanations have done so by emphasising the functional role of the state in 
automatically facilitating capital accumulation. Just as these approaches tend to 
view capitalist order as a jigsaw puzzle in which different pieces fit more or less 
snugly, the state is understood as the rational referee of this game, intervening to 
erase obstacles to capitalist reproduction. In the face of the crisis of productive 
capital, capitalist states acted instinctively to provide escape routes to more 
profitable investment opportunities through financial deregulation, favourable 
monetary policy, and measures that would unleash financial capital more broadly. 
In the process, states themselves have been transformed, with their various agencies 
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and functions becoming streamlined to the needs of the new pattern of financial 
capital accumulation. Bellamy Foster (2007: 6) articulates this position in clear 
terms, by arguing that the ‘role of the capitalist state was transformed to meet the 
new imperative of financialization’. Similarly, Tabb (2010) argues that states have 
automatically morphed to form one piece of the broader financialised SSA jigsaw: 
‘Neoliberalism is globally coherent … [T]he new dispensation rejected previous 
entitlement presumptions of welfare state provisioning and the regulatory role and 
participation of the state in favor of deregulation, contracting out and privatization’. 
For Crouch (2009: 388) too, advanced capitalist states deregulated finance because 
it was functional to the formation of a new privatised Keynesian model; and those 
peripheral states that resisted had such policies ‘imposed as conditions for assistance 
from or membership of such international bodies as the International Monetary 
Fund, the World Bank, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD) or the European Union’. Again, such claims are supported 
with relatively little historical evidence.  
Nevertheless, certain crisis resolution explanations have put forth 
significant historical accounts of the state’s role in financialisation, with a particular 
focus on the US. Arrighi (1994: 326) argues that the Reagan administration sought 
to respond to its declining productive hegemony by establishing the US as the global 
centre for ‘privately controlled world money’, through a variety of policy measures. 
These included the ‘Volcker shock’ interest rate hike combined with a spate of 
financial deregulations, designed to attract mobile capital, and the expansion of 
government debt, linked to an escalation of the Cold War with the USSR (ibid: 326-
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8). Brenner (2006: 276) too argues that as the US manufacturing sector continued 
to founder in the 1970s: 
 
the late Carter and especially the Reagan administrations sought to make 
up for lost time. They moved decisively toward financial deregulation, 
breaking down hitherto existing barriers that confined financial institutions 
to specialized functional and geographic spheres. They also adopted a 
series of policies designed to raise the rate of return on financial activity 
… The Reagan regime, in its early years, could hardly have catered more 
directly to the needs of financiers. 
 
More specifically, Volcker’s monetarist experiment in the early 1980s, alongside 
financial liberalisation and corporate tax breaks, constituted part of an intentional 
policy ‘to detonate a major restructuring of the US economy’ that would lead to ‘a 
reallocation of means of production out of industry into financial services’, among 
other things (ibid: 271). The state, according to this interpretation, is a cold, rational 
watchdog of capital accumulation, which acted mechanically to rescue the ailing 
productive sector through the facilitation of financial largess.  
Nevertheless, the final variety of crisis resolution explanations – 
exemplified by Krippner (2011) and Streeck (2011; 2014) – has eschewed both the 
pluralist and functionalist traps by advancing an account of the state’s role in 
financialisation that brings political struggle and strategic considerations to the fore. 
Streeck (2011: 10) argues that the ‘post-war settlement between labour and capital’, 
constituted by a growing welfare state, free collective bargaining, and Keynesian 
demand management, began to fall apart at the seams in the late 1960s due to the 
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irreconcilable contradiction between the profit motive and democracy. States in 
capitalist democracies found it politically impossible to contain rising wage 
demands by allowing unemployment to rise, and thus instead crafted monetary 
policy so as to allow accelerating inflation to artificially inflate corporate profits and 
thus delay the necessary restructuring. Yet this pacification strategy became 
unsustainable as inflation spiralled out of control, provoking the monetarist penance 
unleashed by Volcker and Thatcher in the early 1980s. In place of inflation, states 
expanded public debt as a strategy to reconcile the social conflict arising from 
productive stagnation by ‘introduc[ing] resources into the distributional conflicts of 
the time that had not yet in fact been produced’ (ibid: 14). Finally, following the 
exhaustion of the strategy of rising public indebtedness, states boosted private credit 
and debt through policies of financial deregulation, in order to ‘make future 
resources available for securing present social peace’ (ibid: 20). In a similar manner, 
Krippner (2011: 140) insists that US state action lay at the heart of the process of 
financialisation:  
 
The state faced three interrelated difficulties as the era of post-war 
abundance came to an end: a social crisis associated with increased 
distributional conflict as growth slowed, a fiscal crisis that resulted from 
policymakers’ attempts to meet proliferating demands with ever more 
limited resources, and a legitimation crisis that reflected sinking public 
confidence. 
 
The US state strategised to delay this unfolding crisis by pursuing domestic 
financialisation and a transformation in monetary policy, which ‘removed internal 
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and external constraints on the expansion of credit in the US economy’ (ibid: 139). 
Facing demands from various sectors of society for increasingly scarce resources, 
this strategy of boosting credit expansion appeared to policy-makers as a 
depoliticised mechanism that could postpone economic catastrophe while 
protecting state legitimacy.  
In sum, both expropriation and (the majority of) crisis resolution 
explanations of the state’s involvement in financialisation suffer from fundamental 
shortcomings. The former advances a pluralist approach to the state, which 
conceptualises policy outcomes as a reflection of the warring social factions 
attempting to capture state power. The latter understands state behaviour as a 
functional, automatic response to blockages in the accumulation of capital, thus 
conceptualising the state as a superstructural functionary of the capitalist system. 
Yet a small number of crisis resolution approaches – exemplified by Streeck and 
Krippner – fundamentally reconceptualise the role of the state in mediating the 
dynamics of productive stagnation and financial expansion. Rather than acting as 
an empty vessel steered by class fractions or an unthinking regulator of capital 
accumulation, the state is acknowledged as a fundamentally political body that must 
balance both economic imperatives and legitimacy considerations – resulting in 
various strategies aimed at reconciling these often contradictory objectives. 
 
Towards a new reading  
 
This thesis will seek to contribute to Streeck’s and Krippner’s innovative accounts 
by further exploring the role of the state in mediating the dual processes of financial 
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expansion and productive stagnation. This will be achieved by addressing two key 
gaps – methodological and theoretical – in the existing literature.  
Regarding the role of the state in financialisation, this literature suffers from 
a methodological shortcoming, namely a lack of detailed historiography. The 
majority of scholars writing on this topic – from both expropriation and crisis 
resolution perspectives – have relied on simplified theoretical schemas, for example 
Stockhammer’s account of the manager versus shareholder tug-of-war, statistical 
correlations, say between profit rates and rates of fixed investment (Duménil and 
Lévy, 2002), and macro-historical analyses that draw chiefly from secondary 
sources (Arrighi, 1994; Brenner, 2006). With regards to individual accounts, this 
methodological one-sidedness is curious but understandable: no single intervention 
can cover all ground. Yet regarding the literature as a whole, it is a debilitating 
shortcoming that has left the literature at somewhat of an impasse, as none of the 
approaches have been able to conclusively support their argument with detailed 
historiography. This is partly why the state’s role in financialisation has been 
theorised in simple pluralist or functionalist terms: the intricacies of the policy-
making process have been obscured by the bird’s eye analysis. As such, this thesis’ 
first contribution to the literature is chiefly methodological. By providing a forensic 
archival analysis of the decision-making processes that resulted in key British 
financial de- and reregulations, this thesis will follow Krippner’s lead in shedding 
new historical light on the state mechanisms that mediated the processes of financial 
expansion and productive stagnation. This in turn will provide a clearer picture of 
the direction of causality between these twin phenomena.  
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Theoretically, this thesis will build on the exceptional research put forward 
by Streeck and Krippner on the contested, political, and strategic nature of the state’s 
role in financialisation, and thus contribute to the transcendence of the 
pluralist/functionalist binary that marks the existing literature. Yet, crucially, this 
thesis will also seek to correct for Streeck’s and Krippner’s unsatisfactory 
theoretical grounding. In addition to their sensitivity to political strategy and their 
refusal to write struggle out of the history of financialisation, these works are also 
fundamentally characterised by their theoretical eclecticism. Streeck (2014: xv) 
admittedly ‘travel[s] light in terms of theory’, yet nevertheless draws inspiration 
from a variety of approaches. In Buying Time, his argument begins by way of a 
sympathetic critique of Frankfurt School theories of legitimation crises, particularly 
those put forth by Jürgen Habermas and Claus Offe. Capitalism indeed entered a 
legitimation crisis in the 1970s, Streeck argues, yet it was capital and not the 
working class that ceased to conceive of the postwar compromise as legitimate (ibid: 
21). Capital, for Streeck, is not a social relation, but is instead a concrete class made 
up of agents defined by their source of income. Drawing next from Michał Kalecki’s 
theory of political business cycles, Streeck (2014: 21) claims it was capital that 
registered its dissatisfaction with the postwar encroachment of democratic 
mechanisms into the private, profit-making sphere. Crises, as such, can be explained 
without reference to the inner workings of capital accumulation itself, but rather by 
pointing to the back and forth struggle between the profit motive and its nemesis: 
democracy. Despite his attempt to move away from economistic crisis explanations, 
Streeck reproduces mainstream economics’ definition of crises as essentially 
exogenous to capital itself, in a similar manner to Ellen Meiksins Wood (1995).  
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The broad thrust of Krippner’s argument, on the other hand, takes inspiration 
from Karl Polanyi’s widely cited dictum ‘laissez-faire was planned’ (2001: 147), in 
that she too insists that financialisation was in many respects a state-facilitated 
project. Yet Krippner is even more ambivalent than Streeck about the precise nature 
of the crisis that financialisation was a reaction too. The crisis of the late postwar 
period, she insists, was characterised by ‘declining affluence’, which manifested 
itself as a social, fiscal, and legitimation crisis (2011: 104). Such dwindling 
affluence is in turn explained by reference to Glyn et al.’s ‘profit squeeze’ thesis 
(1990), whereby the growing bargaining power of workers undermined the profit 
margins of corporations, and Brenner’s ‘investment overhang’ thesis detailed earlier 
in this chapter (2006). Such explanations are mutually incompatible, as Brenner 
(2006) himself points out, yet Krippner does not explore this. Moreover, in setting 
up a framework through which to examine the state’s role in financialisation, 
Krippner displays further ambivalence towards the nuances of the literature. In 
utilising the concept of depoliticisation to explain financial deregulation, she fails 
to differentiate between the broader depoliticisation literature (Flinders and Buller, 
2006; Kuzemko, 2016) and the specific strand that roots the concept in Open 
Marxist state theory (Burnham, 2001; Rogers, 2009). In fact, neither Krippner nor 
Streeck attempt to advance a theory of the state, settling instead for circumstantial 
explanations for state behaviour in particular instances, which are nevertheless very 
compelling.  
In contrast, this thesis will outline an internally consistent and conceptually 
rich state theory through which to understand the archival findings on the British 
state’s role in propelling financialisation. By drawing from the value-form 
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interpretation of Marx’s mature writings, this thesis will examine the strategic 
character of state action within a series of objective limitations – limitations that are 
constituted not simply by the power of different sociological groupings within 
society, but by the peculiar form that wealth assumes in capitalist society, namely 
value. This thesis will thus ground the nuanced empirical analysis in a 
conceptualisation of capitalism that neither relies on appeals to exogenous factors 
nor bases itself upon contradictory theories.  
In addition to addressing interdisciplinary work on financialisation, this 
thesis’ theoretical and empirical contributions will have direct relevance for IPE 
literature on state/market relations and neoliberal financial regulatory change, as 
explained in Chapter 1. While the notion that states and markets are mutually-
constitutive spheres of social activity has become quite commonplace in IPE, the 
value-form approach pushes this insight further. While both state and market 
activities together constitute the full structure of capitalist social relations, these 
same relations take on a rhythmic development pattern that is independent from the 
conscious actions of any actors. Due to this autonomisation of the social structure 
from the active participants that reproduce it, the capitalist economy appears 
external to the system of states – as a quasi-natural or transhistorical realm – which 
in turn gives rise to the incorrect IPE conception of states and markets as engaged 
in a perpetual power struggle. Furthermore, this thesis challenges the IPE consensus 
on the causes of neoliberal financial regulatory change, which stresses the 
importance of dynamics of competitive deregulation and laissez-faire ideology. This 
thesis, in contrast, stresses that financial regulatory policies should be understood 
as statecraft strategies – whether palliative, depoliticised disciplining, or a hybrid of 
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these two – designed to navigate the contradictory forces churned up by global 
crises. Neoliberal financial liberalisation, as such, is reconceptualised in a distinctly 
strategic light.  
 
 
Conclusion 
 
Literature dealing with financialisation, while containing numerous important 
insights, is in danger of expanding to the point of becoming amorphous, and thus 
sacrificing the analytical clarity of the term itself (see Christophers, 2015 for a 
thorough critique). Yet this chapter argued that certain approaches have retained a 
degree of specificity by conceptualising financialisation as the causal relationship 
between financial expansion and productive stagnation. It is this analytically precise 
reading of financialisation that this thesis will address. This literature can be broadly 
divided into two categories, which posit causality in opposite directions: 
expropriation, which insists that financial expansion has undermined the productive 
economy; and crisis resolution, which claims that financial expansion is itself a 
result of failures in the productive economy.  
The key shortcoming of both sides of this literature is their treatment of the 
role of the state in financialisation. Expropriation explanations consider the state to 
be a neutral tool, wielded by specific fractions of the ruling class, and are thus 
fundamentally pluralist/instrumentalist. State policy is understood as just one of a 
variety of mechanisms through which financial elites exerted their power over 
industrial capital in the neoliberal period. Governments’ pro-finance and 
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deregulatory agendas, as such, are explained by reference to the balance of forces 
amongst ruling class fractions. Crisis resolution explanations, on the other hand, 
replace this pluralist vision with a functionalist one. States in capitalist society need 
not be directly lobbied or captured by the capitalist class, but instead automatically 
act in the interests of capital in general. Facing the crisis of productive stagnation, 
states thus reacted mechanically by deregulating the financial sector in order to both 
provide profitable investment opportunities for struggling capitals and free up extra 
credit for failing firms. Expropriation and crisis resolution explanations both 
neglect the state as a strategic actor with its own agency, so to speak, but rather the 
state is generally conceptualised as a weathervane, with policy automatically 
changing direction in response to changing factional forces or economic 
imperatives. Furthermore, by considering the state to be an empty vessel, buffeted 
by external forces, both approaches render in-depth historical research into the 
decision-making processes behind financial de- and reregulation redundant.  
A small but important exception to this trend can be found in the work of 
Streeck and Krippner, both of whom advance crisis resolution explanations that 
reassert the state as a fundamental actor in the process of mediating productive 
stagnation and financial expansion. In addition, these authors consider state policy 
in this regard not as a simple reflection of fractional economic interests, nor as an 
automatic stabilising mechanism for capital accumulation, but rather as a political 
strategy to reconcile the need to both prevent economic catastrophe and maintain 
the state’s legitimacy in the eyes of the electorate. This thesis will contribute to this 
strategic reading of the state’s role in financialisation through an archival 
examination of the British state’s policies of financial regulatory restructuring in the 
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1970s and 1980s. In doing so, this thesis will also overcome the theoretical 
shortcomings of Streeck and Krippner by advancing a comprehensive and internally 
consistent theory of capitalist domination rooted in value-form Marxism. The 
following two chapters will introduce this theoretical framework. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
Framing financialisation I:  
wealth, value, and  
domination 
 
 
It is my view that, instead of always trying to cut off every individual head 
of the hydra, we should pay heed to the general principle at work. 
 
Theodor Adorno (2006: 141). 
 
 
Introduction  
 
To live in the era of financialisation is to feel palpably subject to a kind of 
domination. People are pressured into shouldering unbearable debt burdens, 
sovereign nations in Latin America and the European periphery are plunged into 
poverty by credit markets, and states appear unwilling or unable to significantly 
reregulate financial markets despite the patent madness of the status quo. 
Unsurprisingly, then, domination is a consistent theme in the existing literature, 
either explicitly or implicitly. Palley’s 2013 book, for example, is overtly titled 
Financialization: The Economics of Finance Capital Domination; while Arrighi 
(2005: 85), a progenitor of the term, draws on Fernand Braudel to define 
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financialisation as the capacity of finance to ‘dominate’ all business activity. Martin 
et al. (2008), on the other hand, hint at the almost parasitic control of financial logics 
over the host society: ‘[T]wenty-four-seven news broadcasts run a visual ticker-tape 
of stock prices at the bottom of their broadcast screens as if the modulations of 
equity prices were an EKG to the global body’. Watson (2007: 183) captures this 
creeping domination well through the example of Enron: ‘minute-by-minute 
update[s] on the market price of Enron common stock’ were ‘relayed through the 
computers that sat on each employees desk’, stalking their every decision. From the 
wholesale immiseration of nations to the micro-humiliations of impersonal credit 
scores, financialisation denotes a society that appears more than ever subordinated 
to ‘the rule of the number’ (Caffentzis, 2005: 100).  
For accounts that understand financialisation to mean the causal relationship 
between financial expansion and productive stagnation, the state is a subject of 
domination. For expropriation explanations, state managers became politically 
subordinated to the ascendant class of financiers and ideologically subordinated to 
the policy-making norms that serve their interests. As Davis and Walsh (2017: 40) 
write, ‘City personnel, norms and practices came to dominate the main UK 
departments of economic management at every level’. For crisis resolution 
accounts, state managers became subjugated to the material interests of capitalists 
in general. In the context of economic crisis, policy-makers automatically 
liberalised their financial sectors in order to increase short-term profitability and 
thus ward off an investment strike or capital flight coordinated by dissatisfied 
capitalists. Streeck (2014), to his credit, broadened the analytical horizon, arguing 
that state managers became dominated by economic and political imperatives. Torn 
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between the demands of profit-seeking capitalists and the claims of an enfranchised 
democratic polity, policy-makers attempted to postpone the day of reckoning 
through credit expansion. As such, according to these different explanations, states’ 
roles in propelling financialisation resulted from their domination by finance 
capitalists, capitalists more broadly, or the counterposed demands of capitalists and 
entitled citizens. Power, in all cases, lies with empirically observable sociological 
groups and is exerted upon the state. 
This thesis’ archival analysis of the British state’s part in supporting 
financialisation does not lend support to any of the three accounts described above. 
In fact, pulling back the veil on state managers’ decision-making processes is 
startling in what it does not reveal. The documentary evidence does not reveal the 
cunning power of financial elites, the overwhelming influence of social norms like 
‘shareholder value’, the coordinated strength of the capitalist class, nor the 
functional coherence of neoliberal strategies. Instead, the state appears as an 
ensemble of actors desperately responding to a series of real dilemmas through 
haphazard and often consciously contradictory strategic initiatives. This is also the 
impression given by Krippner’s archival research on US financialisation (2012). 
The concept of domination, as such, appears to be an unsuitable analytical tool. If 
we can speak of it at all, then the state appears dominated, simply put, by the chaos 
of modern economic life.  
As such, a forensic historical examination of the state’s role in 
financialisation runs the risk of banishing the question of domination altogether, and 
instead retreating into empiricist particularism. Yet this need not be the case, so long 
as domination is understood, not as direct relations of coercion between 
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superordinate and subordinate actors, classes, or institutions, but as abstract and 
impersonal relations of coercion wielded unconsciously by society against itself. 
Michel Foucault’s critique of instrumental theories of power is instructive here. 
Rather than focusing on relations of direct constraint, Foucault analyses a form of 
power that is ‘exercised only over free subjects, and only insofar as they are “free”’ 
(2001: 342). Such power (which he interchangeably substitutes with domination) 
does not derive from particular sociological groups, but is rather ‘rooted deep in the 
social nexus’ (ibid: 343) and whose disciplining effects circulate through society in 
a horizontal, ‘capillary’ manner, rather than being imposed from above (1995: 198). 
Clarissa Hayward brilliantly draws a link between Foucault’s theory and the 
faceless oppression that suffocates the characters of John Steinbeck’s Grapes of 
Wrath (Hayward and Lukes, 2008). A tenant farmer, facing the bulldozing of his 
house, demands to know who he must shoot to end this tyranny. After exhausting 
the list of seemingly responsible but ultimately non-culpable people – from the 
tractor driver to the bank manager to the board of directors – the tenant confronts 
the possibility that ‘Maybe there’s nobody to shoot. Maybe the thing isn’t men at 
all’ (Steinbeck, 1992: 41). A similar possibility confronts those who search for a 
concrete source of financial domination in the official archives.  
Yet Foucault’s grasping towards a notion of impersonal rule is only 
productive if it leads us not towards a transhistorical metatheory of power, but 
towards a radical historicisation and systematisation of this type of domination. As 
Moishe Postone (2003: 159) has suggested, this project found its highest expression 
in Marx’s mature works. While Foucault associates ‘impersonal, intrinsic, and 
pervasive’ power somewhat ambiguously with Western modernity, Marx instead 
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grounds such domination in ‘the social forms of commodity and capital’ (ibid). 
Marx’s theory of value is not a theory of wealth in general, but rather a theory of a 
historically-specific form of wealth that is simultaneously a system of impersonal 
domination. By interacting with one another through money relations, Marx argued 
that people’s everyday practices accidentally give rise to a system of crushing social 
constraints. Attempts to reveal the source of such tyranny by seizing hold of the 
industrialist, the banker, or the politician reveal these people to be mere 
‘personifications’ of an abstract social force (Marx, 1976: 92); ‘character masks’ 
that are worn and discarded by an impersonal form of social power (ibid: 757). 
Instead, this domination derives from what Foucault (2001: 345) termed ‘the whole 
network of the social’ or, in Marx’s Hegelian language, the totality.  
This thesis argues that the existing literature’s shortcomings can be 
overcome through an engagement with Marx’s theory of impersonal domination as 
it is expounded in the value-form tradition. According to this reading, the British 
state was not captured by financial elites, and thus acted to deregulate finance to the 
detriment of industry. Nor was the state simply disciplined by the behaviour of 
profit-seeking industrial capitalists, and consequently liberalised finance to satisfy 
this thirst for monetary surpluses. Instead, states themselves unconsciously 
contribute to a system of wealth that in turn dominates them by pressuring market 
participants to compete over labour productivity – a system that periodically lurches 
into severe crises due to its internal contradictions. In opposition to Streeck (2014), 
then, the crisis of the 1970s did not emanate from capitalism’s clash with 
democracy, but rather from the inherent paradoxes of the capitalist form of wealth. 
In the context of such crises, policies of financial de- and reregulation should be 
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understood as strategies to reconcile the material imperative to reproduce this 
system of wealth through painful restructuring and the political imperative to 
maintain state legitimacy in the eyes of the electorate. As such, by drawing from 
Marx’s critical theory, the state’s role in financialisation is reconceptualised as a 
strategy to manage the social dilemmas arising from a dominating, crisis-ridden 
form of wealth.  
This thesis’ theoretical framework is split across two chapters. This first 
theoretical chapter will examine Marx’s theory of impersonal domination in general 
terms, by examining the relationship between the categories of wealth, value, and 
domination. Drawing from the value-form reading of Marx’s work6, this chapter 
first examines how commodity exchange relations give rise to a historically-specific 
form of wealth that is simultaneously a form of temporal domination. Secondly, it 
will be argued that this form of wealth generates tendencies towards the 
classification of society and the formation of capital. Thirdly, the analysis will 
demonstrate that this form of wealth generates recurrent crises that can only be 
rectified through deep restructuring. Finally, it will be argued that this form of 
wealth is continually resisted and shrugged off by society due to its inherent 
                                                        
6 This thesis uses the term ‘value-form’ to refer to a diverse body of literature, 
including Isaak Rubin’s early exegesis of Marx’s theory of value and fetishism; 
certain scholars associated with the Frankfurt School, particularly Alfred Sohn-
Rethel and Theodor Adorno; the German New Reading of Marx (Neue Marx-
Lektüre), which saw Hans-Georg Backhaus and Helmut Reichelt seek in Adorno’s 
writings a reinvigorated critique of political economy; certain thinkers linked to the 
German Value Criticism (Wertkritik) group; particular authors associated with 
Open Marxism, such as Richard Gunn, Simon Clarke, Werner Bonefeld, and John 
Holloway; and scholars less easy to place within any of the above categories, like 
Moishe Postone and Michael Heinrich. To gather all of these writers under the 
umbrella of value-form theory is certainly a violent simplification, yet it will have 
to suffice due to the space limits of this chapter.  
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inability to satisfy social needs. While this level of abstraction cannot be directly 
observed in the archives, it nevertheless acts as an important explanatory framework 
that gives this thesis’ empirical discussion greater meaning. The following chapter 
will build upon this general conceptualisation of capitalist society by integrating the 
state in a theoretically coherent manner, and thus providing a framework for 
understanding financial de- and reregulation in the context of crisis. Chapter 4 thus 
provides a mediating level of abstraction that bridges the intangible value-
theoretical discussion with the directly observable categories of statecraft strategies. 
 
 
Value and wealth 
 
There is a self-congratulatory tendency in the so-called ‘British’ variant of IPE to 
note that the discipline has advanced beyond the theoretical and methodological 
shortcomings of mainstream economics. As Nicola Phillips (2002: 66) argues, IPE 
scholars have challenged neoclassical economists’ ‘stubborn refusal to treat social 
and political variables as anything other than exogenous to the mainstream of 
market activity’. While this is true, IPE’s philosophy of science superiority can be 
easily overstated. Despite regularly employing terms such as value and capital, IPE 
scholars have generally sidestepped the debates – ranging from classical political 
economy to the marginalist revolution to the ‘Cambridge capital controversy’ – on 
what exactly these words mean. Such definitional issues are often considered 
anachronistic to contemporary IPE analysis, with certain important exceptions (see, 
for example, Burnham, 1994, Nitzan and Bichler, 2009, and Watson, 2017). One is 
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reminded of Friedrich Nietzsche’s indictment of the Enlightenment’s reliance on 
Christian morality, despite its disavowal of religion (1974). If the labour theory of 
value and the theory of marginal utility are dead, then on what grounds do we 
employ the term value, or its derivative – capital? IPE analyses of value chains, 
capital mobility, real versus financial capital etc. that do not interrogate the 
substance of what they are dealing with invite the same criticism that Joan Robinson 
(1962: 68) once levelled at the discipline of economics:  
 
K is capital, ∆K is investment. Then what is K? Why, capital of course. It 
must mean something, so let us get on with the analysis, and do not bother 
about these officious prigs who ask us to say what it means.7  
 
In contrast, Marx’s critical theory directly tackles the question of value. 
Furthermore, according to the value-form approach, Marx grounds his theory of 
impersonal domination precisely in the elementary concept of value. This 
interpretation rests on a crucial distinction between wealth and value. Yet, as we 
will see below, this is a key point of contention in Marxist scholarship.  
With the exception of certain subterranean traditions, particularly those 
associated with the value-form approach, most Marxists have understood the 
concepts of value and wealth to be essentially synonymous. Labour is the source of 
value, according to the orthodox reading, for the simple reason that ‘historically in 
                                                        
7 Hans-Georg Backhaus similarly pointed out the paradoxical nature of modern 
economics, which ‘on the one hand, develops complicated mathematical methods 
to calculate the movements of prices and of money and on the other, has forgotten 
to reflect on what could possibly constitute the object of its calculations’ (1980: 
114). 
 82 
all forms of society it is labour that is the active creator of wealth’ (Gamble and 
Walton, 1976: 113). The fact that Marx differentiates between what he calls 
‘concrete’ and ‘abstract’ labour, and that he points to the latter as the sole source of 
value, is not seen as necessitating any deep theoretical reflection. Instead, Marx’s 
peculiar term ‘abstract labour’ is understood to mean a mental abstraction from the 
particularities of different types of labour and a reduction to the basic biological 
metabolism common to all: ‘The observation of the expenditure of calories during 
production is the observation of abstract labour’ (Carchedi, 2009: 150). As abstract 
labour and value are thus conceived of as transhistorical categories rooted in human 
physiology, this orthodox approach argues that they cannot be the source of 
domination in capitalism; rather, it is the existence of the capitalist class that 
perverts these politically neutral categories by wringing surplus value from the 
working class. As Postone (2003: 50) correctly observes, these readings interpret 
Marx’s theory to be a logical extension of David Ricardo’s political economy, 
whereby Ricardo’s insight that labour is the source of value is ‘refined’ and ‘turned 
against the bourgeoisie’ through an examination of exploitation. This physiological 
and transhistorical reading transforms Marx’s value theory into a political slogan to 
demand the redistribution of wealth back to those who produced it – a slogan equally 
suited to all points in history.8  
Yet if value and wealth are synonymous – as the orthodox interpretation 
insists – then the following quotes, from volume I of Capital and the Critique of the 
Gotha Programme respectively, appear utterly contradictory: 
                                                        
8 The prevalence of this interpretation allowed Joan Robinson (1960: 23) to make 
the confused claim: ‘Marx believed that, under socialism, the labour theory of value 
would come into its own’. 
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[W]e know the substance of value. It is labour (Marx, 1976: 131). 
 
Labour is not the source of all wealth (Marx, 1994: 316). 
 
Marx here clearly states that labour is the content of value, but not of wealth more 
broadly. Instead of reducing this apparent contradiction to an inconsistency in 
Marx’s writings, the value-form tradition insists that Marx’s theory of value is not 
a theory of wealth in general, but a theory of one historically-specific form of 
wealth. Rather than being conceptualised as a physical substance that emerges from 
human toil, wealth generally should be understood as a social category that 
encompasses a great array of different objects, attributes, and practices that are 
validated as ‘wealth’ by specific social conventions. Thus, for the Ancient 
Egyptians, gold gained the status of wealth due its recognition as the flesh of the 
sun god Ra; while in Thorsten Veblen’s analysis of conspicuous consumption it is 
other people’s observation of an individual’s consumption that attributes cultural 
wealth to that individual. Value too is a form of socially validated wealth. However, 
the social validation that creates value is not conscious and purposeful, but 
unconscious and accidental. For Marx, the moment of this validation is the act of 
commodity exchange: ‘It is only by being exchanged that the products of labour 
acquire a socially uniform objectivity as values’ (Marx, 1976: 166). 
In commodity exchange, qualitatively different products are equated with a 
certain quantity of money. This process signifies a ‘real abstraction’ from the 
concrete, sensuous characteristics of the goods being exchanged (use-values) and 
thus from the concrete, sensuous characteristics of the labour that produced them 
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(concrete labour) (Sohn-Rethel, 1978). By characterising these goods as worth 
different quantities of the same homogeneous substance – money – the participants 
in exchange accidentally undertake a radical equalisation of the diverse kinds of 
labour expended to create these goods. A ten-pound note does not purchase the 
products of specific labouring activities – say the labour of the carpenter or the 
masseuse – but rather £10 commands a certain quantity of any commodity-
producing labour. Money becomes the embodiment of non-specific, abstract labour. 
More accurately, the mediation of human interactions by money creates abstract 
labour (Rubin, 1978: 199; Heinrich, 2012).9 As Georg Simmel (1971: 330) 
observed, money ‘hollows out the core of things, their peculiarities, their specific 
values and their uniqueness and incomparability … They all rest on the same level 
and are distinguished only by their amounts’. Marx’s concept of abstract labour is 
thus neither a mental abstraction from the particular characteristics of concrete 
labour, nor is it abstract in terms of general human metabolism; rather, labour 
becomes practically abstract through the monetary exchange of commodities 
(Murray, 2000). A peculiar form of wealth thus emerges that is expressed in 
commodified goods but is irreducible to their physical properties – a type of wealth 
that only exists through heterogeneous, tangible types of wealth but is itself uniform 
and intangible. This form of wealth does not discriminate between the concrete 
                                                        
9 Marx is at pains to emphasise that abstract labour is not a conscious accounting 
tool used by market participants, but an accidental, objective social reality:  
 
Men do not therefore bring the products of their labour into relation with 
each other as values because they see these objects merely as the material 
integuments of homogenous human labour. The reverse is true: by equating 
their different products to each other in exchange as values, they equate 
their different kinds of labour as human labour. They do this without being 
aware of it. (1976: 166-7) 
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characteristics nor social purposes of particular goods: they are products of generic 
human labour, distinguishable only by their prices. Marx calls this type of insurgent 
wealth value.  
While in qualitative terms value is a relationship of commensurability 
between diverse kinds of human labour brought about by money-mediated exchange 
– abstract labour; it also has a quantitative dimension – socially-necessary labour 
time. The value of any given commodity equals the mean labour time necessary for 
its production within the web of commodity exchange – an average that is constantly 
in flux due to changes in labour productivity (Marx, 1976: 129). The individual 
commodity producer experiences increases in average productivity as a ‘whip of 
external necessity’ (to misuse Trotsky’s phrase) that forces them to produce more 
in less time – or else find that their commodities appear overpriced on the market. 
Prices thus express an unusual social wealth that changes in proportion to the 
quantity of labour required for a commodity’s production. This quantitative 
dimension means that value is not a static or inert social relationship, but one that is 
dynamic, directional, and dominating. By satisfying their qualitative needs and 
wants through the market, people subject themselves to the rule of abstract 
quantities that threaten them with financial ruin if they do not obey. As Isaak Rubin 
(2010: 81) argued: ‘Value is the transmission belt which transfers the movement of 
working processes from one part of society to another, making that society a 
functioning whole’ – a functioning whole, he neglected to mention, in which the 
unending drive to produce faster than one’s competitors becomes the basis of 
survival. Commodity exchange gives rise to a system in which societal averages of 
labour time become the content of social wealth, and this form of wealth itself 
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becomes a source of decentred social domination. This system of socially validated 
wealth makes true in practice Benjamin Franklin’s observation that ‘time is money’ 
(quoted in Weber, 2003: 48).  
In sum, domination in capitalist society, according to the value-form reading 
of Marx, derives from the peculiar form that wealth assumes in this society: value. 
Neither a physical substance nor a purely mental category, value is a relationship 
of radical equality between diverse types of human labour, which emerges when the 
products of labour are exchanged for money. By comparing tangible goods as 
merely different quantities of human labour in general, commodity exchange creates 
averages of labour productivity that impose themselves upon individual market 
participants as a seemingly external necessity to produce more in less time. This 
overwhelming pressure to compete emanates not from any particular agent, 
institution, or class, but from the totality of monetary exchange relations. This form 
of temporal domination is thus accidentally imposed by society upon itself. In this 
way, Marx roots his theory of impersonal rule in the category of value.   
 
 
Classification and capitalisation 
 
It should be clear from the preceding presentation that the value-form reading insists 
that Marx’s theory of self-imposed domination stands on its own before the 
introduction of ‘the two great classes directly facing each other – bourgeoisie and 
proletariat’ (Marx and Engels, 2008: 34). This notion is anathema to most 
interpretations of Marx, whereby domination in capitalism results from the direct 
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exploitation of the proletariat by the bourgeoisie. For orthodox accounts, such 
exploitation is homologous with the relationship between the peasant and lord, the 
difference being that the bourgeoisie instrumentalises the market as a form of 
coercion with which to entangle the proletariat in relations of domination (Sweezy, 
1981: 30). ‘Surplus value’, Ernest Mandel (2002: 7) insists, ‘is simply the monetary 
form of the social surplus product’, which is pocketed by the capitalist class. Within 
this traditional understanding, value itself is seen to be a benign social form that is 
perverted by capitalists: the extraction of surplus value transforms capitalism into a 
system of social domination.10 A similar notion is even present in certain Open 
Marxist readings, which begin from the transhistorical proposition in Marx’s 
propagandistic work that all history is the history of class struggle, before arguing 
that this universal struggle takes on specific forms (wages, surplus value, etc.) in the 
capitalist epoch (Holloway and Picciotto, 1991: 112; Kettell, 2004: 15; Sutton, 
2015: 19). Class struggle in capitalism becomes one historical expression of a 
transhistorical necessity. 
In contrast, this thesis’ reading insists that the categories of capital and 
proletariat do not corrupt commodity exchange, but are rather the realisation of both 
the incentive and necessity of value as a form of wealth. The existence of wealth in 
the form of money creates both the dazzling incentive of potentially limitless 
accumulation, which is impossible when wealth takes the form of directly useful 
goods, and the objective necessity to match one’s competitors in order to stave off 
financial ruin. Value thus presupposes, and creates immense pressures towards, the 
                                                        
10 See Kurz and Lohoff (1989) for a polemical critique of such traditional readings 
of class.  
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emergence of capital – that is, the expansion of value based upon the systematic 
exploitation of labour. These imperatives press the ‘personifications’ of capital to 
attempt to mould people into malleable labouring subjects, which is pursued through 
the disruption of non-waged forms of subsistence, the extension of zones of 
commodity exchange, the imposition of competitive wages and terms of 
employment, and manifold other mechanisms. This process is what John Holloway 
(2002: 42) terms the ‘class-ification’ of society into blind producers of ever more 
profit. This reading of class as a process of continuous ‘forming’ stands opposed to 
what Richard Gunn (1987) calls ‘sociological’ Marxism, whereby classes are 
defined by certain empirical characteristics (say, forms of income or subjectivity), 
understood as fully constituted at the historical outset of capitalism, and 
conceptualised as opposed to one another in a pitched battle of economic interests. 
Instead, this thesis insists that the imposition of the imperatives of surplus value 
production structure people’s lives in different ways, giving rise not to two 
empirically verifiable classes, but to the constantly shifting sands of youth precariat, 
industrial proletariat, white collar lower middle class, professional middle class, 
managerial class with stock options, and so on ad infinitum. No individual falls 
completely into the category of pure capitalist or worker. Instead, capitalist and 
worker represent two poles of capitalist society, between which real people lie on a 
spectrum that is always changing as a result of the battle over the maximisation of 
surplus value production.  
The key insight of this interpretation is that domination in capitalist society 
does not spring from the manner in which wealth is administered and sequestered 
by one class at the expense of another. Instead, domination is rooted in the 
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apparently innocuous fact that wealth takes the form of value – a relation of radical 
commensurability and temporal competition between market participants. This in 
turn creates pressures for the classification of society into labouring subjects and the 
formation of capital. This casts the first chapter of Capital in a new light: Marx 
begins with an analysis of simple commodity exchange, not as an historical 
examination of a pre-capitalist society (as Mandel 1976 insists), but as a way to 
demonstrate that the most complex and monstrous forms of capitalist domination 
are rooted in the seemingly innocent categories of money, commodity, and 
exchange. ‘[A]lready the simplest forms of exchange-value and of money’, Marx 
(1993: 248) writes, ‘latently contain the opposition between labour and capital’.  
 
 
Crises of value  
 
Just as the tendential classification of society into wage-labourers and the 
emergence of capital logically derive from value relations, rather than being a 
perversion of it, so too is the periodic breakdown of this system of wealth inherent 
to its very nature. When goods are brought into relation with one another through 
monetary exchange, a new form of wealth emerges that exists through these goods 
but is irreducible to their sensuous qualities. The tension between the tangible 
qualities of these goods and the abstract wealth attributed to them is the basis of 
capitalist crises.  
Yet the precise manner in which this contradiction comes to be expressed in 
periodic crises is a matter of intense and often needlessly vitriolic debate (see 
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Kliman et al., 2013). Within Marx’s own writings an array of crisis theories can be 
found, from the overproduction/underconsumption thesis outlined in The 
Communist Manifesto, to the final collapse scenario depicted in the Grundrisse, to 
the disproportionality crises depicted in volume II of Capital, to the cyclically 
declining profitability detailed in volume III (Reuten and Thomas, 2013). Each of 
these explanations have in turn been elaborated by various scholars, including, 
respectively, Rosa Luxembourg, Henryk Grossman, Simon Clarke, and Paul 
Mattick. Instead of conducting a broad survey of these approaches, this section will 
advance a reading of Marx’s ‘law of the tendency of the rate of profit to fall’ 
(LTRPF), as outlined in volume III of Capital, as the general tendency of capitalist 
development and as a meta-theory of crisis.  
It has already been established that the form of social validation that creates 
value – money-mediated commodity exchange – sets producers against one another 
in a battle over labour productivity. On the one hand, those enterprises that produce 
at above average speed can sell their commodities at or below the going market rate, 
while reaping ‘super profits’ due to their reduced overheads. On the other hand, 
slower producers are also pressured into selling their commodities at the going 
price, or else risk declining market share, while facing falling profit rates due to 
their higher cost levels. While productivity increases can be secured through the 
intensification of the work process, this strategy runs up against the physical limit 
of human exhaustion. Technological innovation, however, can unleash potentially 
limitless productivity gains. For this reason, the general trajectory of capitalist 
production entails an increase in the value of fixed capital and material inputs 
relative to the value of wages – what Marx terms a rising ‘organic composition of 
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capital’ (Marx, 1976: 762). In terms of the technical conditions of production, 
capitalist development is synonymous with automation.  
However, Marx argued that while automation can increase the profit rate of 
the market leaders who first introduce new technologies, once such productivity 
gains are generalised, the result is a depression in the average profit rate across all 
capitals. In a classic fallacy of composition, what is beneficial for individual 
businesses undermines the profitability of business in general. As general labour 
productivity rises, the same monetary investment yields a greater output of 
commodities, which, through the mechanism of market competition, leads to falling 
commodity prices. Due to this deflationary or disinflationary trajectory, if 
enterprises invest in machinery, raw material, and labour at the 2015 price level and 
sell their commodities at the 2017 price level (a time gap of some length is inherent 
to all industries that do not realise profit at the exact moment of investment) they 
will experience a falling rate of profit. Ultimately, this depression in the average 
profit rate reflects a decline in the labour time expended within the economy as a 
whole. The ‘tendency of the general rate of profit to fall is thus simply the 
expression … of the progressive development of the social productivity of labour’ 
(Marx, 1981: 319), by way of a ‘continual cheapening of the product[s]’ (ibid: 318). 
Nevertheless, the same mechanism that delivers a falling rate of profit – namely, 
automation – also produces a rising mass of profit. Due to the fact that labour-saving 
technology both increases output and cheapens individual commodities, capitalists 
can realise a greater volume of profits despite the rate of profit on each sale declining 
(ibid: 332). In order to realise stable or rising profits in the context of falling 
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profitability, businesses must continually increase the scale of their operations, 
which tends to test the limits of aggregate demand.  
Several counter-tendencies can arrest the downward pressure on the average 
profit rate caused by generalised productivity gains. These include increases in 
unemployment, due to labour-saving technology, which depress wages; the 
extension of foreign trade, which provides access to cheaper resources; and 
increases in turnover time, which shorten the time span between investment and 
profit realisation. Yet two counter-tendencies have chiefly occupied proponents and 
critics of this theory alike. Firstly, an increasing rate of exploitation – either through 
the unremunerated extension of working hours or intensification of labour – can 
offset declining profitability by increasing the gap between the aggregate labour 
time necessary for the workers’ reproduction and the aggregate labour time 
expended by workers on commodity production (ibid: 339-42). However, this 
countertendency cannot negate the tendency altogether, due to the political, social, 
and absolute limits of the human body to be exploited at a perpetually rising rate. 
Secondly, while increasing productivity tends to depress prices and thus 
profitability, this also cheapens fixed capital and material inputs, which boosts 
profitability (ibid: 342-3). For example, while the generalised implementation of 
containerisation may deflate shipping prices and thus reduce the rate of profit within 
the shipping industry as a whole, the reduced costs of importing raw materials from 
abroad may boost the profitability of the auto industry as a whole. When these two 
industries are considered together, the overall rate of profit thus appears stable. 
Nevertheless, the fact that a time gap exists between monetary investment and 
realisation of profit means that this counteracting tendency cannot completely check 
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the fall in profitability. While productivity gains may cheapen machinery and raw 
materials, this is of no consolation to the enterprise that has already invested in 
machinery and materials at pre-existing prices. As Chris Harman (2007) points out, 
in an otherwise orthodox account, one cannot build the houses of today with the 
bricks of tomorrow.11  
The interaction of the tendency and counter-tendencies thus disqualifies the 
LTRPF as an absolute, always empirically observable ‘law’ in the traditional 
understanding of the word. The inverse relationship between labour-saving 
productivity gains and profitability is felt as a crushing external pressure on 
particular capitals, which must be countered in myriad ways. Whether these 
countervailing factors are sufficient to offset this downward tendency for a time 
does not negate the existence of this inverse relationship, but instead the frenzied 
struggle of firms to simply tread water cannot be explained without an 
understanding of this underlying tendency. In an analogous manner, the law of 
gravity is not disproven by the existence of flight, but rather aeronautics cannot be 
understood without grasping the law of gravity.  
                                                        
11 Essentially the same objection can be made to Heinrich’s criticism of the LTRPF 
(2013), which Frederick Harry Pitts (2017) adopts. Heinrich points out that labour-
saving technology has a dual impact on the profit rate: it decreases the values of 
individual commodities and thus depresses profitability, while decreasing the value 
of labour-power through the falling costs of wage goods (which Marx refers to as 
an increase in relative surplus value). No general tendency can be posited as such – 
whether profitability falls or rises depends on whether productivity gains decrease 
general commodity prices faster than labour-power, or vice versa. Yet this 
disregards the essential time lapse between investment and realisation. For example, 
when the newspaper industry introduced labour-saving computer systems, which 
began to exert downward, competitive pressure on newspaper prices, these firms 
nevertheless had to employ the remaining staff at prevailing wage rates.  
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In circumstances in which the counter-tendencies are insufficient to 
maintain profitability, and the profit rate tends closer to zero, conditions of 
generalised stagnation prevail. This can result in some or all of the following 
outcomes: the heightened productivity results in an oversupply of commodities that 
threaten to exceed market demand; all except the most competitive firms are 
deterred from making new investments; market laggards are pushed into 
bankruptcy; struggling firms take on mounting debt burdens to stay afloat; and less 
competitive producers are forced to increase their prices to stave off catastrophe, 
thus creating a paradoxical situation in which the productive potential for general 
price deflation leads to growing inflationary pressures. These results of declining 
profitability do not explain the rapid contractions in credit markets that signify 
moments of acute financial crises, and thus Clarke (1994: 59) is correct to point out 
that the tendency of the rate of profit to fall is not a complete crisis theory. Such a 
theory would need, as Michael Heinrich (2013) explains, to take full account of the 
dynamics of the credit system, which produce sudden ruptures in capital 
accumulation. Instead, this tendency should be conceptualised as the general 
trajectory of capitalist development, which – if unchecked – leads to growing 
economic stagnation, and increases the likelihood and destructiveness of financial 
crises. Ultimately, the downward pressure on the profit rate can only be ‘reset’, for 
a time, by the large-scale devaluation of wages, fixed capital, and material inputs 
through crises, ‘in which momentary suspension of all labour and annihilation of a 
great part of the capital violently lead [capitalism] back to the point where it is 
enabled [to go on] fully employing its productive powers without committing 
suicide’ (Marx, 1993: 750). 
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Marx’s crisis theory is idiosyncratic in that it neither conceptualises crises 
as exogenous shocks nor attempts to predict their timing. Instead, the LTRPF is 
ultimately a theory of the irreconcilable contradiction between tangible goods and 
the abstract social wealth for which the former becomes a mere vessel. It is a theory 
of the self-generating centrifugal force that tears value apart at the seams. The fact 
that there exists a tendentially inverse relationship between general productivity and 
general profitability hints at a deep social paradox: tremendous increases in human 
ingenuity, productive potential, and material goods result in a decline in social 
wealth (Postone, 2003). Value, as a principle of social organisation, becomes 
increasingly inadequate to the world of tremendous abundance that it has produced. 
This system ‘presses to reduce labour time to a minimum, while it posits labour 
time, on the other side, as sole measure and source of wealth’ (Marx, 1993: 706). 
 
 
The antagonism of value  
 
Value is a form of social wealth and self-imposed domination arising from a 
particular type of social validation: money-mediated commodity exchange. This 
generates dynamics of capitalisation and classification, and gives rise to a social 
system that plunges into crisis due to its own inherent contradictions. However, by 
pointing to the rationality of value and its derivative forms, there is a danger of 
producing a functionalist theory that characterises all social phenomena as obedient 
expressions of value-logic. If the working class is a category derived from value 
relations and has no inherently revolutionary character, and if crises are not a result 
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of working-class resistance, but instead result from the normal functioning of 
capitalist development, then does this mean the agency of everyday actors plays no 
role in contemporary capitalism? This approach runs the risk of reproducing, albeit 
in more nuanced theoretical terms, Louis Althusser’s observation that we need only 
speak of people insofar as they are ‘bearers’ of structures (Althusser and Balibar, 
1970: 321).  
While it is crucial to integrate struggle into the value-form account of social 
domination, there are several theoretical weaknesses that must be avoided. The first 
pitfall is that which conceptualises struggle in capitalism as one specific type of 
class struggle in general. For Maurice Dobb (2001), class struggle is the general 
motor of history – it can account for the breakdown of feudalism just as well as it 
can explain modern struggles over the length of the working day. No fundamental 
revision of categories is needed when we move from one mode of production to 
another, simply greater specification. Transhistorically, struggle remains a battle 
between concrete, empirically defined subordinate and superordinate classes over 
the production and distribution of wealth. As discussed in the section on 
capitalisation and classification, this fundamentally misses the impersonal and self-
imposed nature of capitalist domination. Secondly, for the tradition of autonomist 
Marxism, which also conceives of struggle as an essential characteristic of 
capitalism, the role of the labouring class is prioritised (Bailey et al., 2017). Capital 
does not lead history, they insist, but rather capitalist strategies must be understood 
as reactions to workers’ resistance (Toscano, 2009). Ultimately, the dynamics of 
capitalist development can be explained by labourers’ opposition to the imposition 
of work by capitalists. The autonomist approach simply shifts emphasis from one 
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side of the traditional sociological class binary to the other, without fundamentally 
reconceptualising the nature of domination in capitalist society.  
Postone (2003) mounts a devastating critique of such accounts: the very 
category of (abstract) labour, which is the supposed revolutionary subject for both 
Dobb and the autonomists, is itself the content of decentred social domination, as it 
constitutes a form of wealth that sets people against one another in relentless 
temporal competition. Domination does not emanate from the capitalist class, but 
rather from the principle of value as wealth, around which society is organised. 
Labour is thus as corrupted a category as capital. From this, Postone concludes that 
workers’ struggles are totally constitutive of capitalist social relations, rather than a 
threat to their normal functioning. In this sense, Postone presents a troublingly 
structural-functionalist value-form approach, whereby social antagonism is 
understood as a scripted tug-of-war between capitalists and workers that simply 
reconstitutes capitalism as a whole. Against what this thesis terms Postone’s 
‘closed’ value-form approach, Werner Bonefeld and Holloway advance an ‘open’ 
value-form account. While emphasising that capitalism’s peculiar form of 
domination stems from monetised exchange relations, these accounts insist that 
people’s struggles do not simply reproduce capitalism, but challenge it too. 
Antagonism, in this sense, is not conceived only as a back and forth battle between 
empirically defined classes (although this is one manifestation of it), but also as a 
struggle over the social forms that constitute capitalist life. Human agency operates 
both ‘in and against’ value (Bonefeld, 1993: 27). This open approach is the point of 
departure for this thesis’ interpretation of the antagonisms of value as wealth. 
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The basic premise of struggle in capitalist society is not that value is unfairly 
distributed, but that value itself is a fundamentally inadequate form of wealth. In 
Holloway’s words: ‘Wealth does not fit into the commodity without a remainder’ 
(2015: 13). Value cannot satisfy people’s heterogeneous needs, wants, or desires – 
it is an ill-fitting form of wealth. Human needs can only be satisfied to the extent 
that they can be met for a profit: that is, to the extent that the necessary goods can 
be produced at the average speed or above and sold on competitive markets. The 
rational irrationality of this system of wealth is evidenced, for example, by the 
abandoned factories that litter Britain’s West Midlands, adjacent to communities 
wracked by unemployment and need. The latent wealth embodied in this dormant 
infrastructure and these idle people is value-less, for the simple reason that it cannot 
be set in motion at a speed that matches other market participants. Where human 
needs can be met for a profit, heterogeneous forms of wealth become mere vessels 
for homogeneous value as wealth. Such a dynamic is visible in the academic sphere, 
where the creation of knowledge becomes transformed into a means to outcompete 
one’s colleagues and advance one’s desirability as a source of profit for corporate 
universities. The ideal of a global academic community is increasingly realised, but 
as a community of mutual anxiety and solipsism, especially for untenured 
researchers.12 The author becomes self-divided as she is forced to compromise 
between the potential of her words to grasp towards truth versus the need for these 
same words to ultimately embody market value through the derived indices of 
‘research excellence’. Human aspiration must be tempered to suit the demands of 
this abstract social force. 
                                                        
12 On the ‘practical solipsism’ of commodity exchange, see Sohn-Rethel (1978: 42). 
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Yet this demands the impossible. Human aspiration cannot be tempered in 
this manner, and value is thus regularly shrugged off – at all levels of social 
reproduction – as people assert other forms of socially validated wealth. Faced with 
the unsuitability of value as the key principle of social organisation, people refuse 
to be classified into mere producers of profit for a blind social imperative, and more 
generally refuse the transformation of various social goods into vessels for the 
realisation of monetary surpluses. Crucially, people do not rebel as labour or as 
members of the working class, but rather they rebel against these categorisations, 
knowingly or not. As Bonefeld (2004: 121) drily observes, people do not go on 
strike because they are ‘wage-labouring personifications of variable capital’; they 
strike because they are not and can never be reduced to this inhuman designation. 
This struggle against the imperatives of value can take both progressive and 
regressive forms. In keeping with the previous example, the imposed indices of 
academic (e)valuation are resisted and boycotted, while non-commodified forms of 
academic cooperation and communal knowledge production are continually forged. 
On the other hand, many advanced capitalist countries are currently witnessing the 
assertion of chauvinistic principles of racial supremacy, which are counterposed to 
the impersonal dictates of capitalist globalisation. Anti-value is thus not the 
monopoly of the political left; rather, struggles against the abstract domination of 
value have a fundamentally ambivalent relationship with forms of direct oppression 
such as patriarchy and white supremacy. This form of antagonism represents the 
struggle of human heterogeneity against a historically-specific, self-imposed 
homogeneity. This is what Theodor Adorno (1973) referred to as the rebellion of 
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non-identity against identity – the particular’s resistance to its subjugation by the 
universal. 
This dynamic of struggle rears its head at every level and every moment of 
the reproduction of value. Yet periods of crisis intensify this antagonism. As crises 
accelerate, the contradiction of value is expressed on the surface of society as a 
series of paradoxes: the need for mass redundancies counterposed to the 
intensification of labour for those who keep their jobs; dwindling profits 
counterposed to enormous productive capacities; homelessness counterposed to 
empty, unsaleable housing stock; hunger counterposed to the overproduction, 
overabundance of material goods. Ironically, value demonstrates its insufficiency 
for society most clearly when it is in short supply. Pressures to discipline and 
reclassify society, so as to raise the rate of profit and thus rekindle investment, run 
up against the real needs and aspirations of society in all its diversity – aspirations 
that cannot be synchronised with the booms and busts of capitalist development. A 
struggle ensues over every aspect of restructuring and reclassification, from wage 
reductions to privatisations to social spending cuts; and this contestation means that 
no crisis has a guaranteed solution.  
Antagonism is a defining characteristic of capitalist society. Yet it cannot be 
adequately conceptualised as a struggle between sociological classes over the 
distribution of wealth or the imposition of work. Neither can it be understood as 
entirely unthreatening to the normal functioning of capitalist development. Instead, 
the antagonism that marks the capitalist epoch is a struggle against a form of social 
wealth that is unable to satisfy the diversity of human needs and wants. Value is not 
imposed upon society by one institution or class – in the final instance, at least – but 
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rather emerges accidentally from monetised commodity exchange. As Max 
Horkheimer (cited in Bonefeld, 2016: 60) wrote, ‘human beings produce, through 
their own labour, a reality that increasingly enslaves them’. The peculiarity of social 
antagonism in capitalist society is therefore that people struggle against bonds that 
are unconsciously self-imposed.  
 
 
Conclusion 
 
Domination is a central concern in the existing literature on the role of states in 
mediating the processes of financial expansion and productive stagnation. These 
accounts insist that state managers have been subjugated by particular sociological 
groups, whether rentiers, industrial capitalists, or vocal citizens. Such an 
understanding of domination – that is, as direct relations of constraint imposed by 
one group over another – is not corroborated by the historical evidence provided in 
this thesis. This thesis’ archival analysis demonstrates that policy-makers appeared 
to be subordinated not to particular actors or classes, but to imperatives that seemed 
to have escaped the control of even society’s most powerful groups. Such a form of 
domination, this chapter argued, can only be adequately grasped through an 
examination of Marx’s theory of impersonal domination. The purpose of this 
chapter was thus to set out a general explanation of how Marx grounds this 
conceptualisation of abstract, self-imposed domination in his theory of value. This 
was done by analysing a) the distinction between wealth and value, b) the logical 
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derivation of class and capital from value relations, c) the crisis tendencies inherent 
to these relations, and d) the social antagonism integral to value as a form of wealth. 
Marx’s writings on value should be understood as a theory of a type of 
wealth that is also a form of domination. This domination emerges accidentally from 
the subjective, purposeful action of humans when this action is mediated through 
monetary relations of commodity exchange: ‘Their own collisions with one another 
produce an alien social power standing above them, produce their mutual interaction 
as a process and power independent of them’ (Marx, 1993: 197). This theory roots 
Foucault’s notion of decentred power in a historically-specific form of practice. Just 
as Foucault (2001: 342) insists that power is only truly exercised in conditions of 
formal freedom, Marx argues that the profoundly dominating nature of capitalism 
emerges precisely from the radical equality of exchange: ‘the money system is in 
fact the system of equality and freedom… which prove[s] to be inequality and 
unfreedom’ (1993: 248).  
The temporally competitive dynamics that emerge from the value-form 
create tendencies towards the classification of society into flexible, dependent 
labourers and thus towards the expanded reproduction of value: capital. Yet these 
same competitive dynamics also plunge this form of wealth into regular crises, as 
rising productivity results paradoxically in a proportionate diminution of social 
wealth, expressed as a falling average rate of profit. Value, especially during these 
periods of crisis, confronts society as simply unfit for purpose. To advance their real 
aspirations, preserve their mental wellbeing, and often simply survive, people 
continually refuse value’s dictates, and instead assert different forms of social 
wealth (progressive and reactionary). This form of antagonism characterises a 
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society that cannot transform all material and cultural goods into a means to 
accumulate other means: money (Postone, 2003: 181). Unending turmoil marks this 
society in which people are required, yet refuse all the same, to be mere carcasses 
of time.13  
This chapter has thus laid the groundwork for understanding how 
domination in capitalist society emerges not from particular sociological groups, but 
from the very monetised relations that make up this society. The following chapter 
will integrate the state into this theoretical framework and examine how policies of 
financial de- and reregulation can be understood as statecraft strategies designed to 
ameliorate the contradictions emerging from this dominating, crisis-ridden, and 
socially fractious form of wealth.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                        
13 ‘Time is everything, man is nothing; he is no more than the carcase of time. There 
is no more question of quality. Quantity alone decides everything’ (Marx, 2008: 
57). 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
Framing financialisation II: 
currencies, states,  
and statecraft 
 
 
One sure sign of an ill-conducted state is the propensity of the people to 
resort to theories. 
 
Edmund Burke (quoted in Gamble, 1990: 404). 
 
 
Introduction 
 
To the extent that the financialisation literature engages with states at all, they 
appear as the subjects of domination. Policy-makers are either hemmed in by the 
power of financial elites (expropriation), react automatically to the needs of 
capitalists more generally (crisis resolution), or are torn between the demands of 
capitalists and citizens (Streeck’s crisis resolution variant). States, as such, are 
either class instruments or automatic stabilisation mechanisms. This discussion 
mirrors a debate that took place in Marxist state theory in the mid- to late 20th 
century, between instrumentalist and structuralist accounts (see Clarke, 1991a and 
O’Kane, 2014).  
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The quintessential instrumentalist, Ralph Miliband (2009) argued that the 
capitalist character of the modern state was a result of its direct domination by the 
bourgeoisie. Against Robert Dahl’s polyarchy thesis, Miliband attempted to 
demonstrate in demographic terms that the political elite in Britain was largely 
drawn from the same social circles as the business elite. While largely discredited 
for its crude empiricism, the basic pluralist and instrumentalist nature of this state 
theory lives on in contemporary approaches. For example, neo-Gramscianism, one 
of the most important strands of critical IPE (Cohen, 2007), effectively reduces the 
state to an expression of the fractional struggles within the capitalist class (van der 
Pijl, 1989; Burnham, 1991).  
Structuralist accounts, on the other hand, insist that the state need not be 
directly dominated by particular capitalists because it is indirectly dominated by 
capital in general. For Nicos Poulantzas, the state is ‘relatively autonomous’ from 
capitalist society, bequeathing it both the ability and responsibility to functionally 
reproduce capitalism in all its economic, political, and ideological dimensions 
(Clarke, 1991a: 16-20). Fred Block, on the other hand, put forth a structuralist state 
theory that emphasises the collective power of the capitalist class to shape state 
policy. The ‘major structural mechanism’ determining state action is the fact that 
capitalists have an effective ‘veto over state policies in that their failure to invest at 
adequate levels can create major political problems for the state managers’ (Block, 
1987: 58). One can extrapolate that finance capitalists, whose assets are both highly 
mobile and fungible, have a kind of super-veto. However, despite the intensity of 
the instrumentalist/structuralist debate, both positions share a common 
identification of the forces of domination as lying outside of the state. For Althusser-
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inspired functionalists like Poulantzas, on the one hand, domination emanates from 
the transhistorical notion of ‘mode of production’, from which the state is relatively 
detached. For both Miliband and Block, on the other hand, power lies with a 
capitalist class that in turn subjugates the state to its interests, and thus both theorists 
paradoxically share an agential ontology of domination.  
In contrast, this thesis seeks to conceptualise the state’s role in 
financialisation through a theory of impersonal, self-imposed domination. Rather 
than states becoming subordinated by discrete social actors, states are dominated by 
the imperatives of the monetised social relations that they themselves help to forge 
and maintain. As the last chapter argued, domination emanates from value itself – 
the form that wealth assumes in capitalist society. This chapter will build on the 
preceding analysis by drawing from Open Marxist state theory to devise a 
framework for understanding financial de- and reregulation in times of crisis. Open 
Marxist approaches do not consider the state to be relatively autonomous from 
capitalism, nor dominated by particular fractions of society. Instead, the state 
produces capitalist social relations ‘as a practice of government’ (Bonefeld, 2014: 
183), while in turn becoming ‘subordinated to the need to secure the expanded 
reproduction’ of these same relations or else face disaster (Clarke, 1991b: 193). The 
state, as such, plays a crucial role in giving rise to a form of wealth that in turn 
dominates it. Yet, fundamentally, the state is also a political form of the struggle 
that characterises capitalist society: its form and functions are the object of 
contestation, ruling out functionalist interpretations.  
This chapter will begin by discussing the limits to state action imposed by 
value as the dominant form of wealth. Through the interrelation of state-backed 
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currencies, value emerges as a global system of averages that imposes itself upon 
individual states through the exchange rate mechanism. States are forced to meet 
global profitability averages or face a range of sanctions. In times of crisis, these 
pressures intensify, and states are torn between the imperatives of bringing 
productivity in line with global averages and responding to the tangible demands of 
their electorates. Faced with such a dilemma, this chapter argues, policy-makers 
forge statecraft strategies. Statecraft strategies attempt to ameliorate the 
contradiction between accumulation and legitimation that is inherent in capitalist 
policy-making, but which becomes especially important in times of crisis. This 
thesis will argue that financial de- and reregulation can be theorised by examining 
two forms of crisis statecraft: palliation and depoliticised discipline. While 
palliation strategies seek to postpone the ‘day of reckoning’ and thus delay 
restructuring domestic social relations in line with global value imperatives, 
strategies of depoliticised discipline directly confront the crisis by enforcing the 
dictates of value, yet they do so in a covert manner that shields state managers from 
blame. The first three restructurings of financial regulations examined in this thesis 
– CCC, the abolition of exchange controls, and the Big Bang – must be understood 
as elements of statecraft strategies that fall on a policy spectrum between palliation 
and depoliticised discipline, sometimes constituting hybrids of both strategies. The 
final regulatory change – FSA – constituted an attempt to create a system of 
financial governance appropriate to the preceding fifteen years of liberalisation, in 
a manner that would shield policy-makers from political backlash over future 
financial crises. 
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The limits of state action 
 
Domination and the system of currencies 
 
The previous chapter explained that value is a form of wealth and a system of 
accidental self-domination that is constituted by the totality of monetary exchange 
relations across the globe. Yet it is now necessary to specify that these exchange 
relations are themselves constituted by the intercourse of different state-backed 
national and regional currencies, linked through various types of exchange rate 
mechanism (Burnham, 1990: 1).  
Through the mutual exchangeability of the Renminbi and the Real, the 
labour of an electronics manufacturing worker in Guangdong, China and the labour 
of a combine harvester operator in Mato Grasso, Brazil become instantly 
comparable in purely quantitative terms. By equating these two currencies (at a 
specific ratio), the computer hard drive and the bushel of soybeans become equated 
as different quantities of generic wealth, and the diverse types of labour that 
produced them are equated as merely different amounts of abstract labour. Such 
equality brings about a radical socialisation of people at opposite ends of the globe, 
resulting in a ‘butterfly effect’ of sorts, as an increase in labour productivity in one 
Chinese factory exerts pressures (however small) upon all other market participants 
to boost their own productivity. People become socialised under conditions of 
desperate competition – a kind of antisocial socialisation. Currency intercourse 
gives rise to global productivity and profitability averages, which are expressed 
unevenly in space as various national productivity and profitability performances 
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(see Smith, 2010), and which in turn manifest empirically as balance of payments 
disequilibria, exchange rate diversity, and an international ‘hierarchy’ or ‘pyramid’ 
of currencies (Paula et al., 2017: 187-8; Cohen, 2015: 15). Value, as such, cannot 
be understood either as a national phenomenon nor an extra-national force that 
impinges upon national economies from the outside (Bonefeld, 1993: 58). Instead, 
it is precisely the interconnection of discrete political territories through their 
respective currencies that gives rise to value as world wealth, and which subjects 
particular territories to the domination of global averages.14 This runs counter to IPE 
accounts that point to the antagonistic relations between states and markets (Gilpin, 
1987; Strange, 1996), and adds a layer of complexity to IPE theories that stress 
state/market mutual constitution (Underhill, 2000; Block and Evans, 2005). Indeed, 
as the creation and management of currencies and exchange rate regimes are matters 
of state and of state-delegated political authority – a point that this thesis shares with 
Chartalist theories of money (Knapp, 1924; Bell, 2001; Desan, 2014) – it can be 
said that states themselves produce the ties that ultimately bind them, and thus that 
the dominating pressures exerted upon policy-makers are unconsciously self-
imposed. 
Through the exchange rate, the weight of global averages directly presses 
down upon national economies: ‘just as the value form transmits the competitive 
discipline of capitalist relations to individual capitals through the role of money, it 
also transmits global capitalist discipline to national states through the international 
system of exchange rates’ (Kettell, 2004: 23). If a national economy can maintain 
                                                        
14 ‘[T]he abstraction implicit in the market system represents the domination of the 
general over the particular, of society over its captive membership’ (Adorno, 1970: 
148). 
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high rates of profit, there is a higher likelihood of strong foreign direct and portfolio 
investment inflows, exports can be competitively priced, the balance of payments 
can move into surplus, and foreign currency reserves can expand. Below average 
profitability, on the other hand, can provoke investment outflows, exports become 
less competitive and thus the balance of payments can fall into serious arrears, and 
foreign currency reserves can fall to dangerously low levels (Alami, 2018: 24). The 
manner in which global averages sanction particular territories depends on the type 
of exchange rate regime that prevails. This thesis is concerned with two particular 
regimes: the Bretton Woods system of adjustable pegged currencies, and the system 
of floating currencies that followed it.  
Under Bretton Woods, weak national economic performance tended to be 
expressed as a growing gap between the official value of the currency and its 
suspected true value. Currencies were pegged to the dollar at specific ratios, which 
was in turn pegged to gold. This meant that if the performance of a particular 
economy worsened, it would not automatically result in a depreciation of the 
currency that could help boost export competitiveness. Although an abrupt 
devaluation was allowed under Bretton Woods rules, it was interpreted by financial 
markets as an admission of failure to stick to a particular course of development, 
which could ‘unleash a torrent of capital outflows’ (Eichengreen, 2008: 120). As a 
result, a nation’s poor economic performance generally led to its currency becoming 
increasingly overvalued. This tended to encourage speculation against the 
proclaimed value of the currency, which could only be effectively offset if the 
central bank could marshal significant foreign currency reserves to purchase their 
own currency (Thomas, 1992: 54). Yet in order for central banks to have a large 
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reserve of foreign exchange to see off this threat, the economy needed to maintain 
an export surplus. Therefore, worsening profitability created a vicious circle of 
falling exports, speculative attacks, and declining foreign currency reserves to 
counter these attacks.  
The floating exchange rate system, instituted in 1973, did not release states 
from the external constraints of Bretton Woods, but rather articulated the 
sanctioning power of global averages in a different way. The floating system did 
not recreate the Gold Standard’s supposed automaticity, whereby balance of 
payments problems would be automatically rectified by allowing the currency to 
settle at the level appropriate for the national economy’s export performance (Wass, 
2008: 333). Rather than a nation’s balance of payments deficit leading to the 
growing overvaluation of their currency, as during the Bretton Woods era, deficits 
in the context of floating currencies instead gave rise to increasing speculation that 
resulted in exchange rate volatility (IMF, 1984: 12). In addition to such volatility, 
which disrupted trade and thus further worsened export performance, there was the 
danger that speculation could result in a devastating run on the national currency. 
The danger of poor trade performance provoking such speculative pressures could 
be offset by financial inflows from newly deregulated and decentralised credit 
markets (see Clift and Tomlinson, 2008), yet this in turn raised problems of growing 
indebtedness and the necessity to demonstrate national creditworthiness through 
other metrics of economic performance. Regardless of the type of exchange rate 
regime, then, the interconnection of distinct currencies creates a global system of 
abstract wealth that demands obedience to its temporal imperatives, with formidable 
sanctions for economies that fall behind.  
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The government of the day comes under tremendous pressure to wield the 
state apparatus to ensure average profitability within their territory on ‘pain of ruin’ 
(Bonefeld, 2014: 5). Failure to do so can result in the discrediting and collapse of 
the particular government, or a deeper crisis of the state’s ability to ‘define and 
enforce collectively binding decisions on the members of a society in the name of 
their common interest’ (Jessop, 1990: 341). There are a variety of instruments which 
governments utilise to pursue this necessary objective. These include, but are not 
limited to, attempts to disorganise and cheapen labour, such as anti-union 
legislation, incomes policy, or the erosion of the social safety net; the creation of 
economies of scale through state-facilitated mergers; the channelling of money into 
areas that will benefit the national economy’s external position, by, for example, 
extending special credit facilities to exporting companies or prioritising the 
disciplines within higher education that may boost productivity; the plundering of 
natural resources for national economic gain; the artificial raising of export 
profitability through currency manipulation; the fostering of a deflationary domestic 
climate by raising interest rates so as to force companies to practice wage restraint 
and rationalise their production methods; or the attempt to produce a form of civic 
responsibility premised upon immediate material sacrifice for the purpose of 
meeting long-term national goals. These various mechanisms are implemented by a 
host of governing bodies, from the treasury and central bank to departments of 
technology, labour, industry, and education. As such ‘the state’ appears as a host of 
different agencies, backed by the force of law, each attempting to pragmatically 
resolve problems within their designated fields and each subject to capture by 
particular social groups. This impression lends support to pluralist understandings 
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of financialisation. However, this appearance of a series of isolated policy 
problematics to be addressed by discrete agencies is in fact a manifestation of the 
general pressures unleashed by the integration of the national economy into an 
unconscious system of global competition over labour time.  
 
Crisis and struggle 
 
The pressures exerted upon states that cannot match global profitability averages 
are not extraordinary occurrences, but constitute the normal functioning of a system 
of impersonal domination that develops unevenly in space. Nevertheless, in periods 
of generalised crisis, such pressures intensify: the costs of inefficiency rise; the 
necessity for the state to discipline society according to the imperatives of value 
becomes more desperate; and the state consequently risks shattering the illusionary 
basis of its own ideological reproduction, namely that it is a malleable reflection of 
the democratic will of society.  
The previous chapter discussed the LTRPF as an expression of the 
contradiction inherent to capitalist society between productivity and profitability: 
while the introduction of labour-saving technology improves the profit rate of 
individual firms, it has a deflationary effect on the general price level and thus on 
the average rate of profit, which serves to generate conditions of general stagnation. 
This tendency should not be understood as an ‘economic’ phenomenon that states 
experience, but rather this contradiction plays out through state actions (see Hirsch, 
1978). Just as individual firms are under competitive pressure to increase 
productivity through labour-saving automation, state managers strategise to boost 
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national productivity through various mechanisms, including the forced closure of 
unproductive nationalised industries, the withdrawal of financial support for low 
productivity firms or sectors, the increased financial support for high productivity 
sectors, and the development of industrial technology through the public education 
system. While this may succeed in boosting the productivity of a particular 
economic territory, the general result for the state system as a whole is a downward 
pressure on average profitability. In turn, states aid firms in countering this tendency 
through efforts to increase the rate of exploitation (anti-union legislation, incomes 
policy, etc.), or cheapen the costs of fixed capital (imperial strategies to access 
untapped resources and markets), for example.   
Nevertheless, when the counteracting factors are insufficient to offset the 
deflationary impacts of rising productivity, stagnation prevails. Such conditions are 
not spatially uniform, but rather the falling average rate of profit is expressed as 
relatively high profitability in some national economies and null or negative 
profitability in others – evidenced by the different experiences of West Germany 
and the US in the 1970s (Brenner, 2006). Accelerating global price competition 
results in laggard firms facing declining retained earnings, leading them to prune 
investment plans and raise the prices of their commodities. State managers in poorly 
performing national economies experience this as the contradictory phenomenon of 
stagflation: rates of investment decline as inflationary pressure rises. As claims on 
declining social wealth intensify, via rising prices, increased lending, and growing 
state indebtedness, the money supply inflates out of proportion to the productive 
capacities of the national economy. The worsening export performance, combined 
with these distortions in the money supply, provoke speculative pressure against the 
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national currency. With falling foreign currency reserves, speculative attacks can 
force states to seek rescue (from, for example, the IMF) or face severe financial 
difficulties. As Andrew Gamble and Paul Walton (1973: 16) insisted, ‘[t]hese three 
phenomena, inflation, credit finance, and the monetary crisis are all part of the crisis 
of profitability’. 
In such conditions, states’ existing macroeconomic toolkits become rapidly 
antiquated. In the case of the late postwar crisis, the traditional tools of demand 
management became increasingly redundant as the crisis intensified. Rather than 
boosting another expansionary period, demand stimulus provoked prices hikes 
without a commensurate increase in output, because capital’s rate of return was too 
low to justify meeting increases in aggregate demand (Brenner, 2006: 159; Moseley, 
1997: 26; Carchedi, 1991: 169-74). The external effect was a further worsening of 
the balance of payments and currency reserves, as rising demand was met by an 
increase in imports, with still further speculation against the national currency. The 
crisis of the capitalist form of wealth becomes expressed, to invoke Claus Offe’s 
useful term, as a ‘crisis of crisis management’ (1976). 
However, states are not simply hemmed in by the global imperatives of 
value; they must also respond to (or at least be seen to consider) the wishes of their 
legal subjects. This is the formal political expression of the deeper contradiction 
between value and heterogeneous forms of social wealth. Whether by direct or 
indirect sanction – electoral defeat or riot – the contemporary state is pressed to live 
up to its image as ‘the embodiment of the general interest of society and as the 
neutral arbiter of all particularistic claims’ (Clarke, 1988: 128). Although the 
material reproduction of the state requires its subordination to one particular form 
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of wealth – value – its political reproduction relies on it appearing to pluralistically 
embrace a variety of social wealths. Attempts to bring national economic activity in 
line with global averages, expressed through the exchange rate, tend to jeopardise 
the meeting of people’s heterogeneous demands, and vice versa (Broz and Frieden, 
2006: 590). For example, the achievement of high national profitability may require 
the state to sacrifice the meeting of people’s needs through the disciplining of labour 
markets, underfunding of public services, and regressive restructuring of the tax 
code. On the other hand, the prioritisation of human needs and aspirations through 
an expansive social programme risks damaging national profitability and thus 
undermining the material basis of the intended redistribution. This contradiction is 
exacerbated during crises of general profitability. As states struggle to rationalise 
domestic capitals, discipline domestic labour markets, and retrench their own 
expenditure, society attempts to evade this counterintuitive ‘belt-tightening’ by 
asserting heterogeneous needs – expressed as growing industrial unrest, protest, 
political support for populist parties, increasing demand for consumer credit, etc. 
The need for the state to confine ‘the production of use values within the bounds of 
profitability’ is simply irreconcilable with its ostensible role as the political medium 
through which society advances its real aspirations and needs (Burnham, 2006: 75). 
To individual states, the world economy appears as something external, 
something that impinges upon states from without. This misapprehension is 
reflected in the traditional IPE literature, which emphasises the antagonistic 
relationship between states and markets (Gilpin, 1987; Strange, 1996). Yet, rather 
than being imposed from without, this form of domination is in fact constituted by 
the totality of monetised relations expressed through the interlocking of particular 
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territorial currencies. By plugging their national economies into the grid of global 
value relations through the convertibility of their currency, individual states 
subordinate themselves to the pressures of world averages. Against traditional IPE 
accounts of state/market relations, the appearance of external domination thus 
masks what is in fact accidental self-domination. In normal circumstances, states 
are pressured to meet average rates of profit or face growing external imbalances; 
yet during crises, such pressures assert themselves as crushing imperatives. Policy-
makers are thus necessitated to attempt to restructure domestic social relations in 
line with the temporal demands of the global value principle. Nevertheless, the 
government occupying state power must also ‘display at least a semblant of a 
connection to the views and wishes of the electorate’, or face various political 
sanctions that ultimately derive from people’s assertion of their heterogeneous 
social needs (Kettell, 2008: 631). This mismatch between states’ material and 
political reproduction has been conceptualised as the contradiction between 
‘accumulation’ and ‘legitimation’ imperatives (Offe, 1984; Watson, 2009b). The 
smooth reconciliation of these imperatives is ever elusive, not due to the personal 
faults of particular policy-makers nor the logical faults of economic theory, but 
because the state is forced to manage a form of wealth that is fundamentally 
inadequate to its subjects – a form of wealth that demands the total subjection of the 
heterogeneous variety of life to the homogenous imperative of monetary 
accumulation. In place of a genuine accommodation of the demands of value and 
need, states develop statecraft strategies that allow them to construct a façade of 
reconciliation, which will be examined next. 
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Statecraft strategies during crisis  
 
Thatcher’s first Chancellor of the Exchequer, Geoffrey Howe, wrote in his 
autobiography that the job of policy-makers resembled a ‘trudge through a 
seemingly endless series of multiple choice exam questions’ (1994: 191-2). The 
examiner in this metaphor, this thesis argues, should be understood as value: a 
global system of radical commensurability and productivity competition. In times 
of crisis, as dwindling abstract wealth provokes growing social upheaval, this 
metaphorical barrage of questioning intensifies: state managers are torn between 
imposing the discipline necessary to restart capital accumulation and meeting the 
tangible needs of their electorate. In this context, political authorities develop 
statecraft strategies to manage these opposing forces.  
Statecraft, a concept most comprehensively outlined by Jim Bulpitt (1986: 
21), denotes the strategies through which state managers seek to govern effectively 
without sacrificing their legitimacy. Bulpitt (ibid: 21-2) limits his conception of 
statecraft to four governing objectives: maintaining party unity, winning elections, 
transforming a government’s rhetoric into common sense, and achieving 
competence in the sphere of policy-making. Furthermore, he restricts his analysis 
to the ‘Court’, defined as the Prime Minister and their friends and advisors (Buller, 
1999: 694). Bulpitt’s formulation of statecraft, then, remains quite narrow and 
phenomenological. Yet it points towards a more fundamental insight, namely that 
policy-making cannot be understood simply as the implementation of political 
ideals, as in the ‘Westminster model’ (Gamble, 1990: 409), nor as the ‘shadow cast 
on society’ by lobbying groups (Dewey, 2008: 163). Rather, the political 
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governance of capitalist society requires the pragmatic, strategic accommodation of 
the irreconcilable: global and domestic concerns, accumulation and legitimation, 
and, ultimately, value and human need. In this way, the concept of statecraft has 
been marshalled as part of a broader Marxist state theory by Peter Burnham (2001), 
while others have broadened the analytical lens beyond ‘the Court’ to examine the 
strategic machinations of less senior politicians and even unelected officials 
operating within the civil service (Rogers, 2009).  
This thesis will attempt to incorporate this Marxist reading of statecraft into 
a schematic framework for understanding how policy-makers craft financial 
regulatory policy in times of crisis. It will be argued that as ailing profitability pulls 
state managers in opposite directions, two possible forms of statecraft strategy 
present themselves. Firstly, political elites can postpone the necessary state, 
corporate, and social restructuring by introducing delaying or palliative measures. 
Secondly, state managers can directly confront the crisis by disciplining social 
relations according to the imperatives of value, while depoliticising these painful 
measures so as to avoid political backlash. Particular policies often fall on a 
spectrum between these two poles, and as such constitute hybrid statecraft 
strategies. 
 
Between palliation and depoliticised discipline 
 
Palliation strategies can assume a number of different forms. For Streeck (2014), 
the history of neoliberalism is the history of changing strategies of crisis alleviation. 
The tolerance of inflation in the 1960s and 1970s, the growing public indebtedness 
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role in the 1980s, and finally the promotion of rising private debt levels in the 1990s 
and 2000s constitute attempts to ameliorate the conflicting demands of capital and 
society (ibid). These claims mirror Krippner’s argument that US financial 
deregulation was rooted in an attempt free up credit for the alleviation of social strife 
arising from the postwar crisis (2011). In addition to such grand strategies of crisis 
palliation, policies of currency manipulation, corporate tax cuts, and preferential 
economic diplomacy are also important in postponing the economic ‘day of 
reckoning’. While such palliative strategies may temporarily reconcile the 
contradiction between the imperatives of value and human need, they risk damaging 
the government’s economic credibility – with dangerous repercussions regarding 
speculation against the national currency and the government’s access to global 
credit markets. It is therefore important that crisis delaying measures do not appear 
as such; that is, that they can be dressed up for global audiences as sober evidence-
, theory-, or conviction-based policies (the Thatcher government’s public 
justification of their attempted currency manipulation through exchange control 
liberalisation is a perfect example of this, as demonstrated in Chapter 7). Palliation, 
then, is a statecraft strategy that can allow governments to embark on a temporary 
‘flight from the present’ (Bonefeld, 1995: 40). Yet it entails important dangers: by 
facilitating the expansion of credit, it risks provoking unsustainable debt levels that 
can cascade into severe financial crises, while also drawing allegations of anti-
competitive policy-making and thus endangering national creditworthiness.  
In contrast, strategies of disciplining do not shirk from the crisis, but instead 
attempt to bring about what is termed ‘adjustment’ in the sterilised language of 
economics (Agénor, 2004); that is, the restructuring of businesses, labour markets, 
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and state finances so as to place the national economy in line with global 
profitability averages and thus reignite capital accumulation. Disciplining measures 
can assume a variety of forms: the imposition of high interest rates or the facilitation 
of currency appreciation can put pressure on companies to rationalise production 
and resist wage inflation; public sector redundancies, strict trade union legislation, 
and incomes policies attempt to disorganise workers and reduce wage levels; and 
the privatisation of national assets, the introduction of departmental spending limits, 
and the creation of public debt targets aim to bring state expenditure in line with the 
performance of the national economy. However, if these attempts to restructure 
society in accordance with the temporal demands of value appear to be the result of 
discretionary policy decisions, then the governing administration can expect to pay 
at the polls or even provoke a more serious crisis of state legitimacy. As such, 
governments often seek to mask their disciplining measures through strategies of 
depoliticisation.  
Depoliticisation is a concept that has been operationalised to explain a host 
of different phenomena, from US financial deregulation (Krippner, 2011) to UK 
energy governance (Kuzemko, 2016); yet common to all is a focus on the process 
of seemingly removing the politics from a specific sphere of social life. As a 
statecraft strategy, depoliticisation refers to a form of governance in which state 
actors seek to reconcile accumulation and legitimacy objectives by seemingly 
emptying policy of its political content, so that it appears to be a purely technical 
affair. Bulpitt (1986: 28–32) writes that the discipline of governance requires state 
authorities to gain a certain autonomy from the pressures of various sections of 
society by seeking to establish ‘automatic rules or pilots’ that allow for the 
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‘euthanasia of politics’. As Flinders and Buller (2006) pointed out, depoliticisation 
strategies can be categorised into three types: institutional, whereby politicians 
delegate governance to ostensibly non-political institutions; rules-based, whereby 
decision-making discretion is curtailed by explicit rules; and preference-shaping, 
whereby rhetorical strategies are employed that portray specific social issues as 
outside of the state’s jurisdiction. The goal of depoliticisation is to place ‘at one 
remove the political character of decision-making’ so as to allow the state to achieve 
its policy goals in a more insulated and effective manner (Burnham, 2001: 128). 
These strategies are especially important during periods of crisis, such as the 
‘generalized austerity characteristic of the neoliberal era’, because the state must 
both manage a lacklustre economy and avoid blame for this poor performance in 
the eyes of the electorate (Krippner, 2007: 479).  
This thesis’ conception of depoliticisation moves beyond the somewhat 
banal association of these strategies with the reconciliation of long-term 
macroeconomic goals and short-term political business cycles. Instead, this 
understanding of depoliticisation points to a state in denial of its own nature (Offe, 
1975: 127). The contemporary state must be a capitalist state if it is to ensure its 
material reproduction, yet it must also respond to the wishes of the formally equal 
citizens that make up bourgeois civil society in order to ensure its political 
reproduction. This reflects the more fundamental contradiction between value and 
tangible social wealths that lies at the heart of capitalist society. Such an intractable 
dilemma finds its party-political expression in the form of policy ‘realism’ – 
something that Hillary Clinton (2017: 226-7) castigated Bernie Sanders for his lack 
of in her memoir:  
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He didn’t seem to mind if his math didn’t add up ... No matter how bold 
and progressive my policy proposals were … Bernie would come out with 
something even bigger, loftier, and leftier, regardless of whether it was 
realistic or not. That left me to play the unenviable role of spoilsport 
schoolmarm, pointing out that there was no way Bernie could keep his 
promises or deliver real results. 
 
Yet the constraints of political realism are not eternal and natural, but rather 
historically-specific and socially-synthetic: people’s monetised social interactions 
give rise to a form of wealth that then imposes itself upon them as an apparently 
immutable reality. Nevertheless, if state operators are to succeed politically in this 
perverted reality, they must avoid giving the impression that their inability to meet 
people’s demands results from their own ‘spoilsport’ character. Instead, by pursuing 
depoliticisation strategies, policy-makers attempt to outsource discipline to extra-
governmental mechanisms. Depoliticisation thus denotes a strategy of placing 
unpopular but materially necessary decisions beyond the bounds of what constitutes 
the state, so as to maintain the illusion of the state as a genuinely pluralist body. 
While palliation and depoliticised discipline represent opposing strategies 
for responding to crises, they should be conceptualised as two ends of a spectrum. 
A particular policy may lie somewhere in the middle of this spectrum, thus 
constituting a hybrid statecraft strategy, if it contains measures that embody both 
the former and latter strategies. For example, a policy of targeted industrial subsidies 
may, on the one hand, extend palliative credit to politically sensitive industries, 
while, on the other hand, denying credit to less politically important industries under 
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the auspices of EU rules and thus force them to enact self-discipline (see Moraitis, 
2017 for a discussion of such a policy in 1970s France). Which strategy takes 
precedence at any given moment is strongly influenced by the limits placed on state 
action by the imperatives of value and human need. If the weight of the crisis 
threatens to push the national economy over the brink, and state managers discover 
a mechanism that can veil the state’s hand in the necessary restructuring, then 
strategies of depoliticised discipline may be pursued. Yet if the political backlash is 
too strong, if society proves too resistant to its own recreation as an aggregation of 
single-minded producers, then state managers may be forced to simply ‘buy time’ 
(to borrow Streeck’s term (2014)) through palliation strategies. The framework of 
action within which state actors strategise is thus not a structural given, but is rather 
determined by the antagonistic, unruly assertions of different forms of social wealth.  
 
Financial de- and reregulation 
 
Many accounts of financialisation, particularly expropriation explanations, 
conceptualise specific financial de- and reregulations as policies designed solely to 
address the financial sector. The literature on the Big Bang, examined in Chapter 8, 
is a case in point, as it generally explains this liberalisation by reference to 
increasing financial market innovation and the consequent dynamics of competitive 
deregulation amongst advanced capitalist economies. This understanding plays into 
the theoretical parcelisation of the state into discrete agencies concerned with 
managing particular fields and subject to capture by the relevant lobbying groups. 
The repeal or transformation of financial regulations, then, tends to be explained 
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through an analysis of the relationships between state managers and financial capital 
(both national and global), without recourse to ‘external’ factors, except as 
background context. However, this fundamentally misunderstands the role of 
financial regulations as policy instruments. Such regulations should in fact be 
conceived of as tools for macroeconomic management – as instruments for the 
regulation, not just of the financial sector, but of the broader, contradictory 
dynamics of the capitalist system of wealth. Transformations in financial regulation, 
as such, signify the exhaustion of these regulations as effective tools for managing 
value, likely due to crisis, and must consequently be understood within the 
framework of statecraft strategies. This thesis will examine four of the most 
important changes in British financial regulation, which, taken together, played a 
crucial part in mediating the dual processes of productive stagnation and financial 
expansion. Each of these four policies constituted, to different degrees, strategies to 
respond to both the sputtering, warped performance of the national economy in the 
context of global crisis and the intensifying demands of British people that their 
tangible needs should not be sacrificed at the altar of capital accumulation.  
 
 
Conclusion 
 
Financialisation denotes an epoch of profound domination – an observation that is 
made repeatedly in the existing literature. States have played a central role in 
contributing to this situation, through financial de- and reregulation, and thus 
conventional expropriation and crisis resolution accounts have insisted that policy-
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makers have been dominated by the nefarious lobbying power of financial elites or 
by external economic structures. This thesis, in contrast, has attempted to 
understand domination in the era of financialisation as a form of ‘self-generated 
reflexive domination’ (Postone, 2003: 159), through an examination of Marx’s 
theory of value. Through the seemingly innocuous practice of money-mediated 
commodity exchange, people give rise to a dynamic form of wealth – value – that 
presses each participant to continually raise their productivity. Heterogeneous types 
of wealth become mere vessels for value – a homogenous, temporally-constituted 
substance – and human productive activities become geared towards the production 
of tangible goods only insofar as they embody market value. This principle of 
production as a ‘means to a means’ (ibid: 181)15 drives itself into regular crises, and 
provokes people to continually rebel, shrugging off the imperatives of value and 
asserting a variety of needs and aspirations in its stead.  
States do not stand outside this system of wealth, governing it and smoothing 
out its wrinkles. Nor are states engaged in a power struggle with these ‘market 
phenomena’, as in traditional IPE scholarship (Gilpin, 1987; Strange, 1996). Rather, 
through the creation and management of territorial currencies and exchange rate 
regimes, states directly contribute to the formation of value as a global system of 
radical equality between diverse labours and crushing competitive pressures. As a 
consequence, policy-makers are forced to maintain above average rates of profit 
within their national territories or face external imbalances, while simultaneously 
ensuring the political reproduction of the state by being seen to respond to the 
                                                        
15 Money is a ‘means’ (due to its very nature as universal equivalent it has no 
directly useful purpose) that becomes the ‘end’ of human activity.  
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citizenry’s demands. Policy-making in times of crises, when these pressures are 
heightened, should be understood as an attempt to strategically reconcile these 
contradictory imperatives: capital accumulation and political legitimacy. 
Depending on the balance of forces at any given moment, state managers may 
attempt to delay the crisis through palliative measures, directly address the crisis 
while avoiding political backlash through depoliticised disciplining measures, or 
pursue a combination of these two statecraft strategies. Financial de- and 
reregulation must be understood through precisely this lens – as strategies to 
politically manoeuvre within a system of accidentally self-imposed domination.   
This thesis will apply this theory of social self-domination to the analysis of 
four important changes in British financial regulation: the CCC measures examined 
in Chapter 6, which saw the repeal of quantitative lending limits; the abolition of 
exchange controls examined in Chapter 7, which did away with currency limits on 
inward and outward investment; the Big Bang examined Chapter 8, which 
revolutionised the practices of the LSE; and the FSA examined in Chapter 9, which 
created a new system of regulations for the British securities industry. By analysing 
the political decision-making processes underlying these regulatory changes, 
through archival analysis, it will become clear that state managers did indeed appear 
dominated, yet not by particular social groups or fractions of capital. Instead, the 
state was dominated by the threat of severe external imbalances, ultimately deriving 
from the crisis of falling profitability, and was in turn forced to reckon with the 
social conflict arising from this declining social wealth. Transformations in 
financial regulation were pursued, in the eyes of state managers, as strategies to 
either delay the impending crisis and assuage social upheaval, or restructure the 
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economy in line with global averages, while shifting the blame away from the state. 
The following chapter will provide a broad historical introduction to the period 
under examination. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
The political economy of the  
profitability crisis in Britain,  
1967-1983 
 
 
[Stagflation] well illustrates the fundamental weakness of conventional 
economic wisdom. It indubitably cannot explain what has already occurred 
and therefore we can hardly be expected to have great confidence in its 
ability to predict what is now likely to happen. Indeed our present situation 
is one which, almost by definition, conventional measures cannot resolve. 
 
Brian Reading, special adviser to Edward Heath, 10 February 1971.16 
 
 
Introduction 
 
This thesis argues that the policy changes which propelled financialisation should 
be conceptualised as statecraft strategies for governing in times of crisis. Rather 
than the state succumbing to the lobbying power of financial capital, as the 
expropriation approach argues, or the capitalist class wielding its structural power 
over policy-makers, as in crisis resolution accounts, financial de- and reregulations 
                                                        
16 TNA T 338/39, Comment by Reading, 10 February 1971. 
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in the waning years of the postwar boom must be understood as strategic responses 
to the real imperatives arising from a dominating form of social wealth – value – 
which had become mired in deep crisis and the tangible demands of an enfranchised 
electorate. Nevertheless, before moving from this level of conceptual abstraction to 
the empirical examination of the archival record, it is necessary to introduce an 
intermediary level of historical generality. This chapter will thus present a stylised 
history of Britain’s experience of the profitability crisis that gripped the global 
capitalist system in the late postwar period. A broad examination will be provided 
of the statecraft strategies – both palliative and depoliticised disciplining – 
employed by a variety of Labour and Conservative governments during the 
stagflation crisis in the years 1967-83. This sweeping historical narrative will in turn 
form a solid basis for the detailed historiographical analysis of financial regulatory 
changes in the following chapters.   
That the British economy has suffered a prolonged decline in its imperial, 
economic, and political standing on the world stage since the early 20th century is a 
relatively uncontroversial fact. Indeed, a great deal of both journalistic and 
academic ink has been spilled in an attempt to grasp the nature and causes of this 
economic deterioration. A range of culprits, charged with propelling this 
phenomenon, have been identified in the literature, including the British aristocracy, 
trade unions, politicians, and enduring cultural norms. Nevertheless, this chapter 
argues that it is crucial to conceptually separate the long decline of British might 
and the British economy’s more abrupt dip into severe crisis in the late 1960s. This 
latter occurrence must be understood as one national manifestation of the global 
profitability crisis that erupted during this period. While the crisis was characterised 
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by declining corporate rates of profit, rising inflation, and a number of other 
economic distortions, this thesis makes a significant innovation by further dividing 
this period into two distinct phases: the first, from 1967-77, saw stagflation result 
in an increasingly uncompetitive trade performance, which in turn provoked 
recurrent currency crises; while the second, from 1977-83, was characterised by a 
continuation of stagflation, but with a very strong currency, which further 
exacerbated the recessionary conditions.  
The governments in this first period faced a dilemma. Their attempts to 
postpone the worst effects of the profitability crisis through palliative measures – 
and thus ensure their continued legitimacy in the eyes of the public – tended to 
worsen Britain’s balance of payments performance and thus increase global 
pressure on sterling. This would force governments to retreat from palliative 
measures and instead impose financial discipline, often masked by a range of 
depoliticisation devices. During the second period, the problem of currency crises 
was alleviated by the appreciation of sterling, due to North Sea oil and the IMF’s 
seal of approval. Yet policy-makers faced another dilemma: the strong pound helped 
to discipline British social relations in line with global averages, but threatened to 
shatter governments’ legitimacy because of the ensuing recession. Governments 
were thus forced to deliberate between strategies that, on the one hand, aided and 
exacerbated this disciplinary pressure in order to reassert the primacy of value over 
human need, and, on the other hand, to ease and alleviate this disciplinary pressure 
through palliative measures that sought to assuage key electoral demographics. This 
chapter will demonstrate the utility of this theoretical approach by examining how, 
in the years 1967-77, the governments of Wilson, Edward Heath, and Wilson 
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(again) fluctuated between palliative and disciplining statecraft strategies, in line 
with the opposing pressures of external shocks and domestic agitation. Furthermore, 
it will be shown that both the Callaghan and Thatcher governments operated forms 
of hybridised statecraft strategies of crisis governance, which simultaneously sought 
to work with the strong pound to purge inflation from the British economy and 
rekindle profitable capital accumulation, and against the strong pound by 
attempting to provide certain sectors of the population with temporary respite from 
the worst of the crisis.  
This discussion will not simply provide a broad historical basis from which 
to examine the specificities of discrete financial de- and reregulations. Instead, these 
regulatory changes must be understood as particular elements of the larger statecraft 
strategies employed by British governments during the postwar profitability crisis. 
In this way, this chapter contributes towards situating the policy changes that 
propelled financialisation within a historical reading of the British state’s struggle 
to manage the political and economic antagonisms arising from the impersonal 
domination of global value relations during a period of crisis. 
 
 
Britain’s crisis: national, global, or both? 
 
Britain’s economic decline has been a topic of concern amongst commentators and 
policy-makers since the late 19th century, yet this anxiety transformed into an 
obsession with impending ruin as postwar growth slowed (Supple, 1994: 441). 
There emerged a proliferation of literature focussing on various aspects of lagging 
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British performance, from loss of imperial territories and markets, to flagging 
profitability, to dysfunctional industrial relations, to backwards elite cultures – 
leading Jim Tomlinson to speak of ‘declinology’ as an important narrative on 
Britain’s experiences in the twentieth century (2001: 1). This literature has taken on 
a distinctly partisan dynamic, with competing explanations of Britain’s decline 
emanating from the right and left of the UK’s political spectrum. David Coates and 
John Hillard collected a selection of such explanations in their 1986 book The 
Economic Decline of Modern Britain: The Debate Between Left and Right, which 
saw Britain’s rigid trade union movement, resistant to technological progress, pitted 
against the parasitic City and the aristocratic, anti-industry political elite as the chief 
causes of British underperformance.  
The debate on British decline, however, has been best captured by Gamble 
(1994b), who identified four key theses: imperial, cultural, supply-side, and state-
based. The first explanation examines a variety of factors relating to Britain’s role 
in the world, including the overextension of British military power, the reliance on 
imperial export markets for British manufactures and the related lack of competitive 
pressure on British producers, and the outdated use of sterling as a secondary 
international reserve currency. The second hypothesis states that ‘British culture in 
its various manifestations and institutions was (and is) anti-industrial and anti-
business’, as aristocratic elite traditions posited ‘business life and the pursuit of 
profit as vulgar and distasteful activities, unsuitable for the well-bred’ (Rubenstein, 
1993: 2). Transmitted through the public education system to both government and 
corporate boards, such an aristocratic elite culture acted to retard Britain’s industrial 
modernisation (see also the Nairn-Anderson thesis on Britain’s ‘incomplete 
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bourgeois revolution; Anderson, 1964). The supply-side thesis has focussed on the 
shortcomings of government policy. On the one hand, successive governments in 
the postwar period considered full employment to be of equal importance to price 
stability and global competitiveness, thus allowing Britain’s economic performance 
to atrophy in the name of domestic politicking. On the other hand, it is claimed that 
the British state, while adopting short-sighted Keynesian policies, failed to create a 
lasting economic development plan, which could have forged the necessary 
cooperative relations between the City, industry, and the trade unions to ensure 
competitive growth and industrial modernisation (Gamble, 1994b: 32-5). Lastly, 
and relatedly, it has been argued that Britain’s political institutions have doomed 
the UK to economic decline. In addition to the wrong-headed adoption of Keynesian 
demand management and the failure to create a developmental state, British political 
elites have also been accused of capitulating to special interests, such that political 
business cycles began to develop whereby politicians would routinely inflate the 
economy in the run-up to elections. Such a perception of UK politicians was well 
expressed by US President Lyndon B. Johnson in 1965 who, in a private message 
regarding Wilson’s unwillingness to exercise domestic economic restraint, 
compared Wilson to ‘a reckless boy that goes off and gets drunk and writes checks 
on his father’ (Schenk, 2010: 162).  
While the varied literature on British decline has pointed to important causal 
factors lying behind the UK’s relative underperformance in the 20th century, there 
is a danger that such a close national focus obscures the broader decline in the world 
economy in the 1960s, 1970s, and early 1980s. As Gamble (1994b: xix) argued: 
‘Some observers argued that there was no general crisis of capitalism, only a crisis 
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of capitalism in Britain. But general crises always take the form of national crises’. 
Capitalism is a global economic system, but one that develops unevenly in space, 
due to both the concentration of fixed capital and economies of scale in particular 
geographical zones (Smith, 2010) and the spatial variation in social struggles and 
state governance strategies. As such, while crises may impact unevenly upon 
particular national territories, the fundamental causes of such crises can only be 
located at the level of the global dynamics of capital accumulation. Indeed, Brenner 
(2006: 8) has demonstrated that the crisis of falling profitability that began to 
accelerate in the 1960s was not limited to the UK nor the US, but was also ultimately 
expressed as declining profit rates in market leaders such as Japan and West 
Germany. This is not to suggest that Britain’s peculiarities, relating to its unique 
global role, elite culture, and political institutions, did not play a part in arresting its 
economic performance, but rather it should be stressed that such national factors 
resulted in Britain experiencing a particularly acute contraction in a context of 
generalised world crisis. Furthermore, Britain’s distinct national characteristics 
meant that the global profitability crisis manifested itself in a particular, non-
generalisable way within the UK’s territory, which will be explored next. 
Economic development in Britain in the postwar period took on a lurching 
gait, which came to be referred to as ‘stop-go’. The British state acted to inflate the 
economy through demand stimulus to ensure full employment, up to the point when 
the balance of payments came under threat, at which time the brakes would be 
applied, monetary and fiscal policy would be tightened, and contraction would 
ensue (Cairncross, 1995: 14). As Samuel Brittan (1971: 455) observed, during the 
boom years, ‘Chancellors behaved like simple Pavlovian dogs responding to two 
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main stimuli: one was “a run on the reserves” and the other was “500,000 
unemployed”’. In this thesis’ theoretical language, the stop-go pattern of 
development emerged from policy-makers’ attempts to steer between accumulation 
and legitimation imperatives, which are inherent to the political governance of the 
value form of social wealth. However, this dynamic became qualitatively and 
quantitatively more severe from the late 1960s onwards as global capital 
accumulation faltered and the world economy moved into a state of crisis. As 
Brenner (2006: 99) argues, the years between 1965 and 1973 saw the advanced 
capitalist world transition from a period of boom to one of protracted crisis. As the 
misery index (the sum of inflation and unemployment) rose across the industrialised 
world in the late 1960s, British policy-makers’ tolerance for unemployment was 
forced to evolve: ‘In the early 1970s, the alarm bells rang at one million; in the late 
1970s, at one and a half million’ (Brittan, 1995: 130).  
 
 
Figure 2. British corporate rate of profit, calculated at current cost (Mouatt, 2016: 290). 
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Britain’s corporate profit rate tumbled from 15 per cent in 1960, to eight per 
cent in 1970, to four per cent in 1974. Consequently, company liquidity collapsed, 
hovering around zero in 1965, before plummeting to a deficit of more than £1,000 
million in 1970 and £8,000 million in 1974 (CBI, 1977: 15-17).  
In response, businesses enacted two strategies to stay afloat. Firstly, 
companies took on increasing debt burdens. Debt-to-equity ratios began to rise in 
the 1960s and accelerated towards the end of the decade. Manufacturing companies’ 
debt-to-equity (capital gearing) ratios rose from 20 per cent in 1960, to 49 per cent 
in 1970, to 59 per cent in 1975 (ibid). Furthermore, between 1956 and 1960, 90 per 
cent of industrial and commercial companies’ funds came from internal sources 
(chiefly retained profits) and just 10 per cent came from external sources (bank 
borrowing, government grants etc.). Yet by 1966–70, the ratio had changed to 80 
per cent and 20 per cent (Thomas, 1978: 310). Secondly, businesses cut back 
investment plans and raised prices. Whereas demand stimulus policies had 
previously heralded a ‘go’ period, by provoking firms to meet rising demand with 
increased output, in the late 1960s and 1970s companies increasingly ‘responded to 
the government stimulation of demand by raising their prices at a faster rate in order 
to reverse the decline in their rate of profit’ (Moseley, 1997: 60). This dynamic, 
combined with rising world prices, resulted in the rate of inflation creeping upwards. 
While the annual inflation rate had not exceeded 5.2 per cent since the Korean War, 
it rose to 9.4 per cent in 1971 before skyrocketing to 22.7 per cent following the 
1973 oil shocks. These trends began to distort and warp the money supply 
aggregates – variables that came under increasing scrutiny in policy circles – as M0, 
M1, M3, and £M3 rose steeply from the mid-1960s and became increasingly 
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volatile. Finally, this spiralling economic performance resulted in an increasingly 
precarious external position. The current account of the balance of payments was in 
deficit for three of the six years from 1964-70, before plummeting to a deficit of 
more than £1,000 million in 1973 and remaining in deficit for the next five years.  
 
 
Figure 3. UK Consumer Price Index annual inflation rate, per cent (Bank of England, 2018). 
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and do his sums again – with a new slide rule. For … it was clearly impossible to 
combine 2.75 per cent unemployment with 15 per cent wage increases’. Yet this 
was precisely the economic situation that Britain faced in 1970. This, for Reading, 
‘illustrate[d] the fundamental weakness of conventional economic wisdom’. ‘[O]ur 
present situation’, he argued’, ‘is one which, almost by definition, conventional 
measures cannot resolve’.17  
The new economic common sense that is said to have replaced Keynesian 
demand management during this period was monetarism. As Peter Hall (1993: 279) 
argues, the period from 1970-89 was ‘marked by a radical shift from Keynesian to 
monetarist modes of macroeconomic regulation, which entailed simultaneous 
changes in all three components of policy: the instrument settings, the instruments 
themselves, and the hierarchy of goals behind policy’. However, there is significant 
debate regarding both the nature and chronology of this ideational shift. Jacqueline 
Best (2004) points out that the dominant policy paradigm in the postwar boom 
period was not purely Keynesian, but rather constituted what Paul Samuelson 
termed the ‘neoclassical synthesis’ of Keynesian macroeconomics with 
‘neoclassical microeconomic principles’ (Backhouse and Boianovsky, 2013: 41). It 
was this synthesis that began to cede ground to monetarism in the 1970s. In addition, 
while certain scholars indicate the Thatcher administration’s genuine faith in 
monetarist doctrine (Jones, 2012), others insist that the Thatcher administration 
pragmatically adopted monetarism as an intellectual justification for deflation – as 
Lawson is said to have commented in the 1970s: ‘the conditions for monetarism in 
Britain do not exist. What are they? Water cannon’ (quoted in Needham, 2014: 165). 
                                                        
17 TNA T 338/39, Comment by Reading, 10 February 1971. 
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Regarding the temporality of monetarism’s ascent, certain scholars have pointed to 
Thatcher’s predecessors, focussing on Healey’s ‘unbelieving monetarism’ (Dow, 
2013: 69), or even the early monetary targeting imposed by the IMF in the late 1960s 
(Clift and Tomlinson, 2008). Common to these varying perspectives, however, is 
the recognition that the deterioration of Britain’s postwar political economy 
provoked a realignment of policy wisdom and economic orthodoxy, whereby 
monetary policy came to occupy a much more important position in the regulation 
of capital accumulation.  
The following section will provide a sweeping examination of how the 
different governments in the period from 1967-83 experienced and responded to the 
global profitability crisis and its specifically British manifestations. This discussion 
will in turn provide a solid historical base for the proceeding archival analyses of 
particular financial de- and reregulations – as these transformations in regulatory 
policy cannot be understood separately from the broader macroeconomic strategies 
taking place at the time.  
 
 
Governing stagflation 
 
The stagflation crisis in Britain was not experienced by policy-makers as a 
homogenous period; nor was this era simply one of ever deepening economic decay. 
Instead, this thesis categorises the stagflation crisis in a novel way, by splitting it 
into two periods, which are unique to the British manifestation of the global 
profitability crisis. The first, from 1967-77, was characterised by rapidly falling 
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profitability, careening inflation, and the periodic recurrence of currency crises 
related to poor export performance. The second, from 1977-83, was characterised 
by low and stagnant profitability, a strong pound (propped up by North Sea oil and 
the IMF’s seal of approval), high inflation, and depressionary domestic conditions. 
Thus, while policy-makers in the first period were plagued with concerns over 
current account deficits, runs on sterling, and the level of the foreign currency 
reserves, policy-makers in the second period were somewhat insulated from such 
external crises – creating a superficial air of economic recovery. Nevertheless, the 
positive external position masked the real emaciation of the non-oil economy and 
the strong pound further exacerbated the effects of the profitability crisis, plunging 
the British economy into an unprecedentedly deep recession. 
The administrations that governed during this period relied on myriad policy 
instruments to manage the conflicting imperatives of declining surplus value and 
stubborn human needs. Yet these various policies should be understood as existing 
on a spectrum between strategies of palliation and depoliticised discipline. 
Governments in the period 1967-77 tended to oscillate between these two strategies: 
the political pressures arising from stagnating living standards and trade union 
agitation pressed governments to delay the crisis through expansionist policies, until 
pressures on the currency became so great that governments’ popular legitimacy 
concerns were sacrificed to rescue the immediate external position. In the 1977-83 
period, governments were torn between embracing the deeply deflationary effects 
of the strong pound because of its disciplinary effects on the British economy, and 
resisting sterling’s appreciation due to the ensuing recession’s erosion of state 
legitimacy. In some respects, this mirrors the stop-go development pattern of the 
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broader post-war boom years, yet it also took on a new dynamic. Policies that would 
have previously resulted in a ‘go’ period, increasingly amounted only to a partial 
easing of the deeply stagnant character of British economic development. By 
contrast, the ‘stop’ periods began to result in such economic pain and social strife 
(while having quite a limited effect in reducing inflation) that policy-makers 
increasingly attempted to depoliticise these disciplinary measures through a range 
of mechanisms. As such, this era was characterised by governments’ repeated 
employment of palliative strategies, depoliticised disciplining strategies, or some 
hybrid of the two, in order to navigate Britain through a system of global value 
relations in deep crisis.  
 
From one currency crisis to the next, 1967-77 
 
Wilson’s government had taken office in 1964 with grand ambitions for British 
economic development. Labour’s ‘National Plan’ included the creation of the 
National Board for Prices and Incomes, which attempted to create greater 
coordination between employers and unions. Meanwhile, the Ministry of 
Technology, the Industrial Reorganisation Corporation, and the Industrial 
Expansion Act sought to jump-start the modernisation of British industry and propel 
higher productivity growth (Cairncross, 1995: 171). This was fundamentally not a 
crisis governing strategy. It was rather an attempt to transcend the tired back and 
forth of stop-go, and set Britain on a growth-led path of modernisation and global 
competitiveness. However, instead of dedicating their term to pursuing this 
proactive scheme, Wilson’s administration was rocked by three sterling crises – 
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November 1964, July 1965, and July 1966 – and spent much of their remaining 
years entangled in ‘a day-to-day struggle to support the pound’ (ibid: 150).  
Labour was determined not to devalue sterling, and thus the government set 
about deflating domestic demand and seeking financial aid from foreign central 
banks and the IMF (Schenk, 2010: 155). Nevertheless, in November 1967 Wilson 
capitulated and announced a downward step-change in the pound’s price from $2.80 
to $2.40 (Needham, 2014: 21). In support of devaluation, the government agreed a 
standby arrangement with the IMF and foreign central banks, and introduced the 
most deflationary budget since the war, which included tax increases, public 
expenditure cuts, and a tightening of monetary policy. Furthermore, a series of 
changes to industrial relations were made. The White Paper In Place of Strife was 
published in 1969, which sought to give the Secretary of State for Employment and 
Productivity the discretionary powers to require a ballot before any official strike 
action that would seriously affect the economy, and the power to order a pause to 
strikes that were unconstitutional or which had not resulted from ‘adequate’ 
discussions (Blackby, 1979: 50). The Donovan Committee, which had been formed 
in 1965, also reported in 1968 – recommending a series of measures to disrupt shop 
floor organising as a way to tackle inflation and restore the profitability of capital 
(Clarke, 1988: 302).  
The ‘immediate task’, former Treasury official Peter Browning wrote, ‘was 
to deflate home demand to release resources for the growth of the exports which 
would, in due course, flow from devaluation’ (1986: 20). If successful, it was hoped 
that these measures could help Britain to break free from the trajectory of worsening 
competitiveness that was plunging the economy into repeated currency crises. By 
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enforcing strict financial discipline, somewhat depoliticised by IMF conditionalities 
and the threat of external crises, the government intended to restructure British 
social relations in line with slowing global capital accumulation. To a degree, this 
was successful. Chancellor Roy Jenkins, who had replaced Callaghan following the 
1967 devaluation, presided over a £1 billion reversal in the balance of payments 
between 1967 and 1970 and a Public Sector Borrowing Requirement (PSBR) that 
went into the negative (ibid: 24).  
It was this relatively positive outlook, in the context of a weakening global 
economy, that Heath’s Conservative government inherited in 1970; and it was this 
firm economic basis from which Heath intended to launch a radical break with his 
predecessor’s struggle to reconcile the pressures of militant domestic unions and 
external constraints. As Heath himself argued: ‘We were returning to office to 
change the course of history of this nation – nothing less’ (Blackby, 1979: 52). The 
plan was to institute a form of ‘liberal Keynesianism’, which consisted of 
abandoning Wilson’s industrial policy and turning to the nascent EEC, disengaging 
from the system of industrial relations while reforming the trade unions, reducing 
state expenditure, and tightening monetary policy (Clarke, 1988: 307-8). A core 
tenet of this administration’s ‘Quiet Revolution’, Martin Holmes (1997: 37) has 
argued, was that ‘less government interference with market forces would help to 
restore competition and profitability to British industry after the years of inefficient 
socialist planning and indiscriminately wasteful subsidies’. In a sense, this was a 
project of economic disciplining without a depoliticisation mechanism.  
Yet, much like during the Wilson years, such ambition faded in the face of 
the accelerating stagflation crisis. The passing of the 1971 Industrial Relations Act, 
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which built upon and strengthened the recommendations of the Donovan 
Committee, met instant and fierce backlash from the unions. Following the act’s 
attempt to limit wildcat strikes through the creation of the National Industrial 
Relations Court, the TUC launched the ‘Kill the Bill’ campaign, the Amalgamated 
Engineering Union launched a one-day strike, and the Transport and General 
Workers Union were fined by the Court for their refusal to comply (BBC, 1971; 
Dorey, 1995: 72). Furthermore, the Heath administration’s moderate 
denationalisations and discontinuations of state support for ailing firms were shaken 
by legitimacy concerns as the economy entered deeper into crisis. The government 
responded to the bankruptcy of Rolls Royce with a large package of state subsidies, 
and despite initially refusing to extend the same support to the foundering Upper 
Clyde Shipbuilders, a wave of industrial action by shipyard workers forced Heath 
to rescue the company in February 1972 (Holmes, 1997: 42-44). More important 
than any particular event, however, was the level of unemployment, which breached 
one million in January 1972. As a result, Chancellor Anthony Barber’s March 1972 
budget consisted of the so-called ‘dash for growth’, whereby a five per cent growth 
rate was projected, accompanied by an expansionary fiscal policy and a relaxation 
of monetary policy – despite the 1971 CCC measures that the Bank had hoped 
would allow for interest rates to be more easily raised to combat inflation 
(Needham, 2014: 50). Demonstrating the government’s newfound commitment to 
postponing the crisis, despite their initially anti-interventionist rhetoric, Barber 
claimed in a speech to Parliament that he was willing to sacrifice the exchange rate 
in order to hit the growth targets (Browning, 1986: 35-6).  
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The result of this shift from politicised discipline to an expansionist, 
palliative programme was the intensification of the dynamics of stagflation. In 
addition to fuelling a rise in imports and inflation, the ‘Barber Boom’ provoked a 
spike in investment in the property market, rather than in export-oriented industries 
(Scott, 1996: 187). This was aided by the CCC deregulation, which in the absence 
of high interest rates acted to boost bank lending for property development. In the 
summer of 1972, as the balance of payments began to deteriorate and inflation 
continued rising, there was a substantial move out of sterling (Cairncross, 1996: 
132). The Bank responded by purchasing sterling, with the aid of foreign central 
banks (Needham, 2014: 56). Yet this put unsustainable pressure on the international 
currency reserves, and the pound was ultimately floated in June (Cairncross, 1995: 
192). This contributed to the collapse of the Bretton Woods system of adjustable 
pegged exchange rates, which in turn further added to the speculative forces that 
exerted pressure on the currencies of deficit economies.  
These expansionary policies also did little to dampen wage claims. The 
attempt to negotiate a voluntary incomes policy was shattered by the February 1972 
miners’ strike, and by November this had given way to an imposed wage and price 
freeze, which was itself undermined by the miners’ militancy (Britton, 1994: 14-5). 
The March 1973 budget nonetheless restated the five per cent growth target, and by 
the middle of the year the balance of payments was £1,500 million in deficit – that 
is, before the oil shocks (Cairncross, 1995: 192). Heath attempted to institute a final 
incomes policy in November 1973, which promised that earnings would 
automatically increase to compensate for increases in inflation over seven per cent; 
yet this too was rejected by the National Union of Miners, who began an overtime 
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ban. The resulting sharp reduction in coal output, coinciding with the oil price hike 
and a record trade deficit, led to growing pressure on sterling and ultimately pushed 
Heath to enact a ‘reverse’ budget in December, which saw cuts of £1.2 billion in 
public expenditure (Holmes, 1997: 108). The asset price bubble – which had been 
developing since 1972 – subsequently burst, leaving the secondary banks highly 
overexposed to falling property prices and forcing the government to launch a 
‘lifeboat’ operation to rescue them (Needham, 2014: 191). Finally, in early 1974, 
following another miners’ strike during the government’s three-day week measures, 
Heath called a general election on the question of ‘Who governs Britain?’, failed to 
get a majority, and consequently resigned. 
Heath’s government had initially attempted to directly address the 
snowballing stagflation crisis through a radical disengagement from Keynesian 
forms of industrial relations and state-industry support: the discipline of the market 
would be brought to bear upon Britain’s rigidified and uncompetitive economic 
relations. Yet this disciplining project became rapidly politicised, as it was neither 
justified by an immediately treacherous external position (considering the 
circumstances inherited from Wilson) nor underpinned by a coherent intellectual 
defence (as opposed to Thatcher’s monetarist experiment) (Hall, 1993). Instead, 
Heath’s economic tightening resulted in bankruptcies and growing unemployment, 
which directly challenged the government’s legitimacy. The resulting policy U-turn 
consisted of selective palliation measures, designed to assuage the most militant 
fractions of the working class, while simultaneously attempting to kick-start growth 
in an uncompetitive national economy within a context of global crisis. Such 
expansionary measures in the absence of corporate profitability acted to expand 
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imports faster than exports, thus undermining the balance of payments, boosting 
inflationary pressures, and contributing to a growing property bubble (Clarke, 1988: 
310). 
Following Heath’s defeat, Wilson returned to office (with a Parliamentary 
minority), yet without the far-reaching ambitions that had characterised his previous 
administration’s National Plan. Nevertheless, the Wilson government did formulate, 
through the TUC/Labour Party Liaison Committee, a scheme to create a ‘self-
reinforcing spiral of disinflation’ called the Social Contract (Britton, 1994: 19). 
Labour attempted to distance themselves from Heath’s incomes policy by 
committing to voluntary collective bargaining and suggesting that the government 
would enact price controls and expand welfare subsidies in exchange for wage 
restraint on the part of the unions (Rogers, 2009: 638). This policy quickly ran up 
against the reality of rapidly rising inflation and a growing external deficit, and the 
Social Contract transformed into what Britton (1994: 20) has called ‘frustrated 
Keynesianism’.  
In 1974, demand remained depressed, investment was slowing, and the 
current account deficit stood at £3.3 billion (Rogers, 2009: 639). Simultaneously, 
from July 1974 to July 1975, wages rose by 33 per cent and retail prices by 26 per 
cent (Cairncross, 1995: 203). The government responded with a mildly 
contractionary budget that attempted to shift resources from the personal sector to 
the corporate exporting sector. Yet by December 1974, Permanent Secretary of the 
Treasury Douglas Wass observed that ‘the economic costs of clinging to the existing 
[Social Contract] policy outweigh the political costs of abandoning it’ (quoted in 
Rogers, 2009: 641). As Chris Rogers (2009) has shown, Denis Healey’s Treasury 
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used the twin ‘non-crises’ of 1975 – namely the fall in sterling’s price and the 
government’s drawing from the IMF credit facility – to justify cuts in public 
expenditure and a pivot towards a disciplinary incomes policy. Consequently, the 
Wilson government’s pay policy was announced in July 1975, whereby a weekly 
wage increase ceiling of £6 was implemented, in order to reduce the rate of inflation 
(Needham, 2014: 88); while in November, following the application to the IMF, 
Healey announced that 50 per cent of state spending would be subject to cash limits 
(ibid: 182). Although this succeeded to a certain extent in tackling inflation, which 
fell from 22.7 per cent in 1975 to 15.7 per cent in 1976, unemployment began to 
increase to politically difficult levels (Bank of England, 2018). The government’s 
answer was not reflation, but rather to support ailing firms through the establishment 
of the National Enterprise Board. As Britton (1994: 28) writes, there was a ‘political 
and social need for government to do something about unemployment, even though 
its hands were tied for the present on macroeconomic policy’.  
The Wilson government’s reversal, which Peter Jay of The Times called one 
of the most ‘painful re-examinations of cherished commitments that any 
Government has ever undertaken in peacetime’, had some success in combatting the 
worst of the profitability crisis (quoted in Browning, 1986: 71). Inflation fell, 
investment began to increase, and the balance of payments deficit reduced in size 
(ibid). In order to further alleviate British exporters’ lack of competitiveness, and 
thus aid the balance of payments recovery, Healey sought a depreciation of sterling. 
Nevertheless, when sterling indeed began to slide downwards in March 1976, the 
government used this to create an air of crisis of confidence in the pound, thus 
justifying £1 billion in public spending cuts in July (Rogers, 2013). In spite of 
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Wilson’s resignation and his succession by Callaghan, this strategy continued 
throughout 1976, as the government negotiated an IMF bailout that would 
depoliticise the deflationary measures that the government itself privately 
acknowledged were necessary (ibid). The resulting $3.9 billion loan, agreed upon 
in December, was attached to a range of conditionalities, including a two-year 
ceiling on PSBR, £1 and £1.5 billion in public spending cuts over two years, DCE 
targets, and the sale of state-owned petroleum shares (Harmon, 1997: 12-3). By 
appealing to the IMF for conditional assistance, the government sought to limit its 
own ‘freedom of action’, and thus reassure global markets of Labour’s credibility 
while simultaneously allowing it to pursue domestic disciplining without shattering 
its popular legitimacy (Britton, 1994: 32).   
Although it was not immediately clear at the time, the Callaghan 
government’s rescue by the IMF would usher in a new phase of the profitability 
crisis. The periodic oscillation between palliative and disciplining strategies, in 
rhythm with the recurrent sterling crises, would give way to a different dynamic. 
With the pound set on a path of continual appreciation, British governments were 
faced with a dilemma: support the rise in sterling’s price due to its deflationary, 
disciplining effects; or attempt to relieve the pressure of the strong pound on the 
domestic economy in order to preserve governing legitimacy. The crisis governing 
strategies that emerged in this period attempted to do both simultaneously.  
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The strong pound and the lurch into depression, 1977-1983 
 
The British experience of the global profitability crisis had, until 1977, been 
characterised chiefly by a periodic struggle to defend the price of sterling in the 
context of a deteriorating balance of payments performance. Foreign currency 
reserves, as such, were rarely in abundance, and had to be periodically run down in 
order to prop up the pound. Following the IMF’s intervention, however, this 
situation changed dramatically. The sharp appreciation of sterling allowed the Bank 
to ‘cream off’ foreign currency and replenish the reserves, which reached £20.2 
billion in November 1977 (Dow, 2013: 281). Furthermore, North Sea oil, which 
began to flow in 1975, began to constitute a significant proportion of British exports 
in 1977, which further boosted sterling (Booth, 1995: 78).  
 
 
Figure 4. UK official international currency reserves, $US million (Howson, 1994: 232). 
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Nevertheless, this loosening of the external constraints on British policy-
makers did not imply their complete insulation from the global crisis. The strong 
pound both masked and exacerbated the decimation of non-oil industrial companies’ 
rate of profit, and the rate of inflation remained at historic highs despite the 
disinflationary pressures of the exchange rate. The dilemmas created by the 
profitability crisis simply changed form: rather than finding themselves pressed on 
both sides by the tangible demands of their electorate for the maintenance of living 
standards, on the one hand, and the threat of currency crisis, on the other; the British 
state was now forced to reconcile the deflationary, disciplining effects of the strong 
pound and the growing resistance from various sections of society to the resulting 
depressionary conditions.  
In order to repay the IMF loan, the Callaghan government needed to ensure 
economic growth. Yet this could not come by way of demand stimulus reflation, 
without sacrificing the IMF-imposed DCE targets. Export-led growth appeared to 
be the only solution, but the rising price of sterling was making this increasingly 
difficult (Britton, 1994: 33). In order to achieve a rise in exports, then, the Callaghan 
government attempted to purchase the TUC’s acquiescence to wage restraint 
through a series of tax cuts announced in July 1977 (Needham, 2014: 183). An 
expansionary mini budget was also announced in October, in reaction to the increase 
of unemployment over 1.2 million. In addition, the government sought to reduce the 
upward pressure on sterling by lowering interest rates and liberalising exchange 
controls, which were partially dismantled in December 1977 and January 1978 
(ibid). Following the revelation that the PSBR had actually been below the IMF 
target in 1977, the government launched another moderately expansionary budget 
 153 
in April 1978, which led to an erosion of the balance of payments recovery as 
demand increased (ibid).  
At this time, fears within the government began to intensify that the recent 
confidence in sterling may not last, and that by the time the post-IMF boost in 
sterling wore off, the non-oil exporting sector of the economy would have already 
been decimated and deindustrialised. In July 1978, Callaghan consequently 
published a White Paper called Winning the Battle Against Inflation, which stated a 
five per cent guideline for wage increases (Britton, 1994: 319). This strict incomes 
policy would, it was hoped, allow the government to increase the competitiveness 
of British industry by combatting inflation, without the need to increase interest 
rates and thus further exacerbate sterling’s rise. This, however, was not to be. The 
TUC rejected the five per cent guideline in September, and the Labour Party rejected 
any form of pay restraint at their party conference in October (Needham, 2014: 125). 
This paved the way for a devastating wave of industrial action, known as the ‘Winter 
of Discontent’, which began with Ford workers winning a 17 per cent wage hike in 
November 1978 and peaked with a one-day strike by 1.5 million public sector 
workers in January 1979 (Cairncross, 1995: 223). Labour subsequently lost the May 
General Election to Thatcher’s Conservative Party.  
The Thatcher governments have been the subject of intense academic 
scrutiny for decades (Hall, 1988; Kavanagh, 1990; Gamble, 1994a), with at least six 
key theses on Thatcherism existing within the literature (Jessop, 1988). Perhaps the 
phase of Thatcher’s reign that has provoked the most debate has been the 
government’s ‘monetarist experiment’ in the early 1980s (Thain, 1985; Bulpitt, 
1986; Tomlinson, 2007). The chief point of contention regarding this issue has been 
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the degree of intentionality behind the Thatcher administration’s recessionary 
policies. While Eric Evans (2004) has argued that the Thatcher government plunged 
the British economy into a deep recession in order to break the back of the labour 
movement, Duncan Needham (2014) has insisted that the economic shock was a 
‘mistake’ deriving from the government’s unfamiliarity with monetary targeting. 
Yet rather than relying on this ‘intentional versus accidental’ schema, this period 
can be better understood by grasping the contradictory role of recession in the 
reproduction of capitalist wealth: the Thatcher administration’s contractionary 
policies were intended to purge inflation from the British economy and reinstitute 
profitable capital accumulation, yet the ensuing depressionary conditions also 
threatened to undermine the government’s legitimacy. The monetarist experiment 
can thus be understood as a negotiated attempt to reconcile accumulation and 
legitimation imperatives through a hybrid governing strategy that fused elements of 
both palliation and depoliticised discipline.  
Chancellor Howe’s first budget in July 1979 was quite contradictory, as it 
consisted of deep counter-inflationary expenditure cuts and an interest rate hike, as 
well as inflationary VAT increases. In addition, the government removed the 
remaining exchange controls in July and October, in an effort to ease sterling’s rise. 
Howe’s second budget, on the other hand, was unambiguously contractionary. In 
March 1980, the government set out MTFS – a framework of yearly declining 
targets for the money supply and PSBR. This policy, it was hoped, would lock the 
government in to a project of severe financial discipline: ‘If the targets were not met 
there would be automatic fiscal or monetary changes in government policy. The 
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room for discretionary economic management, which was held to have be so 
destabilising in the past, would be drastically reduced’ (Gamble, 1994a: 109).  
However, this strategy of depoliticised discipline required a degree of 
perseverance that Thatcher did not possess, despite popular opinion to the contrary. 
In 1980, the stagflation crisis reached its most critical stage and the British economy 
experienced the worst economic downturn since the interwar period. Faced with 
more than two million unemployed, record levels of bankruptcies, and a collapse in 
GDP, Thatcher reneged on the MTFS commitments by reducing interest rates – 
despite the fact that the money supply aggregates were far exceeding the proclaimed 
targets (Britton, 1994: 53). As Needham (2014: 162) has wryly observed, ‘the lady 
was for turning’. The government consequently enacted a hybridised crisis 
governing strategy. Palliative assistance was extended to the worst affected firms 
and to homeowners, through a relaxation of interest rates that was intended to ease 
corporate and mortgage debt repayments, as well as depreciating sterling to the 
advantage of exporters (Tomlinson, 2007: 9). Simultaneously, the government 
attempted to stick to its MTFS target commitments by balancing the loosening of 
monetary discipline with more draconian expenditure cuts and tax increases, as well 
as by selling massive quantities of government debt to soak up excess liquidity 
(Dow, 2013: 12; Goodhart, 1995: 106). In order to aid the anti-inflationary push, 
the government moved forward with restrictive trade union legislation with the 1980 
Employment Act, which banned secondary picketing, attempted to disrupt the 
closed shop, and provided state aid for secret ballots (Dorey, 1995: 116). As such, 
by the March 1981 budget, the Thatcher administration was operating a deeply 
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contradictory governing strategy – pressing their feet on both the brake and the 
accelerator simultaneously.  
This hybridised governing strategy continued throughout 1982 and most of 
1983. Bank lending continued to grow, making a mockery of the government’s 
MTFS targets; yet unemployment also climbed above three million (Dow, 2013: 
290). The government thus continued to rely on fiscal tightening and massive 
government debt sales to combat monetary growth, while loose monetary policy 
was intended to keep the worst effects of the recession at bay – particularly in the 
run-up to the June 1983 general election. Furthermore, additional restrictions on 
labour organising were introduced with the 1982 Employment Act, which redefined 
trade disputes (Dorey, 1995: 126). Nevertheless, the worst of the stagflation crisis 
was over. In 1983, British profitability climbed to eight per cent, the highest level 
since 1973, and inflation fell below five per cent, the lowest since 1968 (Mouatt, 
2016: 290; Bank of England, 2018). Nationally, this recovery was due to the depth 
of the preceding recession and the consequent fall in wage and capital costs; while 
globally, the profitability crisis had reached its trough and the world economy began 
to experience an upturn.  
 
Situating financial de- and reregulation  
 
The above stylised history of the governance of the stagflation crisis does not serve 
simply as a historical background against which the analysis of financial 
transformation can be framed. Instead, the discrete regulatory changes that will be 
analysed in this thesis constituted one aspect of British policy-makers’ broader 
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response to the global profitability crisis and its national manifestations. Financial 
de- and reregulations during this period served as elements of a strategy to manage 
both the dominating imperatives of a system of social wealth mired in deep crisis, 
and the legitimacy imperatives arising from a population that was unwilling to 
sacrifice its tangible needs and demands in the name of national competitiveness.  
The first deregulation analysed in this thesis is the 1971 CCC measures. This 
was largely the brainchild of the Bank, which pursued this policy for a variety of 
reasons – both political and technical. Yet CCC’s embrace by the Treasury must be 
understood through the lens of crisis governance. Following the 1967 devaluation, 
and subsequent contractionary measures, demands by both cash-strapped 
companies and persons for access to credit placed increasing strain on the British 
banking system and threatened to further increase inflation. In this context, CCC 
appeared to constitute a mechanism to extend palliative credit to the industrial 
export sector, while enforcing financial discipline upon persons – ultimately to 
improve the balance of payments – and all depoliticised by the cold, rational hand 
of marketised interest rates. The political support for this policy, as such, cannot be 
separated from the broader attempt – pursued by both the Wilson and Heath 
governments – to discipline the British economy in line with global market averages 
in the aftermath of a series of currency crises, without provoking electoral backlash.  
The second policy examined in this thesis is the abolition of exchange 
controls. This policy was bi-partisan, as it was pursued by both the Callaghan and 
Thatcher administrations. This deregulation must be understood in the context of 
the second phase of the British stagflation crisis, as outlined in this chapter. After 
1976, the rising price of the pound aided the government in the battle against 
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inflation, yet threatened to decimate the already unprofitable industrial exporting 
sector, with politically unacceptable results for employment and living standards. 
The dismantling of exchange controls, carried out between 1977 and 1979, 
constituted a palliative measure to bring some relief to exporters by encouraging a 
depreciation of the pound and thus artificially boosting their competitiveness. Yet 
in the aftermath of the collapse of Bretton Woods, such an overtly beggar-thy-
neighbour policy had the potential to spook financial markets, and thus cause a mass 
exodus of investment out of sterling. As such, this deregulation was publicly 
justified by laissez-faire rhetoric that sought to convince markets that this was an 
ideologically motivated policy. In this sense, exchange control abolition cannot be 
understood in separation from both the Callaghan and Thatcher governments’ 
attempts to reconcile the disciplining effects of the strong pound with the need to 
extend some form of palliation to the most economically and politically sensitive 
constituencies. 
The third deregulation analysed in the coming chapters is the Big Bang. This 
monumental transformation of the LSE formally took place in 1986, yet it had been 
gestating for a number of years. The evidence provided in this thesis demonstrates 
that this policy was intimately connected to the Thatcher government’s MTFS 
scheme. As a sort of policy straitjacket, MTFS was designed to allow the 
government to discipline domestic social relations in line with global averages in a 
depoliticised manner, without being forced to fold under the pressure of popular 
resistance. However, as discussed above, this monetary tightening was quickly 
abandoned in the face of a terrible recession. Nevertheless, in order to preserve any 
semblance of this policy framework, it was crucial that the government demonstrate 
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that it could hit the monetary policy objectives set out in MTFS. The key mechanism 
through which the Thatcher administration was pursuing this was the sale of 
government debt on the LSE – a mechanism that was severely threatened by the 
RPC’s court case against the LSE. Thus, in order to maintain the perceived 
coherence of MTFS, the government exempted the LSE from the RPC case in July 
1983 – an event that began the countdown to the Big Bang. This deregulation, as 
such, constituted an attempt to rescue the government’s crisis governing strategy of 
depoliticised discipline, in spite of the weakening of policy-makers’ resolve and the 
consequent resort to palliative monetary policy. 
The final regulatory change covered by this thesis is, in some respects, the 
odd one out. Passed in 1986, and deliberated upon from 1982, the FSA lies almost 
completely outside of the historical timeframe examined in this chapter. This is 
because, unlike the other three changes, the FSA was not part of a crisis governing 
statecraft strategy; in fact the British and world economies were already on a 
cyclical upswing by the time the policy was passed. Rather, this regulatory change 
should be understood as a strategy to retroactively impart some coherence upon the 
crisis-era deregulations that had preceded it. The Big Bang had opened up the LSE 
to global financial actors, and had contributed to a much more fragile and volatile 
form of British capital accumulation. The FSA was a reregulation that attempted to 
institute a clear and effective legal framework for the City’s securities industry. Yet 
this presented a dilemma for the Thatcher government: while this reregulation was 
necessary to ensure global capital that the City was a safe place to do business, the 
increasing state responsibility for the financial sector could undermine the 
government’s legitimacy if there was a serious financial crisis – a likely prospect. 
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The FSA was consequently recrafted in a depoliticised manner, whereby a 
‘lightning conductor’ agency was inserted between the government and the City, so 
as to insulate the government from City scandals and insulate the City from political 
meddling. Thus, while not directly a statecraft strategy of crisis governance – neither 
palliative nor disciplining – the FSA attempted to tie a bow on the preceding decade 
and a half of financial deregulations and protect governing legitimacy from any 
political fallout from the new dynamic of financialised growth.  
 
Chronology 
 
16 October 1964 Wilson elected Prime Minister 
16 September 1965 National Plan published 
18 November 1967 Sterling devalued from $2.80 to $2.40 
19 March 1968 Chancellor Jenkins introduces disciplinary budget 
15 April 1969  Jenkins delivers a second disciplinary budget 
18 June 1970  Heath elected Prime Minister 
16 September 1971 CCC launched 
21 March 1972 Heath’s ‘dash for growth’ budget is delivered 
9 October 1972 Bank Rate replaced by MLR 
22 December 1972 UK joins EEC 
October 1973  OPEC raises oil prices 
21 December 1973 Lifeboat operation launched in reaction to Secondary 
Banking crisis 
4 March 1974  Minority government formed by Wilson 
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10 October 1974 Wilson wins majority 
11 July 1975  Wilson introduces £6 pay policy 
4 March 1976  Sterling devaluation 
16 March 1976 Wilson succeeded by Callaghan 
29 September 1976  Healey announces application to IMF 
26 October 1977  Exchange controls relaxed 
1 January 1978  Exchange controls further relaxed 
6 September 1978 TUC rejects government’s wage guidelines 
22 January 1979 Massive public sector strike 
February 1979  LSE referred to the RPC 
4 May 1979   Thatcher elected Prime Minister 
12 June 1979   Exchange controls relaxed again 
16 October 1979  Thatcher announces that she will not exempt LSE from RPC 
case 
23 October 1979  Remaining exchange controls abolished 
26 March 1980 MTFS launched in Chancellor Geoffrey Howe’s budget 
July 1980  MLR reduced despite MTFS commitments 
August 1980  Unemployment exceeds two million 
10 March 1981 Budget in which Howe both raises taxes and lowers MLR 
July 1981  Gower commissioned to review UK securities regulation  
January 1982  Gower’s Discussion Document is published 
9 March 1982   MTFS relaunched 
9 June 1983   Thatcher wins General Election 
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19 July 1983 Goodison/Parkinson agreement begins countdown to Big 
Bang 
January 1984   Gower Report is published 
January 1985   Financial services White Paper published 
27 October 1986 Big Bang reforms implemented 
7 November 1986 FSA gains Royal Assent 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
While there has been a long-standing tradition of analysing British decline, which 
stretches back to the late 19th century, it is important to distinguish between the long 
decline of the British imperial economy, and the more dramatic stagflation crisis 
that erupted in the late 1960s. British stagflation, one national manifestation of a 
global phenomenon, can be further divided into two distinct periods. The first, 
which lasted from 1967-77, was characterised by a declining trade performance and 
consequently by repeated currency crises. As a result, the governments that ruled 
during these periods tended to oscillate between two forms of crisis governing 
strategy. Palliative measures designed to delay the accelerating crisis and preserve 
the government’s legitimacy tended to worsen the balance of payments and spark 
sterling crises. Policy-makers would consequently impose a programme of financial 
discipline, to rescue the external position, and often attempt to mask these measures 
through some form of depoliticisation device. This back and forth pattern from 
palliation to depoliticised discipline can be clearly seen in Wilson’s move from the 
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ambitious ‘National Plan’ to the post-devaluation contractionary measures, the 
transformation of Heath’s initially austere and unpopular ‘Quiet Revolution’ into 
the economically disastrous ‘Dash for Growth’, and the abandonment of Wilson’s 
‘Social Contract’ in favour of spending cuts and tough incomes policy. 
Governments during this first period of stagflation were torn between balance of 
payments pressures and trade union agitation, which were ultimately expressions of 
the contradiction between accumulation and legitimacy imperatives and, at a more 
fundamental level, the opposition between value and tangible social needs.  
The second period, from 1977-83, took on a different dynamic. The 
appreciation of the pound, provoked by North Sea oil and the IMF’s seal of 
approval, insulated the British economy from currency crises; yet it brought 
problems of its own. The strong pound aided the government in its disciplinary 
battle against inflation, but threatened to plunge the British economy into a 
politically unacceptable level of recession. As such, the Thatcher government 
during this period sought to navigate this dilemma by implementing a hybridised 
crisis statecraft strategy, which combined further disciplining measures with 
selective forms of palliation designed to assuage important constituencies.  
This chapter thus sought to provide a stylised history of the British state’s 
management of the profitability crisis that struck the global economy in the late 
1960s. The political governance of the stagflation crisis tended to take the form of 
a combination of palliation and depoliticised disciplining strategies. These statecraft 
strategies sought to achieve some reconciliation between the opposing legitimacy 
and accumulation imperatives generated by the crisis of a dominating system of 
social wealth. The following chapters will demonstrate how the discrete financial 
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de- and reregulations that spurred processes of financialisation in Britain must be 
understood as props of the broader palliation and disciplining strategies examined 
in this chapter. This will contribute towards this thesis’ wider argument that the 
state’s role in propelling financialisation does not derive primarily from financial 
lobbying nor from the structural power of the capitalist class, but must rather be 
explained as a political response to the impersonal, crisis-ridden form of social 
domination that emerges from capitalist social relations.  
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CHAPTER SIX 
Competition and  
Credit Control 
 
 
[Y]ou spoke of consumer horses which could not be reined in by higher 
interest rates, and of investment horses which could be led to water but not 
made to drink: I am encouraged to try to flog what I am sure must now be 
a dead one. 
 
R. G. Smethurst to Michael Posner, 8 March 1971.18 
 
 
Introduction 
 
CCC, introduced in 1971 and effectively abandoned in 1973, marked the biggest 
change in postwar monetary policy and the British state’s first major action in 
fuelling financialisation. It revolutionised the way in which the authorities sought 
to control bank lending, the money supply, and inflation, by shifting emphasis away 
from quantitative restrictions on how much banks could lend and towards the use of 
interest rates to restrict the flow of credit. The state relinquished its capacity to 
channel funds towards different strategic priorities and instead delegated this 
                                                        
18 TNA T 326/1261, Smethurst to Posner, 8 March 1971. 
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responsibility to the price mechanism. In doing so, many of the key state- and 
private sector-imposed limits on the expansion of financial activities were 
dismantled, allowing a bonanza of lending and secondary trading to take place that 
ultimately resulted in the 1973 Secondary Banking Crisis. CCC, as such, was a 
fundamental element in the British state’s broader propulsion of processes of 
financial expansion and productive stagnation. It is therefore crucial, in order to 
understand the state’s role in furthering financialisation, to examine the British 
government’s motivation for passing this radical policy change.  
It will be demonstrated in this chapter that neither the expropriation nor 
crisis resolution explanations are sufficient for understanding CCC. This 
liberalisation was not enacted due to financial capital’s unique access to the levers 
of political power, nor was it an automatic reaction to the threat of an investment 
strike by profit-seeking capitalists. Instead, CCC must be understood as a political 
response to a crisis that did not appear to emanate from any particular sociological 
class, but instead derived from the very form of wealth that emerges from capitalist 
exchange relations. During the profitability crisis that put paid to the postwar boom, 
the tensions between value and human need appeared before the state as a 
contradiction between the necessity to both rekindle profitable capital accumulation 
and maintain governing legitimacy. The British state, in seeking to reconcile this 
contradiction, developed statecraft strategies that attempted to either discipline 
domestic social relations in line with value imperatives, or postpone the crisis 
through palliative measures and thus ensure political legitimacy. The government’s 
passing of CCC, it will be shown, must be understood as a strategic response to the 
impersonal, decentered domination of capitalist social relations in a period of crisis.  
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First, this chapter will examine the governing dilemmas facing the British 
state. In response to a series of damaging currency crises, which reflected Britain’s 
worsening trade performance in a context of falling global profitability, the Wilson 
government devalued sterling in 1967 and enacted a series of contractionary 
measures with the aim of achieving a sustainable balance of payments surplus. In 
order to support this financial disciplining, the government made efforts to tighten 
monetary policy through the existing framework of credit controls, which relied 
heavily on lending ceilings. However, two obstacles to this objective emerged. 
Firstly, wage earners responded to the economic contraction by increasing their 
personal borrowing, which tended to inflate consumption and increase imports. 
Secondly, companies were facing a severe liquidity crisis, largely due to falling 
profitability, which threatened to depress exports. Both the Wilson and Heath 
governments therefore needed to simultaneously restrict credit to persons and 
expand credit for companies, yet this proved nearly impossible with the existing 
credit control toolkit. In addition, in their attempts to manufacture a redistribution 
of credit resources from wage earners to companies, the state risked politicising 
monetary policy and endangering governing legitimacy.  
Next, this chapter will argue that, due to the aforementioned shortcomings 
of the existing system of credit controls – their functional inadequacy and 
increasingly politicised nature – the Bank’s CCC proposals appealed to the Heath 
government and Treasury officials. While there were concerns about the new 
scheme’s implications for government debt sales and its inability to discriminate 
between persons and companies, the Bank successfully argued that by relying on 
higher interest rates, CCC would render credit prohibitively expensive for many 
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personal borrowers but still accessible to companies – a point that was also 
emphasised by the CBI. In addition, by allowing the government to seemingly let 
go of the reins of monetary policy, CCC could allow this regressive redistribution 
of credit resources to be effected in a depoliticised manner that veiled the state’s 
hand and thus ensure continued governing legitimacy.  
This radical financial deregulation was not passed due to the lobbying power 
of the City or the hegemony of pro-finance ideas; nor was it an automatic response 
by the state to the economic crisis. Instead, CCC constituted a strategic attempt to 
balance the intensifying legitimacy and accumulation imperatives that resulted from 
the accelerating profitability crisis. It was conceived by the government as a tool to 
reconcile the impersonal domination of global value relations with the tangible 
demands by people that their material needs be met. By abolishing many of the 
quantitative limits on bank lending and delegating authority to marketised interest 
rates, the British state attempted to extend palliative credit to ailing exporters while 
disciplining wage earners in a depoliticised manner.  
 
 
CCC and financialisation 
 
CCC was a radical restructuring of the mechanics of British monetary policy and an 
important policy change in the propulsion of financialisation. Previously, the 
authorities utilised six key instruments to guide monetary policy: liquidity controls, 
a weak measure that only applied to the clearing banks and was easy to circumvent; 
hire purchase controls, which limited the purchase of consumer goods by 
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instalment; open market operations, which meant the government sold or bought 
gilt-edged securities to or from the non-bank sector in order to influence the level 
of bank lending; Bank Rate, the interest rate at which the Bank loaned money to the 
clearing banks; special deposits, which were deposits that banks would be requested 
to hold at the Bank in order to reduce their liquid assets and thus their lending 
capacity; and lending ceilings, a combination of formal and informal requests for 
banks to keep their total lending below a certain level (see Needham, 2014: 14–18). 
CCC swept much of this policy toolkit away, leaving a stripped-down system that 
functioned largely through market mechanisms. Lending ceilings and hire purchase 
controls were abolished, as was the London clearing bank cartel that had 
manipulated interest rates. Banks’ interest rates were no longer directly linked to 
Bank Rate, but were instead allowed to move as banks wished, although broadly in 
line with Bank Rate. Bank Rate itself was soon replaced by the Minimum Lending 
Rate (MLR) – a partly marketised mechanism that tied the rate at which the Bank 
lent to the clearing banks to the going market rate for Treasury bills (Moran, 1984). 
While special deposits were retained for emergency use, it was interest rates that 
now acted as the central monetary policy instrument. CCC, in short, represented a 
radical marketisation of monetary policy, whereby credit came to be allocated to 
whoever could pay the highest interest rate.  
By all accounts, this was a disaster: the broad money supply grew by 72 per 
cent in this period; bank lending to the private sector rose from £1.9 to £6.4 billion 
in a single year; credit was funnelled not to exporting industries, but into an 
increasingly inflated property market; and finally this property bubble burst with 
the Secondary Banking Crisis in 1973, heralding an end to a quarter century of 
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relative financial stability (Needham, 2014: 46; Wilson Committee, 1980: 7). In the 
four decades since, this pattern of inflating and bursting of asset bubbles has become 
very familiar. CCC, as such, was one of the earliest deregulations that launched the 
British economy onto a path of increasingly financialised capital accumulation 
(Pettifor, 2017: 129).   
This radical departure from monetary policy orthodoxy emerged from the 
increasing economic and political dislocations that arose in the early years of the 
profitability crisis. As discussed in the previous chapter, Wilson devalued sterling 
in November 1967, after a severe currency crisis that resulted from Britain’s 
worsening global performance and domestic trade union agitation. This devaluation 
amounted to, as Clarke and Pulay (2012: 52) put it, ‘a recognition that a country’s 
living standards have become too high in relation to its productivity: its price-levels 
have got out of line with those of other countries. And devaluation is deliberately 
intended… to lower living standards by raising prices’. In aid of this goal, Labour 
also introduced a package of contractionary measures, which included tax increases, 
public expenditure cuts and a tightening of monetary policy. This last policy became 
the centrepiece of the government’s strategy to discipline the domestic political 
economy and consequently boost Britain’s export performance. The puzzle that will 
be examined in this chapter is: if the government intended to rely heavily on 
monetary policy to discipline the British economy, why did Britain abandon its 
comprehensive and multi-faceted monetary policy toolkit in favour of the stripped-
down CCC mechanisms?  
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Existing interpretations 
 
IPE scholarship has paid little attention to CCC, due to both its relative obscurity to 
non-British politics experts and the fact that it falls outside the generally accepted 
timeline of neoliberal financial regulatory restructuring. Nevertheless, the existing 
literature that has focussed on the causes of CCC’s introduction has focussed chiefly 
on the role of the Bank. This is unsurprising, as it was indeed the Bank that 
formulated the CCC proposals. For such a sharp break from previous monetary 
governance, it might be expected that the Bank would have laboriously worked 
through the proposed changes with the Treasury. Yet the Bank first informed the 
Treasury of its progress in January 1971 and the new regime was up and running by 
September the same year. Several global and domestic factors have been highlighted 
in the literature as having contributed to the Bank’s decision to propose these 
changes. 
Firstly, as Britain encountered increasing financial troubles during the 
1960s, the authorities repeatedly drew from IMF stand-by arrangements with 
progressively stricter conditionalities (Clift and Tomlinson, 2012). After 
devaluation in 1967, the government secured a £1.4 billion loan, the most important 
condition of which was adherence to a monetary aggregate called DCE. A pressured 
and contested re-education process took place during this period, beginning with an 
IMF seminar in London in 1968 on the centrality of monetary targets and leading to 
the formation of the Money Supply Group and the Monetary Policy Group within 
the Bank (ibid). The Bank began to transform from an institution without a great 
deal of economic expertise to one that intervened in global debates on monetary 
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theory. While Gowland (1978) and Needham (2014) disagree on the timing of this 
development, it is widely accepted that British policy-makers had become 
increasingly open to monetary targeting in the run-up to CCC – making use of 
monetary aggregates and econometric evidence. Indeed, after a follow-up seminar 
in 1970, IMF official Jacques Polak commented: ‘There is little difference between 
us on the importance of the role of money’ (Capie, 2010: 459). For this reason, CCC 
can be understood as a natural outgrowth of the increasing focus on monetary policy 
within the Bank.    
Secondly, there was growing dissatisfaction with lending ceilings within the 
Bank – a sentiment that was reinforced by City lobbying. As the money supply 
increased rapidly, it ushered in a transformation in British banking. Clearing banks 
began to lose market share to institutions offering higher interest rates. There was 
significant disintermediation, as money flowed into the inter-corporate loan market, 
money markets, and fringe banks (Gowland, 1978: 84). In this context, lending 
ceilings became very difficult to impose because they punished the already 
uncompetitive clearing banks by forcing them to deny overdraft facilities to the 
corporate sector and invoke possible lawsuits (Goodhart, 2014: 3). On top of the 
authorities’ frustration was added lobbying pressure from the City. In his seminal 
account, Moran (1984: 44) explains that as clearing banks became in danger of 
being eclipsed, their ‘private complaints [turned] into an unprecedented series of 
public protests’. The Bank was particularly receptive to this lobbying, especially 
because they used the clearing cartels as an intermediary through which to transmit 
monetary policy changes to the banking system as a whole (Needham, 2014: 30-
31). The need therefore emerged for a policy that would bolster the institutions, 
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namely the clearing banks, over which the Bank could best exercise a degree of 
control. By abolishing the clearing bank cartel, CCC would thus force the clearing 
banks to compete with the emerging fringe banks. 
Thirdly, and relatedly, a desire for greater competition in the banking sector 
was emerging within policy circles. The Bank Governor voiced his concern in 1971 
that ‘inhibiting competition between banks can do much damage to the vigour and 
vitality of the entire banking system’ (Gowland, 1978: 84). Similarly, the National 
Board for Prices and Incomes released a report in 1967 that criticised the 
uncompetitive clearing banks, and advised that they should expand, diversify, and 
increase transparency in order to remain viable. Four years later, the Crowther 
Committee report lent support to this argument, and went further in emphasising 
that credit should be allocated according to the competitive principles of the market 
(Capie, 2010: 442). Nevertheless, it is impossible to separate the growing popularity 
of the competitiveness mantra from the material conditions of a clearing bank 
system in dire straits. As Moran (1984) argues, it was not so much competitiveness 
as an abstract principle that became the vogue (although there were certain 
ideologues who pressed for this regardless of the consequences), but rather a 
pragmatic kind of competitiveness that would rescue the vessel (clearing banks) 
through which the authorities’ carried out monetary policy. This reading therefore 
emphasises the practical importance of CCC for the functionality of British 
monetary policy. 
Fourthly, the pace of financial innovation and the Bank’s theoretical 
development was unduly slowed by political roadblocks. Bank working groups 
amalgamated new monetarist theory and trial-and-error policy experience, 
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proposing innovative strategies that fell largely on deaf ears within the Wilson 
administration. In fact, Bank official Kit McMahon argued that one of the reasons 
the Bank had adopted the IMF’s monetary targets was to place an external constraint 
on government (Capie, 2010: 455). However, with the victory of Heath in 1970, the 
Bank hoped to find a more receptive audience. As the dual phenomena of stagnating 
output and monetary expansion intensified during 1970, the Bank called on the new 
Chancellor Barber to raise interest rates, but was rebuffed (Needham, 2014: 37-39). 
This stinging rebuke further spurred the Bank’s desperation to circumvent the 
traditional avenues of monetary control. Indeed, Burnham (2007: 413) proposes that 
CCC represented an opportunity for the Bank to ‘shore up its traditional role that 
had been questioned repeatedly since 1945’. CCC can therefore be understood as a 
political strategy employed by the Bank to wrestle monetary control away from the 
government, by placing such a strong emphasis on interest rates.  
The aforementioned factors explain the Bank’s desire to institute a more 
laissez-faire system, but the reasons for the Treasury’s acceptance of CCC are less 
clear. While the final CCC paper was drafted in spring 1971, the Bank had informed 
the Treasury of its progress in January and sent earlier drafts to them in February – 
rather late in the day, but still enough time for the Treasury to make its influence 
felt. The Treasury’s collective thought process during this period has been explained 
in a number of ways. Some authors have treated this issue, to a large extent, as a 
black box. Gowland’s (1978) influential account ignores the Treasury’s role 
altogether, while Capie (2010) is decidedly unclear on the Treasury’s reasoning. 
Peden (2004) simply comments that the Treasury was reluctant to agree to the 
Bank’s proposals, before concluding that the Heath government’s ‘competitiveness’ 
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ideology was enough to push the changes through – a point that Burnham (2011: 
465) also emphasises. Margaret Reid (1982), in still the most detailed study of the 
Secondary Banking Crisis, uses the Treasury’s acceptance of CCC to deduce their 
rationale, rather than the other way around: clearly if the Treasury accepted CCC’s 
departure from credit ceilings then they must have been willing to prioritise interest 
rates.  
Needham (2014), on the other hand, probes deeper, arguing that the Treasury 
had already developed an affinity with the Bank’s approach to credit control, 
following the IMF-instigated experiments with monetary targeting. Furthermore, 
the Treasury was misled, along with Ministers, into thinking that CCC was about 
something that it was not, namely genuine competition. For Moran (1984), who 
devotes the most space to considering the diverse pressures faced by the Treasury, 
the Treasury’s assent was gained by a combination of the Bank winning the 
intellectual argument and exploiting the new Chancellor’s naivety. Even more 
importantly, the ‘introduction of CCC was a sign that the cheap credit lobby 
[industry] in Whitehall had been eclipsed’ (ibid: 52). Moran (ibid: 51) argues that 
‘[t]hroughout the 1960s’ industrial investors had been ‘influentially represented’ in 
Whitehall, resulting in a bias towards the provision of affordable credit. CCC’s 
introduction, which heralded an increase in the price of credit, represented a 
momentary blip in this industrial lobbying power, as City interests temporarily 
gained pride of place. Yet industry’s ‘eclipse was brief’ (ibid: 52), as the cheap 
credit lobby suddenly regained influence once CCC was in place, explaining the 
consequent reluctance of the Heath administration to raise Bank Rate.  
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This chapter will overcome the lack of clarity on the government’s 
motivations for approving the CCC proposals. The focus on the Treasury in 
particular derives from the fact that its role in passing CCC has faced little academic 
scrutiny, unlike the part played by the Bank. This chapter will argue that, following 
the 1967 devaluation, two important obstacles stood in the way of the government’s 
attempt to mount a sustained balance of payments recovery. Firstly, people reacted 
to the government’s contractionary policies by extending their borrowing, which 
acted to boost consumption and thus imports. Secondly, the falling rate of profit had 
seriously eroded corporate liquidity, which threatened to depress exports. The 
existing system of credit controls proved incapable of both restricting personal 
borrowing and extending credit to companies; and monetary policy thus became 
increasingly politicised, threatening government legitimacy. In this context, the 
government’s acceptance of CCC must be understood as an attempt to discipline 
wage earners, while simultaneously extending palliative aid to exporters, through a 
depoliticised mechanism of monetary control.  
 
 
The Treasury’s dilemma 
 
As discussed in the previous chapter, Britain’s stagflation crisis should be 
understood not simply as an event with a clear starting point – say, the 1973 oil 
shocks – but instead as a particular expression of capital’s falling profitability, 
which had begun to gather pace in the 1960s. In turn, this global profitability crisis 
was itself not chiefly determined by conjunctural factors, but by the inner tensions 
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of the capitalist form of wealth, whereby individual capitals are forced to compete 
through labour-saving automation: a process that results in increasing material 
output, but relatively decreasing levels of value – a social substance. In Britain, this 
phenomenon took the form of two distinct crisis phases: 1967-77 was characterised 
by recurrent currency crises, and 1977-83 by a strong pound and deep recession.  
CCC, as stated above, was directly situated in the first period of the 
profitability crisis. Following the 1967 devaluation, the Wilson government 
attempted to bring the British economy in line with global averages through a steep 
contraction. This would rescue Britain’s balance of payments position and insure 
against future speculative attacks on sterling. Monetary tightening was the jewel in 
the crown of this disciplining project. This strategy, however, quickly ran up against 
two quite intractable problems. Firstly, people responded to the economic 
contraction by increasing their borrowing, which in turn boosted consumption and 
resulted in a commensurate increase in imports. Secondly, companies found 
themselves facing a liquidity crisis, as the falling rate of corporate profit began to 
bite upon their internal finances, which damaged Britain’s export prospects. It thus 
appeared that in order to maintain the post-devaluation balance of payments 
recovery, it was necessary to address the first problem by limiting personal 
borrowing, and the second problem by extending credit to exporting firms. In other 
words, the personal sector had to face financial discipline, while palliative measures 
would be extended to strategic exporters. Yet this proved extremely difficult within 
the existing system of monetary control. It was this contradiction, combined with 
the painfully politicised and oppositional nature of the lending ceilings system, that 
paved the way for the Treasury’s acceptance of CCC.  
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Personal borrowing 
 
A key monetary policy goal, following devaluation, was to reduce lending for 
personal consumption, constrain consumption, and thus reduce imports. This focus 
on personal borrowing was just one aspect of a larger package of austerity measures 
that attacked the living standards of British people, conducted in the name of 
rescuing the current account. The austerity that accompanied devaluation in 1967 
hit wage earners hard, as the wage share of GDP had peaked in the early 1960s and 
had since begun to decline (Murphy, 2011). In response, people extended their 
borrowing as a way to bolster their incomes. Lending to persons continued to 
increase for a full nine months after the monetary tightening that accompanied 
devaluation.19 As a result, total consumer spending was running higher in the second 
half of 1968 than 1967, despite the Budget’s aim to reduce it by two per cent. This 
came as a surprise to Chancellor Jenkins:  
                   
It could not be argued that the Budget had been insufficiently harsh in 
respect of personal consumption, yet it was clear that people were very 
resistant to lowering their standard of living. There was little reason to 
believe that they would not take countervailing action to maintain their 
standard of living … [I]f additional measures were needed before the 
Budget he would be inclined to move on monetary policy, for example by 
lowering the ceiling for bank advances.20 
                                                        
19 TNA T 326/961, Bank lending: Developments up to end-October, 22 November 
1968. 
20 TNA T 326/961, Dowler to Hawtin, 25 October 1968. 
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Thus, in November 1968 the credit ceiling was reduced further to 98 per cent of its 
1967 level, with credit for exports and shipbuilding excluded. This approach saw 
the authorities explicitly politicise monetary policy as a tool to transfer resources 
away from persons and towards companies. As Treasury economist Arnold Lovell 
told Armstrong later that year: ‘We do not want to inhibit industrial expansion or 
activity I would have thought … we do want to curb the growth in consumer 
demand, in the hope that this will encourage the shift of resources into exports’.21 
While this policy was exercised through the clearing banks, who bore the brunt of 
borrowers’ frustration, this conflict was then transmitted through to the authorities, 
as government relations with the banks became fraught. 
Indeed, the banks quickly developed ways to evade the authorities’ controls, 
as they themselves began to lose customers to new secondary banks. The main 
finance houses started to ignore the government’s requests to provide personal loans 
with terms at least as strict as the hire purchase rules, and even began receiving 
smaller deposits and granting longer loan repayment periods – all of which boosted 
the expansion of consumer credit. By April 1971, Barclays had announced the 
launch of a new personal loans scheme that would compete with those offered by 
Midland and Natwest. This would extend credit ‘from £100 to £1,000, to anyone 
over 18, whether a customer of Barclays or not, who is credit-worthy and in regular 
employment’.22 While the high interest rates on these loans reassured the authorities 
that their introduction would not lead to a massive aggregate increase in lending, 
                                                        
21 TNA T 326/961, Lovell to Armstrong, 14 November 1968. 
22 TNA T 326/1352, Note for the Record, 15 April 1971. 
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they nevertheless represented an ‘embarrassing’ circumvention of monetary 
policy.23 Furthermore, these developments were a worrying indication of what was 
to come: ‘It is clear that the banks see the consumer loan market as the major area 
for expansion over the years ahead and are preparing themselves for a major assault 
on that market’.24 With the lending ceiling proving increasingly unable to meet the 
Treasury’s aim of effecting a shift of resources away from domestic consumption, 
it appeared that the existing monetary regime was living on borrowed time.  
In addition to wielding monetary policy to directly attack personal 
consumption, the Treasury also did so indirectly by using credit control to reduce 
consumption through its effects upon industrial relations. Industrial conflict 
intensified from the mid-1960s, with the number of days lost to strikes rising from 
2.8 million in 1967 to 10.9 million in 1970 when the Conservatives arrived in power 
(Whittingham and Towers, 1977: 77). From the Treasury’s perspective, this strife 
meant that any perceived relaxation of monetary policy could be interpreted by the 
unions as the beginning of another boom period, fuelling bolder pay demands.25 In 
addition, if monetary policy relaxation boosted demand when industrial output was 
crippled by strikes, the effect on the balance of payments would be damaging. This 
was a particular concern with regards to the British auto industry: ‘There was a 
distinct chance of industrial unrest and if this transpired it would be dangerous to 
stimulate demand for cars since the effect would be to increase imports’.26  
                                                        
23 TNA T 326/1352, Cassell to Ryrie, 16 April 1971. 
24 TNA T 326/1352, Cassell to Ryrie, 16 April 1971. 
25 TNA T 326/1109, Note of a Meeting in the Chancellor’s Room, 16 January 
1970. 
26 TNA T 326/1109, Note of a Meeting in the Chancellor’s Room, 16 January 
1970. 
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This goal – to starve the flames of industrial conflict by tightening credit – 
came into direct conflict with the need to relieve industry’s increasing financial 
difficulties in order to boost exports. Treasury official Wass wrote in June 1971 that 
credit relaxation would ‘enable the [car] industry to sustain their medium term 
investment plans, and so establish their competitive position vis-a-vis the Common 
Market producers’, and ‘if other things were equal, we would I am sure want to 
support the case for some relaxation on industrial grounds’.27 Yet this would send 
the wrong message to car firms with regards to pay settlements:  
 
Unfortunately other things are not equal. The industry has undoubtedly 
been the maverick of employers in the private sector so far as incomes 
restraint is concerned. It has totally disregarded the Government’s 
exhortations to exercise moderation: and although Fords did stand up to 
strong union pressure for several weeks, in the event they climbed down 
and conceded a two-year inflationary pay award.28 
 
As such, if any monetary relaxation took place ‘the industry will I am sure feel that 
it has nothing to fear from the Government and that much of the talk about 
punishment for those who transgress in the field of pay negotiations is without 
substance’.29 This case highlights the inability of existing monetary controls to 
adequately address the balance of payments problems. The same action necessary 
to rescue the financial position and investment plans of exporting companies would 
                                                        
27 TNA T 326/1263, Wass to Henley, 10 June 1971. 
28 TNA T 326/1263, Wass to Henley, 10 June 1971. 
29 TNA T 326/1263, Wass to Henley, 10 June 1971. 
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encourage inflationary pay claims that raised the price of British exports and 
increased the demand for imports.  
Following a series of currency crises and the 1967 devaluation, the British 
state attempted to restructure domestic social relations in line with global value 
imperatives through economic disciplining. This policy, however, was threatened 
by the stubborn refusal of British wage earners to accept declining living standards, 
which led to an increase in personal borrowing and rising wage claims, which in 
turn threatened to boost imports and jeopardise the balance of payments recovery. 
Both the Wilson and Heath governments, then, faced pressures to curtail personal 
borrowing by tightening credit controls. Yet, as will be examined next, this 
monetary tightening ironically risked damaging the balance of payments in another 
way, namely by starving cash-strapped industrial exporters of much needed credit.  
 
Corporate liquidity 
 
The crisis in corporate liquidity was recognised by the Treasury later than the 
personal borrowing boom, yet when it was acknowledged it was regarded as a 
fundamental challenge to their governing strategy. As detailed in the previous 
chapter, the falling corporate rate of profit had, by the late 1960s, led to a critical 
drying up of company liquidity. Such was the deterioration of companies’ financial 
positions that it became increasingly difficult for many of them to fund existing 
working capital, let alone commit capital to future investments. This was 
exacerbated by the policy of credit ceilings, which strangled the flow of bank 
lending that had made up for the decline of companies’ internal funds.  
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Throughout 1969, evidence mounted that suggested the company liquidity 
shortage was beginning to jeopardise the balance of payments recovery.30 Statistics 
showed that between November 1967 and mid-September 1969, London clearing 
bank lending rose by £563 million – £537 million of which was to manufacturing 
industry.31 In a meeting on 18 December, the Bank Governor Leslie O’Brien argued 
that some monetary easing was now appropriate, although only ‘without giving the 
impression of any general relaxation’.32 These pressures intensified in 1970. In 
January, O’Brien informed Jenkins: 
 
our monetary forecasts project an extremely tight financial position for 
companies, especially in this current quarter, but also beyond if present 
policies continue unchanged. So far it appears that companies have coped 
with the squeeze on them by running down their liquid resources, taking 
trade credit wherever possible, repatriating funds from abroad and 
economising on stocks … The question is whether, nevertheless, 
companies will be forced by the financial stringency to prune their 
investment plans unless steps are taken to enable them to acquire extra 
finance from the banks, from the capital market or from the Government.33 
 
Statistical analyses from February to May 1970 showed that the majority of bank 
advances had been to manufacturing industry, particularly engineering, followed by 
construction and mining. Indeed, when the Chancellor inquired about the causes of 
                                                        
30 TNA T 326/962, Control of Bank Lending to the Private Sector, 27 March 1969. 
31 TNA T 326/963, Lovell to Neale, 16 October 1969. 
32 TNA T 326/963, Record of a Meeting, 19 December 1969. 
33 TNA T 326/1109, O’Brien to Jenkins, 9 January 1970. 
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the rise in bank lending at a meeting on 27 July, the Bank Governor replied that one 
crucial factor was the ‘difficult liquidity position of the company sector’.34 Financial 
forecasting later in the year concluded that corporate liquidity was ‘exceptionally 
tight by past standards’, such that it was feared companies would try to extend their 
borrowing at home and abroad or ‘be tempted to cut back or postpone some of their 
investment’.35  
A contradiction began to emerge in the Treasury’s handling of monetary 
policy. On the one hand, the expansion of the money supply, which had gained new 
importance since the IMF’s latest intervention, suggested that significant tightening 
was necessary. By reducing personal loans and deterring inflationary pay 
settlements, this would dampen the demand for imports. On the other hand, the 
performance of the company sector pointed in the opposite direction. If falling 
profitability was undermining companies’ investment plans, then Britain could not 
export its way out of its balance of payments problems unless companies could 
secure adequate credit. As Treasury official R. J. Painter explained to Second 
Permanent Secretary Frank Figgures in August 1970: 
 
the forecast financial position of companies still looked very tight, and 
this… throws up the question whether continuation of present policies 
would cause companies to cut back their investment plans. At the same 
time we have to recognise that action of any kind which facilitated a larger 
increase in the money supply could tend to affect the reserves adversely.36  
                                                        
34 TNA T 326/1352, Note for the Record, 27 July 1970. 
35 TNA T 326/1352, Painter to Figgures, 7 August 1970. 
36 TNA T 326/1352, Policy on Bank Lending, 7 August 1970. 
 185 
 
Furthermore, if the government did not extend certain palliative measures to 
companies, then not only would the balance of payments objectives be jeopardised, 
but it could result in serious legitimacy problems. In July 1970, Wass argued to the 
Chancellor and Governor that without an effective monetary tightening, it might 
look as if the government had abandoned its money supply targets. However, ‘[t]en 
days ago he would have been in favour of responding to the bank advance figures 
by means of calling for more special deposits, but he did not feel able to advise this 
any longer, in view of the latest unemployment figures’.37 Indeed, this was not 
simply a technical problem. Despite the significant improvement in the balance of 
payments in 1969 and 1970, the recessionary effects of the shortage in company 
liquidity threatened to provoke serious social unrest. The CBI Director-General 
explained in a 1970 draft letter that too severe a monetary tightening would 
represent ‘what I might call solution by catastrophe [which] would be too profound 
to be acceptable on economic and social grounds’.38  
By November 1970 – two months before the Treasury first saw the Bank’s 
CCC proposals – this conflict between the need to boost general economic 
performance in the face of the liquidity crisis and the need to maintain monetary 
credibility was recognised as pushing the government towards a new approach to 
financial regulation:  
 
The dilemma facing us therefore is that the prospect presented by current 
policy statements and assumptions would on balance warrant change in 
                                                        
37 TNA T 326/1352, Policy on Bank Lending, 7 August 1970. 
38 MRC MSS.200/C/3/ECO/2/29, Whitehorn to Strachen, 20 October 1970. 
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some direction to ease monetary tightness, whereas the de facto monetary 
relaxation occurring is at an excessive rate … At some stage then policy 
on bank lending will have to be redefined in such a way that it is seen to 
accord with the Government’s view of the total prospect before us and that 
it sustains credibility in the Government’s determination to remain in 
control of the bank lending situation.39 
 
In other words, there was a recognition of the need for an overhaul of a monetary 
policy framework that was proving itself incapable of addressing the twin 
phenomena of rising personal borrowing and company liquidity shortage. It was not 
possible to pursue a reduction in ‘bad’ personal borrowing and ensure an expansion 
of ‘good’ corporate borrowing with the blunt monetary instruments at their disposal. 
As the Prime Minister’s Principal Private Secretary and former Radcliffe 
Committee Secretary Robert Armstrong explained, ‘there is no future in retaining 
the ceiling but exempting “credit for investment” from it. This is simply 
unworkable: the banks cannot identify credit to particular firms by purpose to the 
extent that this would indicate’.40 Furthermore, even if the credit ceiling could 
discriminate in this way, the Treasury’s Permanent Secretary Douglas Allen argued 
that ‘it could not be altered frequently, and it was difficult to enforce effectively’.41 
The attempt by both the Wilson and Heath governments to discipline British 
social relations in line with global economic averages – and thus achieve a 
sustainable current account surplus – was threatened by the contradictory state of 
                                                        
39 TNA T 326/1352, Policy on Bank Lending, 7 August 1970. 
40 TNA T 326/1109, Armstrong to Figgures, 8 January 1970. 
41 TNA T 326/966, Minutes of a Meeting, 29 October 1969. 
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domestic credit growth. While the increase in personal borrowing suggested the 
need for disciplinary credit tightening, in order to reduce imports, the dire state of 
corporate liquidity suggested that palliative credit should be extended to companies 
in order to boost exports. This contradiction was pulling the existing system of credit 
controls in opposing directions. Yet in addition to the functional shortcomings of 
these credit controls, they were also becoming increasingly politicised, which 
threatened the government’s legitimacy. 
 
The politicisation of monetary policy 
 
Lending ceilings, which had also been used in 1957–8 and 1961–2, were initially 
considered a depoliticised avenue through which to conduct monetary policy. There 
were two institutional layers separating the government from direct borrowers, 
namely the Bank and the clearing banks. This allowed the government to mask its 
influence on the money supply. As Painter commented: 
 
The whole apparatus of ‘control’ is a voluntary arrangement, operated as 
the City seem to prefer through the Bank of England in the driving seat. As 
long as the business carries on without too much controversy, there are 
advantages to Westminster and Whitehall in it being conducted at this 
remove.42  
 
                                                        
42 TNA T 326/966, Minutes of a Meeting, 29 October 1969. 
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Yet, by the end of the 1960s, the intensification of economic stagnation meant that 
controversy came frequently and in large doses, undermining the Treasury’s arm’s-
length statecraft.  
As the government’s deflationary measures met growing resistance in the 
form of personal borrowing, the regressive nature of monetary policy became 
increasingly difficult to disguise. At the House of Commons in May 1968, 
Chancellor Jenkins was repeatedly questioned by Conservative MPs about the 
relationship between the monetary tightening and ‘the worst consecutive period of 
heavy unemployment which we have known since the 1930s’.43 Furthermore, even 
the monetary relaxation in July 1971 was seized upon for its pro-business bias, 
which the Daily Express reported with the subheading: ‘Not you! … [M]an-in-the-
street borrowers can’t expect to get anything extra from the new deal’ (McKelvie, 
1971).  
Despite monetary policy acting in industry’s favour, the Treasury came 
under sustained pressure from the CBI to go further. In 1969, the CBI stated that ‘a 
relaxation of the pressure on company liquidity is now called for’, which should be 
achieved by shifting emphasis away from tax manipulation towards monetary 
policy.44 In preparation for a CBI-Treasury meeting in January 1970, a brief was 
circulated which stated that the ‘suggestions that we have put forward [to the 
Treasury] over the last few months for easing the pressure of company liquidity’ 
include ‘[r]elaxation of the restrictions on bank lending’.45 The reason the CBI felt 
                                                        
43 TNA T 326/791, House of Commons, 24 May 1968. 
44 MRC MSS.200/C/3/ECO/2/29, CBI Staff Comment, 4 November 1969. 
45 MRC MSS.200/C/3/ECO/2/29, Brief for CBI/Treasury Meeting, 19 January 
1970. 
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the need to ‘repeat our arguments’ to the Treasury regarding credit deregulation was 
that a full 10 per cent of manufacturing firms were expected to restrict output 
because of a ‘shortage of credit or finance’.46 These objections to government policy 
were made through official channels and during what Allen called the ‘regular 
CBI/Treasury Tea Parties’.47 
In addition to facing flak from individual and industrial borrowers, the 
Treasury’s relationships with the clearing banks also began to fray. At a meeting 
between Bank officials and clearing bank representatives in early 1969, the clearing 
banks argued that, with deteriorating economic conditions, their customers were 
growing increasingly desperate for credit: ‘Managers were tending to lose heart and 
the public image of the banks was getting worse and worse…The banks wondered 
whether H.M.Goverment [sic] fully understood their difficulties. They (the banks) 
feared that they would have to take the blame for the consequences of credit 
restriction’.48 Furthermore, it was not entirely clear whether the government even 
had the power to enforce their own directives. A Bank solicitor informed Lovell in 
1969 that banks’ overdraft facilities could not be limited, and furthermore, attempts 
to punish the banks by lowering the interest rates on special deposits may not be 
legally enforceable.49 As such, in pursuing balance of payment objectives through 
the enforcement of lending ceilings, the authorities risked sparking a very public 
conflict with the City, which they could not be sure they would win. 
                                                        
46 MRC MSS.200/C/3/ECO/2/29, Brief for CBI/Treasury Meeting, 19 January 
1970. 
47 MRC MSS.200/C/3/DG/2/22, Note of a Meeting, 25 November 1971. 
48 TNA T 326/962, Note for the Record, 1 April 1969. 
49 TNA T 326/963, Brooke to Lovell, 10 September 1969. 
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Another source of scrutiny faced by the authorities was from global 
investors. As the credibility of the Treasury’s monetary strategy was called into 
question by their inability to meet money supply targets, they risked damaging the 
position of sterling. Regarding DCE targets (a metric advocated by the IMF (Clift 
and Tomlinson, 2012)), Painter explained to Treasury Deputy Secretary Alan Neale 
in April 1970 that ‘[w]e are of course in a dilemma. We have to give a figure of 
some sort, and yet we all know what a hostage to fortune it may be’.50 This concern 
continued after the Conservatives’ electoral victory. Bank Governor O’Brien 
explained to Chancellor Barber at a meeting in July 1970 that if the authorities were 
not seen to respond to ballooning bank loans ‘the Government’s monetary policy 
and policies for management of the economy generally would lose credibility’.51 
The inadequacy of existing controls meant that any stated monetary target could 
quickly come back to haunt the authorities. With bank lending well above the five 
to seven per cent target in July and August 1970, the authorities had to respond in 
order to demonstrate that they had not lost control, without making unachievable 
commitments: ‘The essential task for us is to devise some weasely words which 
justify whatever signal we give to the clearing banks without pinning ourselves on 
the 5%/7% hook’.52 
As the global profitability crisis gained momentum, Britain faced greater 
external shocks to its stagnating economy, in the form of speculative pressure on 
sterling. In response, the Wilson government attempted to discipline British social 
relations through a series of contractionary policies (a strategy that was continued 
                                                        
50 TNA T 326/1109, Painter to Neale, 2 April 1970. 
51 TNA T 326/1352, Note for the Record, 27 July 1970. 
52 Emphasis added. TNA T 326/1352, Painter to Kelley, 19 August 1970. 
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in the first years of the Heath government). Yet this strategy ran up against the dual 
problem of stubbornly high personal borrowing and desperately low corporate 
liquidity. The existing monetary toolkit proved unable to simultaneously discipline 
the personal sector and extend palliative credit to the company sector. In addition, 
as the functional limits of the system of credit control became exposed, monetary 
policy became increasingly politicised, which threatened to erode the government’s 
legitimacy. This combination of factors ultimately paved the way for the passing of 
the CCC measures.   
 
 
Depoliticisation in place of solution 
 
A new policy approach, CCC, landed in the Treasury’s lap in January 1971. Yet it 
did not initially appear to resolve the policy dilemmas that they faced. Firstly, there 
were concerns in the Treasury that the new approach to monetary control would 
endanger government funding by disrupting their strategy for selling gilt-edged 
bonds. The Bank had, until now, acted to stabilise gilt prices by purchasing or selling 
gilts en masse – an objective that was not to be sacrificed to meet immediate 
monetary targets (Dutta, 2017: 10). Yet under CCC, operations in the gilt market 
would be directed at controlling the money supply, rather than smoothing out gilt 
prices. Interest rates would thus be allowed to fluctuate to the level necessary to 
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curtail monetary growth, without regard to the effect on gilt prices; a prospect which 
could ‘have an undesirable effect on the marketability of Government debt’.53  
Secondly, and perhaps more importantly, CCC did not appear to address the 
central problem of post-devaluation monetary policy, namely the necessity to both 
restrict personal credit and expand credit to exporting companies. Andrew Britton, 
Senior Economic Advisor, succinctly captured this problem on 5 March: ‘The 
present forecasts show a company sector financial position which is quite possibly 
critical in the short run and which is certainly not sustainable in the medium term. 
The policy problem is to help companies without an excessive growth of money 
supply’.54 CCC, it seemed, was too simplistic an instrument to effect this kind of 
regressive redistribution.55 Home Finance Advisor Frank Cassell was tasked with 
finding a compromise between the new approach and the existing export credit 
scheme in June, but was forced to conclude that the ‘blunt fact is we think they do 
not tie in together at all well’.56 These kinds of directional controls on lending 
clashed with CCC’s philosophy of allowing banks to arrange their portfolios 
however they pleased. Furthermore, as Figgures observed, CCC’s emphasis on 
increases in Bank Rate would be difficult to implement when ‘the cost of borrowing 
money was already close to the return on investment’.57 
                                                        
53 TNA T 326/1261, Minutes of a meeting, 26 March 1971. 
54 TNA T 326/1261, Britton to Posner, 5 March 1971. 
55 MacDougall was also concerned that the laxity of CCC could allow an explosion 
in bank lending for consumption during the transition to the new regime, and that 
the authorities would have insufficient tools to rectify it (TNA T 326/1261, Minutes 
of a meeting, 18 February 1971; TNA T 326/1261, Note of a Meeting, 3 March 
1971). This was a prescient insight, considering the experience of the Secondary 
Banking Crisis, and one that was shared by other Treasury figures, which Needham 
(2014: 42) explores.  
56 TNA T 326/1263, Cassell to Henley, 4 June 1971. 
57 TNA T 326/1261, Minutes of a Meeting, 10 March, 1971. 
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 Nevertheless, the chief inadequacy of existing credit controls was judged to 
be the lending ceilings, not the price of credit. Indeed, domestic industry had 
become increasingly vocal in arguing this point. As early as 1969, the CBI had urged 
that ‘more reliance should be placed on interest rates than restricting the availability 
of credit’.58 In 1970, the CBI President advised that, with regards to lobbying 
strategy, ‘the availability of finance was a more serious problem than its cost. These 
considerations suggest to me than an attack on the credit ceiling, in which we were 
associated with the Clearing Banks, would be preferable to a request to them to 
revert to their earlier interest rate structure’.59 This reasoning from industry was 
reinforced by the Bank. In response to concerns about higher interest rates hurting 
industrial investment, Bank Executive Director John Fforde reminded Figgures in 
March 1971 that ‘under the present arrangement some companies were denied credit 
at any price. The proposed scheme would help the financial position of these 
businesses’.60 In July, the CBI reaffirmed their approval of the Bank’s plans in an 
Economic Committee Meeting: ‘In general, the analysis and proposals set out in 
“Competition and Credit Control” are in line with the views of the Committee 
formulated in 1969, notably the intended change in emphasis from quantitative 
limits to interest rate policy’.61 Indeed, as the CBI admitted in 1974, they ‘had 
welcomed the liberalisation of monetary policy late in 1971 as providing a much 
needed stimulus to industry and to the economy as a whole’.62 This runs entirely 
counter to Moran’s claim that the ‘introduction of CCC was a sign that the cheap 
                                                        
58 MRC MSS.200/C/3/ECO/2/29, CBI Staff Comment, 4 November 1969. 
59 MRC MSS.200/C/3/ECO/2/29, Anderson to Plumb, 19 May 1970. 
60 TNA T 326/1261, Minutes of a Meeting, 10 March, 1971. 
61 MRC MSS.200/C/3/ECO/2/29, Economic Committee Meeting, 5 July 1971. 
62 MRC MSS.200/C/3/ECO/2/7, Report, 19 September 1974. 
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credit lobby [industry] in Whitehall had been eclipsed’ (1984: 51-52).63 More 
broadly, it also contradicts the expropriation thesis that financial deregulation 
resulted from the power of financial elites to impose their agenda at industry’s 
expense. 
 In addition, CCC offered a way to rediscover a depoliticised monetary policy 
toolkit. After reading the proposals, Treasury official Michael Posner commented 
in February 1971 that ‘several of us were attracted by the notion that we could 
escape from ceilings and run an “arms-length” control of the banking system’.64 
With lending ceilings abandoned, much of the tensions with the clearing banks 
would be alleviated, and the authorities could not be viewed by the public as directly 
restricting borrowing. Instead, it would be individuals’ own financial shortcomings 
that stopped them from accessing credit at high interest rates, veiling the transfer of 
credit resources from persons to companies. As Figgures explained in March, CCC 
‘could be a means of very strict control, but by different methods which could bear 
more hardly on some than the present system’.65 This method of policy 
implementation would, as Barber assured Prime Minister Heath in May, ‘allow us 
to achieve the object of greater flexibility with a fully adequate control over 
monetary conditions’.66 
 There remained some concern that the ‘new approach’ would not in fact 
depoliticise monetary policy enough, due to the greater role that special deposits 
                                                        
63 Indeed, the CBI admitted in 1974 that they ‘had welcomed the liberalisation of 
monetary policy late in 1971 as providing a much needed stimulus to industry’ 
(MRC MSS.200/C/3/ECO/2/7, Report on the Work of the Financial Policy 
Committee, 19 September 1974). 
64 TNA T 326/1261, Posner to Cowdy, 18 February 1971. 
65 TNA T 326/1261, Note of a Meeting, 3 March 1971. 
66 TNA T 326/1262, Barber to Heath, 6 May 1971. 
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would play. Allen argued that special deposits ‘had sometimes been turned down 
on political grounds – an unwillingness to advertise that monetary policy was being 
tightened’.67 Yet the Bank insisted that interest rates would be the key tool of 
monetary policy under the new scheme. To this end, the politically sensitive nature 
of Bank Rate movements would be ‘diffused’ by the creation of MLR – a new 
marketised system for setting interest rates.68 It was acknowledged by Fforde in 
November that ‘there would be problems for the Bank in operating the new 
approach if there was a political nervousness about Bank Rate changes’.69 As the 
Treasury’s Group on Monetary Policy had explained earlier in the year, ‘increases 
in Bank Rate have come to be regarded, not as a signal of the Authorities’ views 
about the appropriate level for interest rates, but rather as signals of economic 
crisis’.70 MLR, Treasury officials Painter, Cassell and Michael Hawtin emphasised 
in a November meeting, would ‘reduce the political problems about changes in 
Bank Rate’.71 This new system was introduced in 1972, linking Bank Rate to market 
interest rates and thus freeing it to fluctuate far more. This allowed politicians to no 
longer be ‘seen as directly responsible for movements in the rate’, effectively 
delegating the enforcement of financial discipline to a more nebulous entity: the 
market (Burnham 2011: 477). 
 The CCC measures could not solve the contradictions inherent to the British 
state’s post-devaluation disciplining strategy. It was necessary to both restrict credit 
to personal borrowers, in order to weaken demand and thus reduce imports, while 
                                                        
67 TNA T 326/1261, Minutes of a Meeting, 1 March 1971. 
68 TNA T 326/1702, Note of a Meeting, 12 November 1971. 
69 TNA T 326/1702, Note of a Meeting, 12 November 1971. 
70 TNA T 338/39, Report of the Group on Monetary Policy, 20 January 1971. 
71 TNA T 326/1702, Note of a Meeting, 12 November 1971. 
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simultaneously extending palliative credit to exporters. This required a regressive 
redistribution of credit resources from persons to companies – a policy that could 
provoke severe popular resistance if it was carried out too publicly. While CCC did 
not offer a solution to this dilemma, it did appear to provide the authorities with a 
more depoliticised mechanism through which to effect this strategy of selective 
monetary disciplining and palliation. By relying chiefly on higher interest rates to 
adjudicate between borrowing requests, companies would be able to access credit 
that was unaffordable to persons – all while the government appeared to let go of 
the reins of monetary policy. This, it was hoped, would insulate the government’s 
legitimacy as they struggled to restructure British social relations in line with global 
value averages, in the context of a nascent global profitability crisis.   
 
 
Conclusion 
 
The existing literature on states’ roles in propelling financialisation, understood as 
the dual processes of financial expansion and productive stagnation, have relied on 
two explanations. The expropriation approach has argued that states have favoured 
the financial sector over industry due to the lobbying power of financial elites and 
the growing influence of pro-finance ideology. The crisis resolution approach has 
argued that states reacted quite reflexively to the onset of economic crisis in the 
1970s by automatically deregulating finance so as to assuage mobile capitalists. 
This thesis, however, advances a different explanation. The dominating imperatives 
that press states to reproduce conditions for profitable capital accumulation do not 
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derive from particular sociological groupings within capitalist society, but from the 
very form of wealth itself that emerges from capitalist exchange relations – relations 
that the state itself continually reaffirms. During times of crisis, as the competitive 
drive to increase productivity paradoxically undermines the profitability of capital 
in general, states are increasingly torn between the need to reproduce the basis of 
capitalist wealth through disciplining measures and the need to reproduce the basis 
of the state’s political legitimacy through crisis-delaying palliative measures. It is 
through this analytical lens that the CCC deregulation can best be understood.  
In the aftermath of a series of sterling crises, the Wilson government 
devalued the pound and enacted contractionary measures with the purpose of 
mounting a sustained recovery in the balance of payments. However, this 
disciplining strategy encountered two problems: a personal borrowing boom and a 
company liquidity crisis. Wage earners reacted to the governments contractionary 
measures by increasing their borrowing, which had the effect of increasing imports, 
while companies’ weak liquidity position endangered Britain’s export performance. 
It was thus necessary to simultaneously restrict credit to persons and extend credit 
to companies, in order to meet the balance of payments target. Yet the existing 
system of credit controls could not effectively repress personal borrowing without 
further starving companies of much needed funds. Furthermore, the post-
devaluation controls became too politicised to allow the government the leeway to 
carry out this regressive redistribution of credit resources. In contrast, the Banks’s 
CCC proposals appeared to offer an imperfect solution, by removing all formal 
limits on the availability of credit and instead allowing high interest rates to 
adjudicate between borrowing requests. This principle was lobbied for heavily by 
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the CBI, which – with the Bank – convinced the Treasury that CCC had the potential 
to reduce consumer borrowing while allowing large exporting firms access to 
previously unavailable credit. In addition, the hands-off nature of CCC was 
welcomed because it would allow these policy objectives to be met in a depoliticised 
manner. The CCC deregulation – the first major policy change by the British state 
that propelled processes of financialisation – must therefore be understood as a 
hybrid statecraft strategy intended to reconcile the contradictory imperatives 
generated by the global profitability crisis: financial discipline was to be enforced 
upon persons and palliative aid extended to capital, all disciplined by the delegation 
of authority to the market mechanism.  
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
The abolition of  
exchange controls 
 
 
Exchange control abolition was bound to be a leap in the dark. 
 
Nigel Lawson, 4 October 1979.72 
 
 
Introduction 
 
The UK’s abolition of exchange controls has a special status within accounts of 
British financialisation as well as IPE literature on the global shift towards 
international capital mobility and financial accumulation. Alongside the scrapping 
of capital controls in the US in 1974, this event is seen as one of the ‘crucial turning 
points’ in the history of capital control liberalisation (Best, 2005: 126). As Paul 
Langley (2002: 112-3) argues, the ‘zeal’ with which the Thatcher government 
pursued this deregulation ‘had considerable ramifications for the making of the 
contemporary financial order’. By abolishing rules on the use of sterling for 
overseas investment and the repatriation of foreign-earned profits, the dismantling 
                                                        
72 TNA T 388/207, Note for the Record, 4 October 1979. 
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of exchange controls both increased the horizon of capital accumulation beyond the 
national stage and allowed for an enormous shift of investment from industrial to 
financial assets. Perhaps more than CCC, this deregulation had enormous 
implications for the financialisation of both the British and world economies.  
The dominant explanatory frameworks for conceptualising the state’s 
propulsion of financialisation – the expropriation and crisis resolution lenses – are 
insufficient for understanding the abolition of exchange controls. The evidence 
presented in this chapter demonstrates that, despite this liberalisation being passed 
in the first year of the Thatcher government, this administration’s laissez-faire 
ideology and close connections with the City were not the primary impetuses for 
this policy change. Neither did the government dismantle these controls as a direct 
reaction to the pressure by desperate capitalists to escape British territory for more 
profitable climes. Instead, the abolition of exchange controls constituted a pragmatic 
political strategy to navigate the contradictions arising from a crisis of society itself: 
that is, the pressures to deregulate emanated not from particular lobbying groups, 
but from the very form of wealth that emerges from capitalist social relations. This 
liberalisation must therefore be understood as an attempt to strategically reconcile 
the impersonal domination of value relations in crisis and the tangible demands of 
civil society.  
This chapter will first examine the political quandaries that both the 
Callaghan and Thatcher governments faced. In the context of an appreciating pound, 
following the 1976 IMF bailout and rising revenues from North Sea oil, the British 
state was confronted with a governing dilemma: the strong pound acted as an 
automatic disciplining mechanism that aided in combatting inflation, yet it 
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simultaneously pushed the competitiveness of the struggling industrial export sector 
to dangerous lows and thus risked provoking a politically unacceptable recession. 
The political choice was whether to embrace the disciplining effects of sterling 
appreciation, or resist it through palliation measures. The evidence presented in this 
chapter will show that the governments of Callaghan and Thatcher prioritised 
political legitimacy and thus sought to depreciate sterling by relaxing exchange 
controls and encouraging an investment outflow.  
However, two obstacles stood in the way of this palliation strategy. Firstly, 
the trade union movement was opposed to exchange control liberalisation, and the 
Labour government was wary of further alienating union leadership as they 
attempted to gain union acquiescence to an unpopular incomes policy. Secondly, in 
a context of floating exchange rates, any attempt to manufacture a currency 
depreciation could spook currency markets and provoke a sterling crisis. This 
chapter will demonstrate that these hurdles ultimately impeded the Callaghan 
administration from pursuing full exchange control liberalisation. After reneging on 
the Social Contract, imposing a harsh incomes policy on the trade unions, and 
becoming a minority government, Callaghan lacked the political leeway to directly 
confront the unions on the issue of exchange controls. Furthermore, no strategy had 
been devised which would allow them to effect a devaluation via exchange control 
deregulation without spooking global financial markets. The Thatcher government, 
on the other hand, faced a weakened union movement following the ‘Winter of 
Discontent’ and managed to construct a rhetorical strategy that attempted to placate 
global currency markets by emphasising that exchange control abolition was a 
responsible and internationally credible policy driven by laissez-faire ideology. This 
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provided the Thatcher administration with the confidence to abolish exchange 
controls completely in October 1979 and thus provide palliative relief to the British 
economy. 
The dismantling of exchange controls was a crucial policy step in the 
financialisation of the British economy and the forging of a new global financial 
order. Yet this measure cannot be explained by the lobbying power of the City, the 
pro-finance stance of the British government, or the immediate threat of investment 
strike by flighty capitalists. Instead, this deregulation was an attempt to reconcile 
the contradictory imperatives generated by the global profitability crisis. The 
Callaghan and Thatcher governments intended to lower the price of sterling through 
exchange control relaxation and thus ensure their governing legitimacy by 
temporarily boosting the competitiveness of British exports. Yet only the Thatcher 
administration felt able to pursue this palliation strategy without damaging British 
economic credibility in the eyes of global currency markets.  
 
 
Exchange controls and financialisation 
 
In 1941, Keynes commented: ‘I share the view that central control of capital 
movements, both inward and outward, should be a permanent feature of the post-
war system’ (Crotty, 1983: 62). As such, Britain’s abolition of exchange controls 
between 1977 and 1979 represented a dramatic abandonment of the instruments of 
Keynesian demand management, and a significant step towards the financialisation 
of the British economy. In Britain, the most historically important subset of capital 
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controls was exchange controls. These controls constituted a system of limits on the 
use of UK funds for overseas investment and rules for the repatriation of profits 
earned overseas (Shepherd et al., 1985: 156). They did not directly restrict overseas 
investment, but rather affected the currency with which these investments were 
financed. The overarching goal of this system was, in the words of former Treasury 
Under Secretary Britton, to ‘conserve the UK’s holdings of gold and foreign 
currency’ and as such ‘assist the balance of payments’.73 These controls came into 
being in 1939 for emergency use during the war and were given a statutory basis 
with the 1947 Exchange Control Act (Cairncross and Sinclair, 1982: 403). 
Exchange controls were removed in four stages by the Callaghan and Thatcher 
governments: October 1977, January 1978, July 1979, and October 1979.  
The scrapping of this system of controls acted as a dramatic impetus to 
processes of financialisation. Watson (1999: 61) writes that as a result of ‘the 
indiscriminate relaxation of capital controls following the demise of the Bretton 
Woods settlement … financial markets have become increasingly dissociated from 
the productive realm’. In the first half of 1980, insurance companies and pension 
funds channelled four times as much investment into overseas equities than they 
had in the first half of 1979 (Coakley and Harris, 1992: 43). Indeed, the yearly flow 
of investment overseas increased from £1 billion in 1979 to £18 billion in 1985 
(Bellringer and Michie, 2014: 119). Furthermore, this deregulation accelerated the 
transformation of British investment holdings away from long-term industrial 
assets. Overseas direct investment in assets other than oil, banking and insurance 
rose by 49 per cent between 1978 and 1981, while overseas portfolio investment 
                                                        
73 TNA T 381/145, Paper by Britton, May 1978 
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rose by 142 per cent (Shepherd et al., 1985: 7). In allowing the City to compete on 
a level playing field with the New York Stock Exchange, this deregulation became 
perhaps the most important financial measure by the British government until 
Gordon Brown’s 1997 announcement of Bank independence (Roberts and 
Kynaston, 2002: 129).  
 
Existing interpretations 
 
In order to understand the decision to scrap exchange controls, the existing IPE 
literature has chiefly relied on two explanations: the Thatcher administration’s 
neoliberal ideology and commitment to boosting the City’s global competitiveness. 
In his landmark IPE work, States and the Reemergence of Global Finance, Helleiner 
(1994: 150) argued that the ‘key explanation’ for exchange control abolition ‘was 
the neoliberal orientation of the new Thatcher government, which perceived 
exchange controls as preserving outdated Keynesian strategies’. This echoed the 
claim by Henk Overbeek (1990: 196) that this deregulation was the ‘first act of the 
Thatcher government that made clear its dedication to the “free market”’. In the 
same vein, Keegan (1984: 149) explained that while exchange control abolition was 
expected to help reduce the pound’s high price, the ‘main political motive for this 
relaxation was not the height of the exchange rate … it was the basic economic 
philosophy, and the desire to give as free a rein as possible to market forces’. 
Advancing a more political account, Christopher Bellringer and Ranald Michie 
(2014) claim that the Thatcher government was constrained by laissez-faire 
commitments made while the Conservatives were in opposition, and thus once they 
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came to power, the government found itself forced to go through with exchange 
control abolition in order to maintain ideological consistency. Scott Newton and 
Dilwyn Porter (1988) have argued that there was a gap between the rhetoric and 
reality of the Thatcher administration’s motivation for abolishing controls. While 
‘government spokesmen argued that it would help exporters by restraining the rise 
in the exchange rate’, this justification ‘was entirely bogus’ (ibid: 200). Instead, ‘the 
abandonment of controls was a symbol of the government’s conviction that given 
the rejection of dirigisme only the full integration of the British into the international 
economy would lead to the degree of restructuring which would make the country 
competitive’ (ibid). This key deregulation, then, was not a product of pragmatism 
or of immediate concerns about economic management, but rather it resulted from 
the Thatcher government’s commitment to the principles of laissez-faire. 
Helleiner (1994: 151) also gave credence to the idea that lobbying by City 
institutions was important in motivating this deregulation, as financial companies 
wished to ‘diversify their portfolios in the new floating exchange rate system’. Even 
more important, though, according to Helleiner (ibid), was the fact that ‘the Bank 
of England saw the abolition of exchange controls as a way of attracting more 
financial business to London’ – a point that Jeremy Green (2016: 447) has recently 
reiterated. While the City had boasted the Euromarket in the 1960s, when many 
other financial centres were laden with stricter regulations, this novelty was 
undermined by the US’ abandonment of capital controls in 1974 (ibid). The City 
thus risked marginalisation if it did not undergo a commensurate deregulation, 
prompting the Thatcher government to act in its favour (Palan et al., 1996: 52). For 
Alexander Gallas (2015: 135, 209), exchange control abolition was a reflection of a 
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more coherent commitment to a ‘neo-Ricardian accumulation strategy’, based on 
transnational competition and financial dominance over other sectors of the 
economy. This argument was taken further by Jerry Coakley and Laurence Harris 
(1992: 37), who claimed that ‘a central pillar of the whole Thatcher enterprise was 
action to change the role of money and finance and to strengthen the position of the 
financial sector; whatever happened to manufacturing, the City was intended to 
flourish’. They pointed to the relative decline of the ‘arcane … gentleman’s club’ 
that was the LSE, as business flowed towards more competitive and less heavily 
regulated financial centres (ibid: 40). Coakley and Harris (ibid) muse that ‘it is 
doubtful whether a Labour administration could have ignored the pressure from the 
City, reinforced by the structural changes underway internationally, unless it were 
prepared to change the City by forcing a historical turn towards supporting industrial 
regeneration’. In other words, if Labour had won the May 1979 election, they would 
have faced a stark choice between abolishing exchange controls and supporting 
domestic industry. The importance of the Thatcher administration, then, was not the 
act of deregulation itself, but ‘the timing of the policy’, the ‘laissez-faire stamp on 
its form’, and the promotion of ‘the continued international ambitions of the City at 
the expense of industry’ (ibid). As such, exchange control abolition, in the words of 
Moran (1991: 74), was a positive and distinctly pro-City ‘response to the 
increasingly global character of markets’. Capturing the existing literature’s 
emphasis on the role of neoliberal ideology and financial competitiveness, Randall 
Germain (1997: 147) summarised the causes of UK exchange control abolition as 
‘the ideological predispositions of the newly elected Thatcher government and the 
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clear desire to maintain London’s position at the center of the Eurocurrency market 
and European finance’.  
In contrast to the majority of the literature’s claims about the centrality of 
Thatcher’s neoliberal ideology and finance-oriented accumulation strategy, a 
limited number of accounts draw attention to more pragmatic policy considerations. 
Age Bakker (1996) highlights the government’s concerns about the position of 
domestic exporters in motivating deregulation. The Thatcher administration, he 
argues, feared that ‘a disproportionate appreciation of the pound … would further 
hurt the weak non-oil industrial base in the United Kingdom. A relaxation of 
exchange controls was expected to cause capital outflows’, which would ‘help 
dampen the upward pressure on the exchange rate’ (ibid: 139). In a similar but more 
nuanced account, Needham (2014) frames the abolition of exchange controls 
through the lens of the Thatcher administration’s obsession with controlling the 
money supply. When the exchange rate rose through 1979, the ‘deleterious effect 
of the strong pound on British exports’ indicated that some depreciation was 
necessary (ibid: 142). As investment flowed into sterling, the government was 
forced to sell gilt-edged bonds in order to soak up excess liquidity in the financial 
system and thus stop the money supply increasing too much. Yet the sheer volume 
of inward flows meant that the government would have to sell an enormous amount 
of debt, which would in turn have required very high interest rates that were 
unpalatable for mortgage market reasons. On the other hand, ‘[l]owering interest 
rates to make sterling less attractive to foreign capital … would have interfered with 
the government’s objective of running a tight monetary policy’ (ibid). As such, 
‘there was very little the authorities could do other than dismantle exchange controls 
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to encourage capital to flow overseas’ (emphasis in original; ibid). These revisionist 
accounts have the novelty of both highlighting the messy, pragmatic politics behind 
this deregulation and pointing to the government’s concerns with the plight of 
exporting industry – an argument that contradicts much of the existing literature’s 
claims about the Thatcher administration’s industrial neglect. The problem is that 
both Bakker and Needham deal with exchange controls abandonment in a relatively 
fleeting manner, such that their insights remain undeveloped and they tend to 
become lost in the minutiae rather than connecting these developments to the 
ongoing stagflation crisis. 
This chapter will advance an account of the UK’s exchange control abolition 
that both demonstrates the inadequacy of the existing IPE literature’s emphasis on 
the Thatcher government’s laissez-faire ideology and their pro-finance stance, and 
provides a more systematic explanation of this deregulation than the existing 
revisionist accounts. It will be argued that this liberalisation must be understood in 
the context of a global profitability crisis – self-generated by the contradictory 
nature of the capitalist form of wealth – and the governing dilemmas that it gave 
rise to. Trapped between the disciplining effects of the strong pound, and the 
political need to ease the ensuing recession, the Callaghan and Thatcher 
governments sought to relax exchange controls so as to depreciate sterling and 
provide relief to exporters. Yet in order to pursue this palliation strategy 
successfully, policy-makers needed to both disarm an opposed union movement and 
avoid spooking global financial markets. This chapter will demonstrate that the 
Thatcher government developed a rhetorical strategy that they felt would allow 
them to convince financial markets that this deregulation was not a pragmatic 
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strategy to boost exports, but was rather driven by a deep-seated commitment to free 
markets. This deregulation, which was fundamental in propelling processes of 
financialisation both in Britain and globally, must be understood as a palliative 
statecraft strategy, designed to pragmatically navigate the contradictory economic 
and political imperatives engendered by the value form of wealth and heightened 
by the profitability crisis. 
 
 
The sterling dilemma 
 
While the CCC deregulation examined in the preceding chapter took place in the 
early years of the global profitability crisis, by the time of the first moves towards 
exchange control dismantlement, the British economy was deeply riven by the twin 
phenomena of extremely stagnant economic performance and record-high inflation. 
In a more schematic sense, these two deregulations took place in different phases of 
the British experience of the profitability crisis. The first, from 1967-77, saw 
governments hemmed in by recurrent sterling crises and domestic popular agitation; 
and the second, from 1977-83, saw governments torn between the disciplining 
impact of the strong pound and its deeply unpopular recessionary effects. The 
abolition of exchange controls, between 1977 and 1979, fell squarely in this latter 
phase.  
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Figure 5.   The sterling exchange rate (spot exchange rate, US dollars into sterling), 1976-
1979 (Bank of England, Interactive Database). 
 
As explained in Chapter 5, policy-makers in this period faced a governing 
dilemma. The effect of the IMF’s seal of approval and the flow of North Sea oil had 
driven up the price of sterling, which both insulated the pound from speculation 
crises and acted as a form of automatic disciplining mechanism upon the British 
economy. The strong pound helped to combat inflation, by both decreasing the price 
of imports and punishing exporting firms such that they were discouraged from 
paying large wage settlements to their workers. Yet it did so at the cost of plunging 
the economy into a politically unacceptable recession. British non-oil industrial and 
commercial companies’ rate of profit had fallen to four per cent in 1977, down from 
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8.6 per cent in 1971,74  while earnings were increasing much slower than the rate of 
inflation (Britton, 1991: 251). As such, governments in this period faced a new 
manifestation of the accumulation/legitimation contradiction inherent to the 
political governance of capitalist social relations. The dilemma was whether to 
support the strong pound’s disciplining effects, or act to depreciate sterling as a 
palliative strategy to delay the pain of crisis and protect governing legitimacy.  
This chapter will demonstrate that both the Callaghan and Thatcher 
governments prioritised the latter objective, and thus sought to depreciate the pound 
through the abolition of exchange controls. However, there were two important 
obstacles that had to be overcome before this strategy could be pursued: it was not 
at all clear how exchange control relaxation could be sold to an opposed trade union 
movement, nor how an orderly depreciation of sterling could be brought about in 
the context of volatile floating exchange rates. The first problem arose from the fact 
that the TUC favoured a strong pound because of its downward pressure on the cost 
of living and supported the extension of exchange controls as part of a proactive 
industrial strategy. As the unions were bearing the brunt of Callaghan’s anti-
inflation incomes policy, Labour policy-makers were wary of further incensing 
them. The second problem was a direct result of the move to floating exchange rates 
in 1973. The onset of this currency regime entailed an increase in speculative 
activity and a consequent rise in exchange rate volatility. As a result, governments 
struggled to reconcile their political and economic objectives with the ‘imperatives 
of exchange rate stabilization’ (Eichengreen, 2008: 142). This was amplified in the 
case of Britain due to the massive overseas holdings of sterling. As former Treasury 
                                                        
74 MRC MSS.200/c/3/dg2/23, Trade and Industry magazine, 22 September 1978. 
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Permanent Secretary Wass observed, an immediate ‘step-change in a floating 
environment would have been a policy without precedent’, and one which 
threatened to ‘shatter’ confidence in sterling altogether (2008: 336-338). Yet the 
alternative – a gradual depreciation – was also ‘without precedent’, ‘uncertain and 
indeed potentially dangerous’ (ibid: 336). Thus, any attempt to manipulate the price 
of sterling required extremely careful public presentation, so as to avoid provoking 
speculative attacks against the pound. In order to boost the competitiveness of UK 
exporters through exchange control relaxation, then, politicians required an 
appropriate strategy that would both disarm the unions’ opposition and avoid 
spooking global financial markets.  
This chapter will argue that the Callaghan and Thatcher governments’ 
different degrees of success in developing such a strategy is what best explains the 
dynamics of exchange control liberalisation in the years 1977-9. The Labour 
administration was ultimately constrained by its tense relations with the unions and 
its unfamiliarity with exchange rate policy in a system of floating rates, resulting in 
its moderate easing of exchange controls. On the other hand, the Conservatives not 
only faced a much weakened labour movement, but they were also able to craft a 
rhetorical strategy that would convince financial markets that their policy of 
competitive currency devaluation was in fact an expression of their laissez-faire 
beliefs. The Thatcher administration believed that this discursive strategy would 
allow it to bring about a managed sterling depreciation through complete exchange 
control abolition without provoking a collapse in the pound. In sum, in the context 
of a global profitability crisis and severe domestic financial discipline imposed by 
the strong pound, the liberalisation of exchange controls constituted a pragmatic 
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attempt to extend palliative aid to exporters so as to maintain governing legitimacy, 
yet without spooking global financial markets. 
 
I. The Callaghan administration 
 
On 26 October 1977, Labour Chancellor Healey announced the relaxation of 
exchange controls affecting inward direct investment, travel, cash gifts, and 
emigration. Then, on 1 January 1978, the government relaxed controls on outward 
direct and portfolio investment in the EEC, by abolishing the rule whereby British 
investors had to surrender 25 per cent of proceeds from foreign currency sales to the 
Bank for conversion into sterling.  
The pressure that motivated a Labour government to enact the most 
significant dismantling of exchange controls in nearly 40 years was not immediately 
apparent. At first glance, it appeared that in 1977 Healey could ‘boast that he was 
one of the few post-war Chancellors to preside over a growing economy, falling 
inflation, falling unemployment, and a balance of payments surplus’ (Needham, 
2014: 109). Yet in private discussions, government officials had a greater awareness 
of the underlying problems veiled by the IMF’s endorsement and North Sea oil. An 
inward surge of capital was causing sterling to appreciate steeply, thus aiding the 
government’s attack on inflation but exacerbating the dire circumstances faced by 
non-oil exporters. It was against this background that the dismantling of exchange 
controls became a topic of interest, as it could create an outflow of investment that 
would weaken sterling’s appreciation.  
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On 19 October, Healey circulated a proposal that outlined various possible 
exchange control relaxations. His motivations for proposing the consideration of 
these changes, he explained, were threefold: the difficulty in justifying exchange 
controls during a period of sustained current account surplus; the need to give some 
indication to the EEC that the government took seriously their stance on free capital 
mobility; and the more immediate need to offset inflows of capital that were 
destabilising the exchange rate and money supply. 75 The responses Healey received 
from various government departments generally focused on his third concern as the 
most important. Labour’s Roy Hattersley, Secretary of State for Prices and 
Consumer Protection, (unsurprisingly considering his remit) urged Healey against 
taking the measures. Hattersley argued: 
 
For exporting industries, a policy of depreciation would represent the 
abandonment by Government of an important sanction in our fight against 
inflation. Firms in these industries would be free to enter into excessive wage 
settlements, secure in the knowledge that the Government would mitigate their 
effects on profitability by allowing the exchange rate to slide.76 
 
However, Hattersley was in the minority. DoT, DoI, and the Bank all clearly 
favoured some depreciation of the exchange rate in order to ease the pressure on 
exports. DoT official Hans Liesner wrote to his Secretary of State, Edmund Dell, 
that the ‘the UK’s long-run trade and hence industrial performance will be 
threatened by a worsening of competitiveness, and that exchange rate policy should 
                                                        
75 TNA FV 89/2, Healey to Callaghan, 19 October 1977 
76 TNA FV 89/2, Hattersley to Healey, 19 October 1977 
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be conducted accordingly … [This] is where the exchange control relaxations 
should help’.77 In turn, Dell emphasised the severity of the problem to Callaghan, 
Healey, and Bank Governor Gordon Richardson at a meeting the following week. 
He argued that further sterling appreciation ‘would be deleterious to investment, to 
employment, and to the industrial strategy’, and thus recommended a close 
examination of exchange control relaxation, which would allow ‘money to flow out 
of the country as freely as it could now flow in’.78 
Similarly, the DoI informed Callaghan that it ‘very much welcome[d]’ Healey’s 
proposed deregulation, on the grounds that ‘there is scope for certain selective 
relaxations of controls on outward investment that could benefit UK industry 
directly in the medium term’.79 The Secretary of State for Industry, Eric Varley, 
further emphasised the gravity of the situation at the meeting with Callaghan, 
Healey, and Richardson, when he explained that while he understood the counter-
inflationary benefits of the strong pound, ‘the effects on manufacturing industry 
could not be ignored’:  
 
Some of our industry was barely competitive at the present exchange rate. The 
textile and clothing sectors, for example, employing 850,000 people, would be 
severely hit, with serious political consequences … The prospect for export-led 
growth, on which the industrial strategy rested, could be greatly reduced by too 
rapid an appreciation of the exchange rate.80  
 
                                                        
77 TNA FV 89/2, Liesner to Secretary of State, 20 October 1977 
78 TNA PREM 16/2108, Note of a Meeting, 28 October 1977 
79 TNA FV 89/2, EGV to Callaghan, 24 October 1977 
80 TNA PREM 16/2108, Note of a Meeting, 28 October 1977. 
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Sir Kenneth Berrill, head of the Central Policy Staff Review of the Cabinet Office, 
echoed this sentiment to Callaghan in November, when he insisted that the ‘United 
Kingdom’s high exchange rate reduces our export prospects in this gloomier market. 
Domestically, there is no sign of a great revival in the United Kingdom industrial 
investment which the IMF team told us would come if we took the measures they 
advocated’.81  
The Bank too positioned itself against the existing controls. The Bank had 
been traditionally hostile towards exchange controls, yet this sentiment increased 
following the abandonment of fixed exchange rates (Dow, 2013: 143). By the 
middle of 1977, Bank advisor Charles Goodhart was advocating the greatest 
relaxation possible, while Executive Director McMahon and First Deputy Chief of 
Exchange Control Douglas Dawkins also favoured relaxation but were more 
concerned about the timing (Capie, 2010: 766-67).  
With regards to lobbying pressure, there is much more evidence of pressure 
from domestic industry than the financial sector, in marked contrast to the 
assumptions of much of the existing literature on exchange controls abolition and 
financialisation more generally. From at least the early 1970s, the CBI had lobbied 
against exchange controls – arguing to Heath’s Financial Secretary Patrick Jenkin 
in 1971 that ‘the CBI has long urged the Treasury to ease and then remove exchange 
controls on outward investment as soon as the balance of payments permits’.82 As 
industry’s rate of return continued to fall, compounded by the oil shocks and then 
the appreciation of sterling, the CBI’s pressure on the government intensified. 
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Through its Overseas Investment Committee, the CBI launched a renewed 
campaign in 1976 to convince the government of the benign effects of overseas 
investment, so as to hasten the removal of exchange controls. This included 
commissioning the Metra Consulting Group to produce a favourable report on 
overseas investment, as well as lobbying the government through the NEDC and 
directly through meetings with the Treasury.83  
The City’s lobbying efforts were much more limited. In July 1977, Treasury 
Permanent Secretary Leo Pliatzky went for dinner with LSE Chairman Goodison. 
Goodison thought that a relaxation of exchange controls could help the City become 
the centre of securities in Europe, but feared (quite melodramatically) that ‘Treasury 
people at Ministerial and official level’ were ‘uninterested in anything except the 
manufacturing sector’. 84 Yet he displayed none of the fervent hurry or systematic 
strategising of CBI lobbyists, claiming that he would be satisfied to see some action 
on exchange controls within a timeframe of three years. Nevertheless, certain 
officials did support exchange control relaxations due to the advantages for the City 
and Britain’s invisible earnings. The Treasury’s Deputy Secretary, F. Russell 
Barratt, argued in May 1977 that it was ‘very much in the national interest that the 
general capacity of the City to engage profitably in international financial business 
should be sustained and enhanced’, which was in turn dependent on the ability to 
operate freely in foreign currencies.85 This sentiment was echoed by the DoT’s Dell, 
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who, as sponsoring Minister for the Stock Exchange and insurance industry, 
‘welcome[d] the prospect of further strengthening of the overseas position of UK 
insurance companies and of the relaxation on overseas portfolio investment 
respectively’.86  
The creation of a consensus within the Callaghan government and the Bank 
in favour of some degree of exchange control liberalisation was primarily the result 
of political concerns over the dangerously low competitiveness of British industrial 
exports. While there is some evidence as to the need to comply with EEC guidelines 
on capital controls, the presentational discrepancy of maintaining controls despite 
the positive balance of payments outlook, and a desire to boost the City’s global 
prospects, the overwhelming motivation for pursuing exchange control relaxation 
was to provide a palliative response to exporters’ woes by depreciating sterling. The 
next section will examine why, despite the legitimacy concerns over the pressures 
of the strong pound, the Callaghan administration did not go further in liberalising 
exchange controls.  
 
II. Market uncertainty and union militancy 
 
There is no single reason why the Callaghan government did not completely abolish 
exchange controls. One important factor was that the deregulation of controls on 
investment was counterintuitive to a Labour government that had come to power 
promising an interventionist industrial strategy. Indeed, Healey explained to 
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Callaghan that he did not intend to go too far with exchange control relaxation 
because it was ‘much more consistent with the industrial strategy to find ways’ to 
use the benefits of North Sea oil ‘more directly to build up the UK industrial base’.87 
Yet of greater importance were two more immediate problems: the difficulties of 
managing currency depreciation and the political constraints upon the Chancellor 
and Treasury ministers exerted by their fractious relations with the trade unions. 
The Callaghan administration was unable to craft a strategy to assuage financial 
markets through declarative signals, nor disarm the labour movement, resulting in 
the moderate exchange control liberalisations of 1977-8.  
In May 1977, when talks about exchange control relaxation began in earnest, 
the Bank was split on the issue of the best way to devalue sterling. Bank advisor 
McMahon thought a step-change was the least risky option, while officials David 
Holland and John Sangster preferred to move gradually.88 The Treasury was also 
divided, with some pushing for overnight devaluations and others, most notably 
Treasury Under Secretary Peter Middleton, arguing that a gradual depreciation 
would be least damaging.89 This disagreement was symptomatic of an institutional 
unfamiliarity with exchange rate policy in the context of floating rates. By October, 
on the eve of Healey’s first exchange control relaxation, Treasury Permanent 
Secretary Wass admitted that there was still ‘no effective means for bringing the 
rate down in the current situation. A step devaluation, always difficult in a floating-
rate regime, would in the current circumstances lead to a chaotic market’.90 Yet a 
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gradual ‘engineered slide would require a change in market sentiment’ with regards 
to sterling that was equally difficult to manufacture without causing outright panic.91 
After meeting Treasury officials in October to discuss exchange control relaxations, 
Graham Mason, the CBI’s Deputy Overseas Director, explained: ‘I can characterise 
the attitude of the Treasury officials as exceedingly cautious … They were clearly 
not confident that the large inflow of currency into our reserves of late is here to 
stay’.92 This deep uncertainty as to the side effects of sterling depreciation 
contributed to the general apprehension amongst the Callaghan administration 
towards exchange control relaxations, as these relaxations were designed precisely 
to exert a downward pressure on the pound. 
The government was also impeded by its tense relations with the unions. 
Labour had come to power in 1974 promising a Social Contract, in which the unions 
would voluntarily moderate their wage demands in return for greater welfare 
provisions and a favourable industrial policy, creating a ‘self-reinforcing spiral of 
disinflation’ (Britton, 1994: 19). While Phases I and II of the government’s incomes 
policy were quite successful in balancing strict wage restraint with social 
expenditure, this compromise came under increasing strain due to the public 
spending cuts necessitated by the IMF bailout. This marked the unofficial end of the 
Social Contract, engendering a ‘strong undertow of tension and resentment’ within 
the union movement (Thorpe, 1999: 144). Phase III began in August 1977 without 
formal TUC backing, as union leaders struggled to impose the government’s 
requests on their increasingly dissatisfied membership – a membership that voted 
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overwhelmingly for an immediate return to free collective bargaining at the 1977 
TUC conference (ibid: 144-5). As Jack Jones (head of the Transport and General 
Workers’ Union) argued in May 1977, for the unions to gain grassroots backing for 
the government’s incomes policy, the government needed to present an ‘an 
alternative economic policy’, which – importantly for the purposes of this article – 
would include ‘import deposits or controls’ (Coates, 1980: 73). 
   Thus, an extensive relaxation of exchange controls, during a period in 
which the government was attempting to impose Phase III of its incomes policy on 
a disillusioned union movement, appeared politically very risky. Not only were 
important union officials like Jones calling for greater import controls, but the TUC 
was in fact lobbying the government in 1977 for the creation of a new ‘tripartite’ 
agency that would ‘examine all applications for outward investment’ on a case-by-
case basis.93 ‘The exchange control system’, the TUC argued, ‘should be 
supplemented to consider these wider questions’ of domestic job creation.94 To 
entirely disregard the TUC’s concerns by abolishing controls ran the risk of 
undermining union acquiescence to the government’s already embattled incomes 
policy As Barratt argued in a meeting with Treasury and Bank representatives in 
May 1977, ‘the need to move gently in such a politically sensitive area … had 
deterred the Treasury from putting forward definite proposals for relaxation at this 
stage’.95 Indeed, Joel Barnett, Chief Secretary to the Treasury, explained to 
Callaghan’s Principal Private Secretary, Kenneth Stowe, in September 1977 that 
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‘political considerations apart … [a] small relaxation would be a sensible proposal. 
But we cannot ignore political considerations, and in my judgement the inevitable 
(if ill-informed) outcry there would be is not worth provoking for a comparatively 
modest relaxation’.96 Thus when Healey finally announced his exchange control 
proposal in October, he acknowledged that the more radical measures like 
abolishing the 25 per cent surrender rule ‘might cause some political difficulty, 
especially with the TUC’.97 Callaghan echoed this concern, insisting on delaying 
any extensive relaxations ‘until there has been the discussion in the TUC/Labour 
Party Liaison Committee’.98  
Furthermore, despite essentially constituting a reflationary measure, due to 
its stimulating effect on exporting industries, dismantling exchange controls could 
potentially have the doubly negative effect of alienating the TUC and the general 
electorate by exacerbating inflation. As Hattersley emphasised to Healey in 
December 1977: ‘Our economic progress and our political success will in very large 
part be judged on our success or otherwise in avoiding a return to inflation at or 
above 10 per cent. The Conservatives are already making it clear that they do not 
believe that we shall succeed’.99 In addition, the high pound automatically reduced 
inflation without the need for direct government intervention, which had significant 
political advantages. Healey explained to an audience that included Callaghan and 
Richardson in November 1977 that if exchange control relaxations resulted in some 
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depreciation, the ‘alternative would be a very restrictive fiscal and monetary regime 
which would probably be just as damaging’.100  
There undoubtedly existed a consensus in favour of a significant degree of 
exchange control relaxation, primarily to check sterling’s appreciation and 
consequently avert disaster for British exporters – thus constituting a palliative 
statecraft strategy to protect governing legitimacy by postponing the effects of the 
crisis of value relations. Yet there was also considerable apprehension within the 
Treasury as to the external economic and domestic political consequences. Labour, 
weakened by their minority status and their clashes with the unions over incomes 
policy, lacked a strategy that would convince markets that exchange control 
abolition was not a cynical strategy to boost exports and would disarm the opposed 
trade union movement. This confluence of pressures for and against the dismantling 
of exchange control resulted in the moderate relaxations of October 1977 and 
January 1978.  
 
III. The Thatcher administration 
 
On 12 July 1979, Conservative Chancellor Howe announced extensive relaxations 
of exchange controls on outward direct investment and minor relaxations on 
outward portfolio investment. The remaining controls were completely abolished 
on 23 October. This bold move did not result from a clique of ideologues forcing 
their plans upon the civil service, as much of the existing literature on exchange 
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control abolition suggests (Helleiner, 1994; Newton and Porter, 1988). Instead, the 
Conservatives’ proposals – which were no doubt motivated by a radical political 
vision – found a receptive and prepared audience in the Treasury, Bank, and various 
government departments. Much like the Callaghan administration, the Thatcher 
government’s desire to dismantle exchange controls was driven chiefly by the 
political necessity to ease the pressure on British exporters and thus on the British 
economy by putting downward pressure on the pound.  
In spite of the Callaghan administration’s inability to implement further 
measures on exchange controls following the Winter of Discontent, preparations for 
further relaxations carried on in Whitehall. In early March 1979, the Cabinet’s 
Official Committee on External Economic Affairs advised ‘supporting the idea of a 
gradual relaxation of exchange control for outward investment’.101 They wrote: 
‘[D]espite our common concern about inflation, we are beginning to be worried 
about the effect of the continued strength of sterling on manufacturing industry 
competitiveness and that some relaxation may help to ease the rate down a little’102. 
In April, the Overseas Trade Board expressed similar concerns, arguing that ‘the 
present rate imposed a severe strain on some export activity’ due to the poor state 
of domestic profitability, which could be alleviated by some exchange control 
relaxations.103 A week before the May general election, Treasury Under Secretary 
David Hancock, anticipating further exchange control measures in the case of a 
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Thatcher win, drafted a proposal of relaxations ‘for a Conservative Chancellor 
only’.104 
Once in office, Financial Secretary Nigel Lawson – driven by a deep-seated 
ideological opposition to exchange controls – set up a team to investigate the 
possibility of further exchange control relaxations, which was led by Hancock and 
Dawkins, the Bank’s Chief of Exchange Controls (Capie, 2010: 769). This team in 
turn set about consulting the relevant departments. Similar to the Callaghan years, 
there was some division as to which policy goal should be prioritised: inflation 
targeting or rescuing export competitiveness. As Hancock succinctly explained, 
albeit in the patronising language of the time, officials would of course prefer to 
increase competitiveness by reducing inflation below that of Britain’s competitors, 
yet in current circumstances this was wishful thinking:  
 
Like the Irishman, we would prefer not to start from where we find ourselves. The 
controversial question is what we should do given our present situation. In 
particular, given that we significantly lost competitiveness over the past winter, is 
it better: (i) to pursue policies which help to get our rate of inflation down and thus 
keep the rate high; or (ii) to encourage the nominal exchange rate to fall (if we can) 
in the hope that this will increase output in the short term and thus possibly mitigate 
the damage that is being done to our industrial base.105 
 
Wass believed that the balance of opinion might lean towards focussing on the 
former goal, especially amongst radical Conservative politicians: ‘[i]t may well be 
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the case also that Ministers are rather pleased about the exchange rate, partly 
because of the beneficial price effects it will have and partly because, by reducing 
corporate profit margins, it will put increasing pressure on private employers to 
bargain toughly in the next pay round’.106 This line of reasoning was adopted by P. 
V. Dixon of the Treasury’s Industrial Economic Division. Industry, he explained, 
was ‘caught between the upper millstone of monetary policies/exchange rate and 
the lower millstone of wage costs’.107 This was something to be encouraged, not 
alleviated: ‘Industry has to realise that the climate for profits is potentially very 
unpropitious; firms will go bust if there is not a very substantial deceleration of 
wage costs’.108 For this reason, Dixon urged Lawson not ‘to move too quickly to 
industry’s rescue’ regarding exchange controls.109 He wrote that the ‘way 
industrialists are talking about pay does not suggest that they are yet seeing their 
financial position as the constraint which will cause the rate of pay settlements to 
decelerate sharply. The Budget cannot succeed unless this is perceived’.110 The 
ultimate goal of this approach, as outlined in a DoT paper in July, was to facilitate 
a ‘deterioration in the prospects for the traded goods and services sector, both in 
terms of output and profitability’ so as ‘to stiffen employer resistance to pay claims, 
and once again to moderate wage demands’.111  
However, the majority of opinion within the government viewed this 
disciplining strategy as too risky, which casts doubt on accounts that emphasise the 
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Thatcher government’s disregard for the fate of domestic industry (Coakley and 
Harris, 1992; Talani, 2012). British industry’s profits had fallen by 13.5 per cent in 
the first three months of 1979, which became a central concern for the Treasury 
(Riddell, 1979a). When Howe arrived in office in May, Bank Governor Richardson 
advised him that the government should respond to the overvaluation of sterling 
with ‘significant relaxation of exchange control’.112 A few days later, Hancock was 
informed that post-tax returns on overseas investment may be higher than pre-tax 
returns on domestic investment.113 Indeed, at a CBI-Treasury meeting the same 
month, the CBI recommended ‘measures aimed at restoring competitiveness and 
adequate levels of profitability’, which included the ‘abolition of exchange 
controls’.114 The nature of the dilemma was captured best by Treasury official GM 
Gill, who explained to Hancock in late June that ‘we may well be moving into an 
area now where the benefits to inflation from a higher rate may be obtained at too 
great a cost in terms of output and the current account of the balance of payment’.115 
There was a great difference, Gill argued, between an ‘organically’ high rate based 
on a strong economic performance, and a high rate ‘imposed on industries which 
were inherently weak’.116 Britain faced an inorganically strong pound, such that 
‘too fast a rise in the rate will cause immediate damage to the viability of these 
industries before the counter-inflation benefits have had time to come through’.117 
For this reason he encouraged Lawson to proceed with exchange control abolition.  
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The DoT and DoI also positioned themselves against exchange controls for 
this reason. The Under Secretary for the DoT explained in early May that ‘we have 
been losing competitiveness and there is nothing much in prospect to suggest a rapid 
change in trend is likely … Despite the inflationary disadvantages I think from the 
Department’s point of view there is a strong case for supporting some relaxation’.118 
This same message was put in starker language in July, when a Trade official 
informed Treasury Minister of State Peter Rees that ‘with shipping in worldwide 
recession … the profits of UK shipping companies [are] decreasing or non-existent’, 
further necessitating the ‘commercial flexibility’ that would accompany exchange 
control relaxations.119 Hancock was also contacted by a top DoI official in early 
May, who urged the Treasury to address the ‘serious and general lack of 
competitiveness … in British industry’.120 The kind of monetarist penance 
advocated by some in the Thatcher administration, he wrote, was wrong headed: ‘I 
do not believe that the adjustment that is necessary in our economy will come about 
through an overvalued pound, Germany and Japan did not attain their virtuous 
circles in that fashion’.121  
A different argument, albeit with the same policy prescription, was put 
directly to Howe by Secretary of State for Industry Keith Joseph on 1 June. Joseph 
argued that ‘restrictions on portfolio investment overseas reduce the return on 
investment in the UK, since by restricting international capital movements we 
reduce the pressure on British management to increase profitability’.122 Exposing 
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British capital to global competition via exchange control relaxation could reinforce 
the need for companies to economise on labour costs and counteract the inflationary 
effects of exchange control abolition. Finally, the Foreign Office too made their 
position clear. At a May meeting with officials from the Treasury (including 
Hancock), Bank (Dawkins), Trade and Industry, the Foreign Office representative, 
M. D. Butler, explained with great clarity that there was a ‘case for relaxing 
exchange controls completely over the next three years, in order to stimulate large 
outflows to balance the large increments to the balance of payments from North Sea 
oil, and thus to keep the exchange rate competitive’.123 Summarising the various 
discussions taking place on this topic, Hancock wrote to Lawson that, while 
depreciating sterling through exchange control abolition could damage the fight 
against inflation, it was likely a less inflationary strategy for effecting a competitive 
depreciation than direct intervention in the exchange rate.124 
The greatest disagreement was not whether or not to relax exchange 
controls, but which controls to relax first. Against claims that this deregulation was 
intended to boost the global prospects of the City, the Bank, DoT, and Lawson were 
pushing for portfolio controls – which most frustrated the City’s activities – to be 
maintained.125 This was due to fear of a massive diversification by overseas 
investors out of sterling. On the other hand, the DoI proposed the complete abolition 
of direct and portfolio investment in one swoop.126 This supports the conclusions of 
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Bellringer and Michie (2014: 120), who observed that the Thatcher government 
appeared quite indifferent as to the impact of exchange control relaxation on the 
City’s activities.  
Contrary to the claims of Helleiner (1994) and Germain (1997), the Thatcher 
government’s advocacy of exchange control liberalisation was not chiefly driven by 
a desire to consolidate the City’s position as a global financial centre, nor by a 
commitment to neoliberal principles. Instead, this chapter follows Bellringer and 
Michie (2014: 122) in arguing that ‘no evidence can be uncovered that the decision 
was designed to improve the competitive position of the London Stock Exchange’, 
nor other sectors of the City. Furthermore, while key figures in the government were 
certainly ideologically opposed to controls, the most immediate and pressing 
concern was the dire lack of export competitiveness. The Thatcher government 
intended temporarily to alleviate the stress on British exporters by placing 
downward pressure on the pound through exchange control liberalisation. The final 
section of the chapter will explore the Conservatives’ strategy for overcoming the 
barriers that had restricted their predecessors’ deregulatory agenda. 
 
IV. The Winter of Discontent and spooking the market 
 
If the Callaghan and Thatcher governments both shared the same motivation in 
pursuing exchange control liberalisation, then what of the impediments to full 
deregulation that the former administration had faced? This section will argue that, 
while the domestic political constraint had significantly eased, the problem of 
volatile currency markets remained. Yet, unlike its predecessors, the Thatcher 
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government crafted a rhetorical strategy that it believed would allow it to 
circumvent the latter obstacle. By publicly emphasising the administration’s 
ideological commitment to laissez-faire principles, the Thatcher government 
intended to create the policy space to pursue currency depreciation without 
spooking the markets.  
Domestically, Thatcher was less constrained by the unions than her 
predecessors. To some extent, this was due to the public relations defeat suffered by 
the unions following the Winter of Discontent. As Gamble (1994a: 94-95) observed, 
the ‘myth of the Winter of Discontent, with its images of closed hospitals, rubbish 
piling up in the streets, and dead bodies rotting unburied in graveyards’, reinforced 
the popular notion of the bankruptcy of benign state collaboration with the union 
movement. A directly oppositional policy towards the union movement was now 
not only possible but electorally savvy: the ‘old Tory disadvantage of a cold and 
distant relationship with the union movement … turned into an asset’ (Dorfman, 
1983: 20). This calamitous event, combined with ‘rising unemployment and de-
industrialisation’, meant that ‘Mrs Thatcher inherited a strong strategic position in 
relation to the trade unions’ (Marsh, 1992: 64). Indeed, the government ‘used their 
obvious political leverage over trade unionism’ to enact a radical overhaul of 
macroeconomic strategy ‘without so much as consulting nor considering trade union 
views’ (Dorfman, 1983: 20). Whereas the Callaghan government had moved 
tentatively on the issue of exchange control relaxation because of tense government-
union relations, the Thatcher administration in fact believed that the abolition of 
exchange controls would ‘help the Government’s position vis-a-vis the trade unions, 
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by showing that the Government were determined that investors should be allowed 
to put their money where they can earn the best return’.127  
The external economic constraint, however, remained. The attempt to effect 
a currency depreciation via exchange control relaxations in the context of a floating 
exchange rate system was, as Lawson admitted in October 1979, ‘bound to be a leap 
in the dark’.128 There remained a sense of unease throughout the different branches 
of the government about the proper tools for managing a floating rate. The Official 
Committee on External Economic Affairs – memories of past sterling crises fresh 
in their minds – insisted that exchange control relaxation measures should be 
gradual ‘in order to avoid the risk of a foreign exchange crisis’.129 The Overseas 
Trade Board concurred, arguing that government intervention to lower the rate 
‘could easily get out of hand because of speculative action, and it might be very 
difficult to halt’.130 Despite the accumulation of foreign reserves in recent years, the 
authorities still feared that the floating rate system ruled out ‘an orderly devaluation 
of sterling because any overt action by the government would have the potential to 
provoke a diversification out of the pound’ (my emphasis; Rogers, 2012: 203).  
The Thatcher administration concocted a rhetorical strategy to neutralise these 
dangers. By justifying the abolition of exchange controls under the banner of ‘good 
housekeeping’ – which meant a combination of responsible, forward-looking policy 
and a commitment to laissez-faire principles – they could manufacture a devaluation 
in a covert and seemingly unintentional manner. This would, it was hoped, reduce 
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the chance of depreciation spooking the markets or painting the government as 
hypocrites. In June, Hancock wrote to Lawson: ‘it is risky for Government 
spokesmen to say that it [exchange control relaxation] was intended to secure a 
depreciation in the exchange rate. Once that feeling got abroad, the short term 
consequences for the exchange rate could be very destabilizing’.131 For this reason, 
the government should avoid ‘the argument that exchange control relaxation is 
intended as a means of increasing competitiveness’.132 Lawson agreed that:  
 
reasoning based on the premise that the exchange control relaxations would help 
prevent this country catching the “Dutch disease” should be avoided; while the 
Financial Secretary sees some merit in the argument, it is not one that he would 
want to use publicly and prefers instead to contend that the revenue from north sea 
oil should be used to build up overseas investments whose future earnings can 
provide a stream of foreign-generated income which will ultimately be able to 
replace the revenue from North Sea oil. In this way the exchange control 
relaxations can be presented as good house keeping.133 
 
In August, Lawson explained to Howe that, while he favoured a strong (yet not 
inexorably rising) pound for anti-inflation purposes, he proposed ‘a bonfire of most 
(if not all) of the remaining exchange controls this autumn’.134 This deregulation 
‘might’ slow sterling’s rise without overtly signalling that ‘we are unhappy at the 
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strength of the £’, which ‘would quickly lead to a very serious loss of confidence in 
our resolve to stick to [anti-inflationary] policy’.135 
Nott demonstrated this strategy in an interview with BBC Radio 4 after the first 
round of relaxations in July. In response to a question about whether this relaxation 
was an attempt to depreciate sterling, Nott responded:  
 
it’s very difficult to say whether overseas opinion will take this further measure of 
liberalism, liberalisation with exchange control, in such a way that it thinks that 
the pound is all the more worth-while buying, because it is an act of self 
confidence, or whether they will say “well, this means there’s going to be a little 
bit more money going out of the country into overseas investment and therefore, 
we must sell the pound”. Now which way it’ll go is very difficult to predict … 
What the strong pound has enabled us to do is pursue what I regard as the correct 
policies in themselves.136 
    
This strategy was also visible following the final abolition of controls in October. 
Speaking to the House of Commons, Howe insisted that the aim was not to weaken 
the pound, but rather to build up overseas income streams for the future and to 
provide greater ‘freedom of choice’ to ‘companies and individuals’.137 The strong 
pound merely helped to facilitate this move. At a later press conference, Lawson 
was questioned on the relationship between exchange control abolition and the price 
of sterling, but he ‘refused to speculate about the possible outflows or impact on 
sterling from the changes’ (Riddell, 1979c). 
                                                        
135 Emphasis in original; TNA T 388/59, Lawson to Howe, 28 August 1979.  
136 TNA PJ 1/94, BBC Radio 4 interview, 19 July 1979. 
137 Hansard, House of Commons, vol. 968, cc235-264, 12 June 1979. 
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The government’s pursuit of this rhetorical strategy must be understood in 
the context of the rise of new classical economics, with its emphasis on the 
importance of ‘policy credibility’ (Grabel, 2000). Propelled by several pivotal 
articles in the late 1970s, this approach argued that rational agents ‘assess the 
credibility of an announced policy’ before acting (ibid: 3). Particularly influential 
for the Thatcher government was Patrick Minford’s ‘rational expectations’ model, 
which too stressed the centrality of perceived credibility to the art of policy-making 
(Cooper, 2012: 39-40). Indeed, this rhetorical strategy was convincing, due to the 
perceived sincerity of the Thatcher administration’s commitment to free market 
principles. The Conservatives had ruled out a pragmatic depreciation of sterling for 
export competitiveness purposes in their 1976 manifesto The Right Approach: ‘We 
reject the simplistic argument that a depreciating currency is required to maintain 
competitiveness. Internal inflation is the real enemy of successful competition. A 
falling exchange rate makes internal inflation worse’. In addition, key figures in the 
administration had previously denounced exchange controls as a matter of principle. 
At a November 1978 Commons debate, Howe had decried the controls as ‘a 
bureaucratic hallmark of a society that has no confidence in itself’, while in his 
autobiography he characterised them as ‘totalitarian’ and kept in place by ‘forces of 
ignorance, timidity and inertia’ (Howe, 1994: 140-1). Lawson too had publicly 
expressed his disdain for exchange controls, condemning them first in his ‘maiden 
speech’ as Opposition Treasury Spokesman in November 1977 and then in a 
Financial Weekly article at the height of the 1979 election campaign (Lawson, 1992: 
38). Immediately following both the July and October 1979 deregulations, the 
Financial Times published front page stories that repeated the government’s 
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rhetoric. Peter Riddell reported on 19 July that ‘the latest moves are not designed as 
a response to the recent sharp rise in the rate’ (Riddell, 1979b). In October he went 
further, arguing that the ‘Government has decided to go all the rest of the way now 
because Minsters believe it is right on its own merits to give additional freedom to 
investment’ (Riddell, 1979c).  
So successful was this rhetoric that the Thatcher government’s ‘neoliberal 
orientation’ and ‘dedication to the “free market”’ is still one of the dominant 
explanations for the abolition of exchange control in the IPE literature (Helleiner, 
1994: 150; Overbeek, 1990: 196). To paraphrase Gamble (1989: 351), the large gap 
between rhetoric and actions is not specific to Thatcherism, yet what is novel is the 
unusual degree to which the Thatcher administration was able to convince even its 
critics that this gap was much smaller than it really was. This is not to deny that 
figures like Howe and Lawson were ideologically committed to exchange control 
abolition – both indicated in private that they wished to see the controls abandoned 
on principle, regardless of the other economic effects.138 Yet, this does not explain 
the ease with which this deregulation gained support at all levels of the civil service, 
nor why the ideological motivation was the only justification used publicly, despite 
the overwhelming desire to see these relaxations exert a downward pressure on 
sterling. 
                                                        
138 In early July 1979, Lawson observed: ‘there were arguments for and against both 
a high and low real exchange rate. No precise answer was possible. So the case for 
further exchange control relaxations had to be considered on merits without regard 
to the arguments about competitiveness and counter-inflation’ (TNA T 388/204, 
Record of a Meeting, 2 July 1979). In October, Howe wrote to Thatcher: ‘Obviously 
the effect of abolishing exchange controls would be to permit outflow which, 
especially if they proved substantial would cause the rate to be lower than otherwise. 
That is a necessary consequence of the achievement of our aim to abolish exchange 
control’ (TNA T 388/207, Howe to Thatcher, 11 October 1979). 
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In the context of the global profitability crisis, the strong pound following 
1977 presented policy-makers with a dilemma. The rise of sterling acted as an 
automatic disciplining mechanism that acted to purge inflation from the domestic 
economy, yet at the risk of plunging Britain into a politically unacceptable 
recession. As such, Callaghan and Thatcher endeavoured to ease exchange controls 
as a part of a palliative statecraft strategy to depreciate sterling, boost the 
competitiveness of exporters, and ease the recession. However, both governments 
faced the challenge of a vehemently opposed union movement and volatile global 
currency markets. While these obstacles impeded the Callaghan administration, the 
Thatcher government believed that by justifying the dismantling of exchange 
controls with rhetoric about ‘good housekeeping’, they could pragmatically boost 
export competitiveness while reducing the risks of a collapse in sterling’s position.  
 
 
Conclusion 
 
Britain’s abolition of exchange controls constituted a fundamental step towards the 
financialisation of both the UK and world economies. Yet the existing lenses for 
conceptualising the state’s role in financialisation – namely the expropriation and 
crisis resolution explanations – prove inadequate for understanding this 
deregulation. British governments did not pursue this policy change due to the 
lobbying power of financial capital, the ascendance of laissez-faire ideology, or the 
threat of capital flight during the stagflation crisis. Instead, the dismantling of 
exchange controls must be understood as a strategic response to a crisis of the very 
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form of wealth underpinning capitalist society. Facing the impersonal domination 
of value relations, on one side, and the tangible, concrete demands of an 
enfranchised electorate, on the other, governments forge statecraft strategies to 
navigate this dilemma. This particular deregulation should be conceptualised as a 
strategy to meet the latter imperative by delaying the former: that is, to ensure 
governing legitimacy by postponing the worst effects of the profitability crisis.  
In the depths of the stagflation crisis, sterling’s appreciation from late 1976 
presented the British state with a contradiction. The rising exchange rate disciplined 
the domestic economy and aided the government in tackling inflation, while placing 
further pressure on critically uncompetitive industrial exporters and thus risking a 
politically damaging recession. The archival evidence demonstrated that the 
Callaghan and Thatcher governments prioritised the latter goal, namely political 
legitimacy, as they recognised the immediate threat to economic performance and 
social stability, and thus endeavoured to depreciate sterling by relaxing exchange 
controls and allowing an outflow of investment. Yet two key obstacles stood in the 
way of this deregulation: an opposed trade union movement and the volatility of 
currency speculation in a floating rate system. The Callaghan administration was 
unable to forge a strategy to overcome either of these barriers, resulting in its 
relatively weak relaxation of controls in 1977 and 1978. The Thatcher 
administration, on the other hand, used the narrative of the ‘Winter of Discontent’ 
to disarm the unions, while devising a rhetorical strategy that veiled its intended 
competitive devaluation with appeals to laissez-faire notions of responsible 
economic management. The abolition of exchange controls was thus fundamentally 
a palliative statecraft strategy to manage accumulation and legitimation imperatives 
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– ultimately reflecting the contradiction between value and tangible needs – during 
the second phase of the profitability crisis in Britain, while the particular form and 
timing of this deregulation must be understood in terms of discursive strategies 
designed to navigate the dangers of creating economic policy in the context of 
volatile global currency markets.  
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CHAPTER EIGHT 
The Big Bang 
 
 
If Big Bang goes off successfully, it will be seen as a showpiece for 
Government policy on deregulation and increased competition; if it leads 
to scandals and liquidations, it will be labelled the unacceptable face of 
unpopular capitalism. 
 
Brian Griffiths and David Willetts to Margaret Thatcher, 3 June 1986139 
 
 
Introduction 
 
On the twentieth anniversary of the Big Bang, the Financial Times recited the 
‘conventional wisdom’ that these reforms had ‘saved the City from a slow slide into 
irrelevance’ (Larsen, 2006). The Big Bang, it was claimed, had transformed 
Britain’s financial sector into ‘probably the nearest thing to a true meritocracy’ 
(ibid). The twenty-fifth anniversary commemorations in 2011 assumed a very 
different tone. As hundreds of protesters marked the occasion by demonstrating in 
Canary Wharf and at the ‘Occupy’ encampment outside the LSE, The Economist 
(2011) ran a story with the subheading: ‘In the 25 years since the Big Bang, the 
                                                        
139 TNA PREM 19/1718. 
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mood in the City has changed from optimism to anxiety’. In just five years, the 
memorialisation of this event had transformed from an exercise in self-
congratulation to a cautionary tale. What has remained unchanged, however, is the 
fact that the Big Bang represented a crucial policy change in propelling processes 
of financialisation both in Britain and globally. By disrupting the cartel-like 
workings of the LSE and allowing for the globalisation of the City, this deregulation 
accelerated the expansion of the financial sector out of all proportion with industrial 
growth. For these reasons, it is important to analyse the policy motivations 
underpinning the Big Bang in order to understand the state’s role in advancing 
financialisation. 
To a greater extent than either CCC or exchange control abolition, the Big 
Bang has generally been understood in popular discourse and much of the academic 
literature as a policy designed to boost the prospects of financial elites over 
industrial capitalists. As Talani (2012: 63) has argued, this policy secured the 
‘definitive submission of productive capital to financial capital’. However, this 
chapter will demonstrate that neither this expropriation perspective nor the 
opposing crisis resolution approach are sufficient for understanding this radical 
deregulation. The Big Bang must rather be conceptualised in relation to the state’s 
broader attempts to navigate the contradictory imperatives of the crisis of a form of 
abstract wealth – value – and people’s assertion of their tangible demands and needs. 
This financial liberalisation, it will be argued, constituted an attempt to support the 
government’s broader strategy of depoliticised discipline, which itself was intended 
to restructure British social relations in line with the dominating pressures of global 
value relations in a period of crisis, without jeopardising governing legitimacy. 
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This chapter will advance an account that situates the Big Bang within the 
Thatcher administration’s larger macroeconomic strategy. After their referral to the 
RPC in early 1979, the LSE began lobbying the government for an exemption from 
RPC jurisdiction. This presented the Thatcher administration with a dilemma. While 
granting this exemption would ensure that the government could continue to sell 
gilt-edged securities on the LSE uninterrupted (an important instrument of monetary 
control), this high publicity favour for the City would make a mockery of their 
competition rhetoric. The political considerations won out in 1979 and Thatcher 
refused the LSE’s request.  
However, the balance of forces shifted with the creation of the MTFS in 
1980. MTFS was a self-imposed policy straitjacket that would lock the government 
into a four-year path of severe contractionary measures, in an attempt to purge the 
British economy of stagflation. As a strategy of depoliticised discipline, MTFS 
required that certain money supply targets were met each year – so as to prove that 
the policy was working, and thus justify the painful deflation. Yet this policy went 
disastrously wrong: the ensuing recession was deeper than expected, largely due to 
the further appreciation of sterling provoked by monetary tightening, and the 
government was unable to restrain the money supply, due to the fact that they had 
ignored warnings that their chosen monetary aggregate (£M3) was unreliable. In the 
context of deepening recession and the erosion of the government’s legitimacy, the 
Thatcher administration reneged on their MTFS pledges and reduced interest rates 
in an attempt to ease the pressure on the corporate sector and mortgagors. Without 
the interest rate weapon, the government was forced to discover a different method 
for reducing the money supply, or else risk the total failure of MTFS. They found 
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this instrument in a process called ‘overfunding’, whereby more government debt 
was sold than required by current levels of state expenditure, as a way to soak up 
excess liquidity in the banking system. In turn, overfunding required a smoothly 
functioning stock exchange, which could not be reconciled with the continuation of 
the RPC case. As such, from 1982, the Thatcher government endeavoured to 
negotiate an exemption for the LSE, which was finally announced in July 1983. The 
decision that led to the Big Bang, then, was ultimately a result of the government’s 
need to ensure the success of its depoliticised disciplining measures.  
In sum, there is little evidence to support the expropriation claims that the 
state’s role in the Big Bang was motivated by a pro-finance bias or a desire to 
promote City competitiveness. Neither can this deregulation be understood as an 
automatic reaction to the crisis of industrial capital, as the crisis resolution 
explanations insist. The Big Bang emerged in the context of the British state’s 
attempts to reconcile the dominating constraints of a system of social wealth mired 
in crisis with the need to ensure governing legitimacy in the eyes of the UK 
electorate. This fundamental step in the British state’s propulsion of financialisation 
should be understood as one element of a broader strategy to respond to the 
profitability crisis through depoliticised disciplining.  
 
 
The Big Bang and financialisation 
 
While within the literature, Britain’s abolition of exchange controls is seen as 
emblematic of the broader abandonment of Keynesian demand management, the 
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Big Bang has come to symbolise the radicalism and audacity of the neoliberal 
revolution in favour of global financial capital. On 27 October 1986, the LSE 
underwent a dramatic deregulation. Monopolistic fixed commissions on the trading 
of securities were abandoned and barriers to the entry of foreign firms into the LSE 
were removed (Plender, 1986: 39). These changes in turn resulted in the scrapping 
of the single capacity system, which had barred jobbers (who wholesale traded on 
their own account) from performing the same role as brokers (who traded on behalf 
of their clients) (Vogel, 1996: 97).  
This package of deregulations transformed the City as a financial centre and 
consequently the British economy. The transaction costs of doing business in the 
LSE fell rapidly, dropping by 30 per cent between 1986 and 1987 (Laurence, 2001: 
83). As a result, the average daily turnover increased from £500 million in 1986 to 
£2 billion in 1995 (ibid). The increased competition generated by the Big Bang, 
which saw US and Japanese banks flood into the LSE, is said to have led to the 
1980s being the only peacetime decade in which productivity in the UK financial 
sector grew faster than general productivity (Bellringer and Michie, 2014: 113). 
Between 1985 and 2005, the UK’s banking assets rose from £762 billion to £5,526 
billion (Larsen, 2006). By 2007, the financial sector accounted for 8.3 per cent of 
Britain’s GDP and, more importantly, trade in financial services yielded a surplus 
of £36.9 billion compared to the deficit of £89 billion in traded goods (Eglene, 2011: 
34). As Gamble (2009: 16) argues, the Big Bang was central to the emergence of a 
new financialised growth model, in which financial services are relied upon to 
‘replace the gap left by the decline of manufacturing’. Froud et al. (2011: 9) relate 
the Big Bang to financialisation in even stronger terms, emphasising that the credit 
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creation capacity unleashed by this deregulation ultimately became the driver of 
Britain’s economic growth in the neoliberal era. 
‘Big Bang’ is perhaps a misnomer, considering the gradual and winding 
institutional pathway through which this deregulation was arrived at. Although the 
changes that set off this financial revolution were enacted overnight, the Big Bang 
was in fact a long time in the making. The legal process that resulted in this 
liberalisation began when the Wilson administration extended the jurisdiction of 
restrictive practices legislation in 1976 to cover ‘virtually all services’, without 
exempting the LSE.140 As a result, the Director General of the Office of Fair Trading 
(OFT), Gordon Borrie, came under legal obligation to refer the LSE’s rulebook to 
the RPC, which he did in February 1979. The Chairman of the LSE, Goodison, 
consequently launched a campaign to lobby the government for an exemption. 
Goodison’s pleas were rejected by the Callaghan administration, but the LSE 
expected a more sympathetic audience once the Conservatives won the 1979 
election. However, in autumn 1979, after discussions between the DoT, Treasury, 
and Bank, the Thatcher administration refused to exempt the LSE. Goodison, 
frustrated but undeterred, continued to lobby the government. Finally, in summer 
1983, under the stewardship of a new Chancellor and Secretary of State for Trade 
and Industry, the Thatcher government relented to the LSE’s requests and halted the 
RPC case. In return for exemption, the LSE agreed to several fundamental changes 
to its rules, which were to be implemented three years later in October 1986 (Moran, 
1991). As such, in contrast to the abruptness of the Big Bang’s enactment and its 
                                                        
140 TNA FV 73/148, Thatcher to Wilson, 10 November 1980. 
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radical implications, the formulation of this landmark piece of deregulation was 
surprisingly slow, hesitant and punctuated by long periods of inactivity. 
 
Existing interpretations 
 
The existing IPE literature has attempted to explain the radicalism of the Big Bang 
by pointing to both the ideological makeup of the Thatcher administration and the 
global dynamics of competitive deregulation. This, in fact, is characteristic of the 
broader IPE consensus on the causes of neoliberal financial regulatory restructuring. 
However, only a select few accounts have endeavoured to understand the reason for 
the gradual and indecisive route by which the government decided to pass this 
deregulation.  
Similar to his analysis of the abolition of exchange controls, Helleiner (1996: 
151) argues that the ‘government’s pressure on the stock exchange to introduce 
these reforms stemmed in part from a neoliberal desire to eliminate restrictive 
practices in London’. The role of ideology is also emphasised by Laurence (2001: 
81), who points out that the Conservatives had ‘always been seen as friends of the 
city’ and thus it should not come as a surprise that they ultimately acquiesced to the 
LSE’s requests for exemption from the RPC case. Moving beyond the analysis of 
the Thatcher government’s broad opposition to financial regulation, Moran (1991: 
71) and Laurence (2001) also point to the role played by specific ideologues, such 
as Chancellor Lawson and Secretary of State for Trade and Industry Cecil 
Parkinson, who are said to have broken the deadlock of indecision within the 
administration as a whole. This chimes with the broader explanation of 
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financialisation as an ideas-driven phenomenon, which constitutes one part of the 
expropriation approach (Palley, 2013). 
On the whole, however, IPE explanations of the Big Bang have placed more 
emphasis on structural shifts in global financial markets than the ideological 
predisposition of figures within the Thatcher administration. While recognising the 
role played by contingent factors in shaping the timing and specific form of this 
deregulation, it is argued that it was the global pressures of competitive deregulation 
and financial innovation that forced governing elites to act. As Helleiner (1996: 151) 
claims, ‘the mobility of financial activity encouraged a competitive deregulation 
dynamic’ that pushed the Thatcher government to pursue the ‘goal of preserving 
London’s position as an international financial center at a time when global financial 
business was shifting from banking to securities activity’. Similarly, Laurence 
(2001: 72-3) argues that the May Day deregulation of the New York Stock 
Exchange provoked a decline in transaction costs in New York financial markets, 
which, when combined with Britain’s abolition of exchange controls in 1979, 
caused a mass exodus of securities trading from London to more profitable climes. 
This global dynamic, combined with the rise of large institutional investors in 
Britain who no longer benefited from the LSE’s monopolistic practices, created a 
powerful pressure for the abandonment of the LSE’s cartel-like rules. Ultimately, 
Laurence (ibid: 75, 80) insists, it was the Bank that pushed the government to 
exempt the LSE out of fear for the competitiveness of the City as a financial 
powerhouse. Talani (2012: 60) advances this interpretation in even stronger terms, 
claiming that the Big Bang ‘inevitably followed’ the abolition of exchange controls. 
With the free flow of capital entailed by this deregulation, the declining 
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competitiveness of the City would directly result in the loss of the LSE’s share of 
global securities trade. By revolutionising the outdated practices of the LSE and 
consequently prioritising the interests of the British financial sector, Talani (ibid: 
63) claims that the ‘Big Bang represented the final stage of a process which had 
already begun in the mid-1970s: the definitive submission of productive capital to 
financial capital’ – echoing expropriation approaches to financialisation. 
Thereafter, ‘short-termism’ became ‘a structural characteristic of the British 
capitalist system’ (ibid). The Big Bang, from this perspective, is understood as one 
aspect of a broader deregulation agenda that was forced on states by the insipient 
dynamics of financialisation – conceived of, presumably, as a sort of self-moving 
phenomenon.  
While the IPE literature has prioritised two explanations of the Big Bang – 
ideology and the global dynamics of competitive financial deregulation – a number 
of influential accounts have brought to light the messy intra-governmental politics 
that led to the Thatcher administration’s decision to exempt the LSE. These 
explanations stress, as Daniel Mügge (2010: 46) writes, the lack of ‘coherent 
government strategy’ with regards to the LSE, and instead point to the dynamics of 
institutional path dependency that were initiated by the expansion of the OFT’s 
jurisdiction in 1976. Steven Vogel (1996) puts forwards the most detailed account 
of the Big Bang, in which he highlights the conflicts both between government 
departments and between the Treasury and Bank. Vogel (ibid: 102-3) argues that 
the Thatcher government initially refused to exempt the LSE due to political 
concerns, namely that they did ‘not want to be seen as too close a friend of the City’. 
This point is echoed by Bellringer and Michie (2014: 125), who emphasise that 
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Secretary of State for Trade Nott, in particular, was extremely cautious not to 
‘contradict [the Conservatives’] rhetoric on competition policy’. After Nott’s 
successor, John Biffen, also refused to exempt the LSE, Vogel claims that the Bank 
decided to intervene. Motivated by a ‘keen interest’ in ensuring the successful 
‘trading of gilt-edged securities’ and ‘the overall health of the City’, the Bank began 
a process of negotiation with the LSE, OFT, DoT, and Treasury in 1982 (ibid: 104). 
As Moran (1991: 71) argues, the 1983 appointment of two pro-market ideologues 
to powerful positions within the government – Lawson and Parkinson – gave a new 
impetus to the Bank’s endeavours, which ultimately resulted in the exemption of 
the LSE in July. These detailed expositions of the period from 1979 to 1983 serve 
to highlight the complicated and incoherent nature of the government’s strategy 
with regards to the LSE. Bellringer and Michie (2014: 126) go as far as to claim that 
the ‘government’s focus was not on sparking a process to propel the Stock 
Exchange, and as a consequence the City of London, to a position of global 
influence’. Rather, this approach emphasises the role of chance, the binding power 
of legal path dependency, and the manner in which this dynamic interacted with the 
political considerations surrounding competition policy.  
This literature is, on the whole, deeply unsatisfactory. While various 
accounts make important points about the state’s motivation in pursuing the Big 
Bang deregulation, the literature in general is characterised by a completely 
counterproductive assertion: government policy with regards to financial regulation 
is arbitrarily separated from broader macroeconomic policy. Due to the fact that the 
sale of government debt on the LSE was a crucial mechanism through which the 
government exercised control over the money supply, which in turn formed a central 
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element of the government’s macroeconomic agenda, state strategy cannot be neatly 
compartmentalised into the self-enclosed categories of financial policy, monetary 
policy, and macroeconomic objectives. While Vogel (1996: 104) and Bellringer and 
Michie (2014: 126) mention the role of government funding in the RPC case, neither 
place the gilt markets at the centre of their accounts. Sahil Dutta (2017) has made a 
welcome contribution, in this sense, by directly linking the Big Bang with the 
government’s debt-selling needs. By examining the British state’s intervention in 
the gilt-edged markets since the 1960s, Dutta (ibid) draws a link between this 
financial liberalisation and the state’s broader attempts to manage its sovereign debt. 
Nevertheless, despite the innovative nature of Dutta’s account, no existing literature 
relates the Big Bang to the immediate macroeconomic needs of the Thatcher 
government in the early 1980s. The period 1979-83, during which the government 
was deliberating over the RPC case, was also marked by the formulation and 
implementation of an incredibly bold macroeconomic plan that transformed the 
government’s debt-selling needs. MTFS was primarily a political device designed 
to lock the government into a four-year disciplining programme and insulate it from 
political pressures to reflate the economy. In order to successfully depoliticise this 
disciplinary policy framework, this strategy required a number of economically 
questionable but politically important monetary targets to be met each year. This in 
turn necessitated that the government was able to sell massive amounts of gilt-edged 
securities in order to control the money supply. As the government’s sole medium 
for the sale of debt, the LSE’s smooth functioning was thus an essential element in 
the government’s macroeconomic strategy. The Big Bang, as such, must be 
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understood in relation to the immediate debt-selling needs generated by the 
implementation of MTFS.  
This chapter will overcome the shortcomings in the existing IPE literature 
by analysing this deregulation in terms of a strategic response to the global 
profitability crisis and its national manifestations. The Big Bang will be framed as 
a pragmatic attempt to prop up the Thatcher government’s MTFS – a strategy of 
depoliticised disciplining that was proving contradictory, politically divisive, and 
fundamentally unworkable. The evidence presented in this chapter not only 
highlights the shortcomings of the Big Bang literature’s reliance on dynamics of 
competitive deregulation and ignorance of debt management issues, but also 
constitutes a broader disconfirmation of theories of the state’s role in 
financialisation. The British state neither pursued this liberalisation primarily to 
boost the City’s competitive position, as the expropriation approach claims, nor was 
this policy change an attempt to placate the capitalist class by freeing up credit in 
times of crisis, as the crisis resolution approach would insist. Rather, the Big Bang 
must be understood in relation to the contradiction between the impersonal 
domination of global value relations during a period of crisis and the demands by 
people for their immediate needs to be met. MTFS was an ill-thought-out political 
strategy to discipline domestic social relations in line with global value imperatives, 
in a depoliticised manner that would insulate political legitimacy – and the Big Bang 
should be conceptualised as an ad hoc attempt to support this ailing strategy. 
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Thatcher’s initial refusal to exempt, 1979 
 
As detailed in the previous chapter, when the Conservatives arrived in office in May 
1979, they faced a dire economic situation. The British experience of the global 
profitability crisis had entered its second phase, whereby the strong pound, propped 
up by North Sea oil and the IMF’s seal of approval, was aiding in the government’s 
attack on inflation (which nevertheless remained extremely high), while 
simultaneously eroding companies’ already desperately low rates of profit. Just as 
these conditions had presented the government with a dilemma with regards to 
exchange controls, so it also led the Thatcher administration to hold conflicting 
views on the RPC’s legal action against the LSE. Four days after the election, 
Goodison began lobbying Secretary of State for Trade Nott to exempt the LSE from 
this court case.141 Yet the LSE’s pleas did not concern the new administration 
greatly. Instead, they were torn between two contradictory governing imperatives.  
Firstly, the government needed a smoothly functioning stock exchange both 
to sell its own debt and so that companies could sell their securities. This was crucial 
for two reasons: in the context of accelerating inflation, the sale of government debt 
helped to control the money supply by soaking up excess liquidity; and in the 
context of dwindling corporate liquidity, companies needed to raise funds for 
investment on the stock exchange. Secondly, the Thatcher administration had been 
elected on a platform of increasing the competitiveness of the British economy in 
all its aspects – ostensibly, this was to be their solution to the interminable 
                                                        
141 TNA FV 73/146, Goodison to Nott, 8 May 1979. 
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stagflation crisis – and the high profile exemption of a cosy cartel such as the LSE 
from legal scrutiny would represent an embarrassing U-turn on this stated objective. 
Indeed, as explored in the previous chapter, it was the apparent conviction of the 
Thatcher government’s rhetoric on free competition that had given them the 
political cover to attempt to manipulate the pound through the abolition of exchange 
controls. This divergence between the Thatcher government’s rhetoric regarding 
their unwavering commitment to laissez-faire and the reality of their pragmatic 
manoeuvrings casts doubt on the ‘blueprint’ theories of Thatcherism that emphasise 
the intentionality and coherence of the Thatcher governments’ economic legacy 
(Evans, 2004).  
The Thatcher administration, once again, faced a difficult governing 
dilemma, arising ultimately from the global profitability crisis. The RPC 
investigation of the LSE threatened to destabilise the government’s immediate 
objectives to dampen the spiralling inflation numbers and stave off large-scale 
bankruptcies. Yet exempting the LSE from the RPC would ridicule the 
government’s longer-term strategy for reviving sustainable economic growth – 
namely their competition agenda – and thus endanger their governing legitimacy. 
The interplay of these contradictory pressures explains the Thatcher government’s 
decisions with regards to the LSE in 1979. 
Upon its election, the Thatcher government was immediately warned by 
Treasury and Bank officials as to the dangers of the RPC case. On 10 May, Treasury 
official R. H. Seebohm wrote to Treasury Under Secretary Michael Bridgeman, 
explaining that an: 
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effective secondary market in gilts is highly desirable to support the 
funding of the PSBR … There is a genuine risk of financial anarchy in the 
event of an adverse Court decision before a new system is developed, 
during which period there could be a hiatus in gilt sales. The secondary 
market is also important for company securities.142  
 
Indeed, Bridgeman recognised that ‘there is a risk, which may be small, of severe 
damage to the present Government’s key element in its macro-economic strategy, 
control of the money supply’.143 This reflected his observation earlier in the year 
that ‘[n]o Government which was committed to control of the broader monetary 
aggregates as a major element in its macro-economic policy and so a substantial 
programme of gilt sales could run the risk of such an hiatus’.144 This problem was 
recognised by the Bank months before the Conservatives had arrived in office. In 
June, Bank Governor Richardson wrote to Chancellor Howe. Richardson argued 
that the ‘outcome of such a review could be far reaching and unless very carefully 
handled could seriously disturb markets generally and the gilt-edged market in 
particular’.145  
Against this advice, however, Howe was also repeatedly warned of the 
political embarrassment that would accompany an exemption of the LSE – a point 
also made by Vogel (1996), Laurence (2001), and Bellringer and Michie (2014). A 
Treasury note on 17 May warned that an ‘amendment to the Services Order would 
require an Affirmative Resolution in both Houses and there could be political 
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embarrassment for the Government (which could be accused either of abandoning 
the policy enshrined in the Fair Trading Act 1973 or of being selective in the support 
for stronger competition powers generally)’.146 Two weeks later, Nott repeated this 
fear to Howe. He agreed that the RPC was the wrong forum to examine the LSE’s 
practices, but emphasised that the legal process was ‘already in train’ and 
interrupting it now while claiming to want to ‘strengthen competition policy 
generally … might be fiercely criticised’.147 The Bank, despite voicing their support 
for exemption, was also beginning to realise the extent of the government’s bind. 
Peter Cooke, Head of Banking Supervision, was informed by a Bank official after 
a meeting with Conservative ministers in mid-June that the ‘topic is going to be 
decided on political grounds by Ministers hooked on competition’.148 
An attempt to reconcile the funding and political imperatives was made, 
however, in the form of a ‘stay of execution’ clause to the Competition Bill that was 
to be unveiled in 1980.149 This legal amendment would grant the LSE time to adjust 
to the changes if its rulebook was deemed restrictive by the RPC, thus avoiding an 
initial period of chaos that could endanger gilt sales. A Treasury note explained that 
this clause ‘seems to remove the main difficulties of allowing the reference to 
proceed, without incurring the difficulties of immediate exemption’.150 While this 
proposal was endorsed by Financial Secretary Lawson151, the Bank was not 
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convinced, with Richardson insisting to Howe that the stay of execution was a 
‘valuable improvement’ but still deeply insufficient.152  
A split began to emerge between Howe and Richardson on one side, and 
Lawson and Nott on the other. Howe wrote to Nott in late May, voicing his strong 
opposition to Nott’s hesitancy about exemption. After numerous discussions, 
Howe’s position softened somewhat. On 8 August, he explained to Nott that he was 
unable to ‘simply accept the danger to our funding programme which a hiatus in gilt 
sales would represent …  an effective market in gilts and in equities is essential to 
the economy’.153 As such, he urged Nott to accept the stay of execution immediately 
and to keep open the option of exemption when the opportunity presented itself. Yet 
Nott remained steadfastly opposed to exemption throughout this period. The 
political considerations, he insisted, had to take precedent: ‘The press (the Guardian 
and the Economist) had stated explicitly that they would regard the Government’s 
actions with respect to the Stock Exchange as the key test of its commitment to 
[competition] policy’.154 The Bank came to believe that Nott had isolated himself 
from his colleagues and advisors. There was talk in the Bank that Treasury 
Permanent Secretary Wass had ‘spoken to the Chancellor who had urged Nott to 
reconsider this approach but Nott had said “no”’.155 Furthermore, a DoT official had 
hinted to the Bank that ‘DOT officials’ advice to their Minister had been opposed 
to the line Nott was now taking’.156 However, despite his possible isolation, Nott 
could rely on support from Lawson and, more importantly, Thatcher. The latter 
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explained that while she was content for Nott and Howe to resolve the issue amongst 
themselves, she was ‘inclined to agree with Mr. Nott that it would be hard to justify 
not having the Stock Exchange investigated by the Restrictive Practices Court … at 
this juncture’.157 Nott revealed his decision not to exempt the LSE to Goodison on 
16 October, to the latter’s dismay.158 
In the context of the second phase of the profitability crisis, in which the 
high pound was pushing the British economy deeper into recession, the RPC’s case 
against the LSE presented the government with a dilemma. On the one hand, 
exempting the LSE would allow continued sales of gilts and company securities, 
which helped in the battle against inflation and in keeping companies afloat despite 
dire profitability. On the other hand, this exemption would directly contradict the 
Thatcher government’s pro-competition rhetoric, and thus threaten their political 
legitimacy. In 1979, the government decided, as a result of pressure from Nott, 
Lawson, and Thatcher, to postpone this dilemma. The immediate legitimacy 
considerations were considered to take priority, while the dangers associated with 
debt sales were somewhat allayed by the stay of execution clause. This narrative, 
thus far, is broadly in line with the arguments of Moran (1991), Vogel (1996), and 
Bellringer and Michie (2014). However, in the following years, the balance of 
forces was to change in significant ways, with the sale of government debt becoming 
an increasingly central element in the government’s attempt to discipline British 
social relations and thus revitalise the stagnant economy. This in turn rejuvenated 
the debate surrounding the RPC case.   
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A medium term political strategy 
 
The archival record shows a curious lull in discussion of the RPC case within the 
Treasury, DoT, and Bank after Nott’s decision in late 1979.159 Yet in 1982 this 
debate reignited with a greater fervour than before. While this period of inactivity 
is generally explained in the existing literature as deriving from the ideological 
disposition of the Secretaries of State for Trade who held office at the time – Nott 
and Biffen supposedly shared a lack of sympathy for the LSE’s plight, while Arthur 
Cockfield and Parkinson were more predisposed to take the City’s side (Moran, 
1991; Vogel, 1996) – the following sections of this chapter will advance a different 
explanation. The re-emergence of interest in the RPC case was primarily driven not 
by ideological considerations, but out of a necessity to support the government’s 
broader macroeconomic strategy. More specifically, it was the 1980 enactment of 
MTFS – the Thatcher administration’s depoliticised strategy to discipline British 
social relations and thus resolve the profitability crisis – that forced the government 
to ensure that there was no disruption in the gilt market resulting from a negative 
RPC decision.  
MTFS was the policy framework upon which the Thatcher government’s 
notorious monetarist experiment was based. It consisted of a four-year plan that set 
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a series of annually declining targets for the money supply and PSBR, with the 
stated overall goal of reducing inflation. Not only were the money supply targets 
extremely ambitious, but the key monetary aggregate chosen as a target – £M3 – 
had a very loose relationship with inflation. Indeed, there were concerns within the 
Bank, Treasury, and Civil Service Committee that ‘the relationships between (any 
particular definition of) monetary growth and nominal incomes were too fragile a 
basis for such a long-term commitment’ (Goodhart, 1989: 302). As Needham (2014: 
147) points out, while there was little econometric evidence suggesting that control 
of £M3 would allow the government to rein in inflation, there was a ‘tolerably 
robust’ relationship between another aggregate – M1 – and nominal incomes. Yet 
Lawson – the policy’s progenitor – chose the former as a target because prioritising 
M1 would have given more interest rate setting power to the Bank, further 
cementing its autonomy from Treasury and ministerial control (ibid). In addition, 
the raft of financial deregulations that had preceded MTFS – most significantly the 
abolition of exchange controls – seriously undermined the ability of policy-makers 
to have any definite impact upon the money supply. Such practical concerns, 
however, were ‘brushed aside’ by the government in their determination to 
implement this new policy framework (Goodhart, 1989: 302).  
The government’s unwillingness to be deterred by the technical deficiencies 
of MTFS hint at its fundamentally political character. MTFS should be understood 
not simply as a reflection of the Thatcher administration’s stubbornness and 
monetarist ideological fervour, but as an attempt to commit the government to a 
strict disciplining project that would confront the profitability crisis head on. Several 
authors have made this point in strong terms. Bulpitt (1986: 32) argued that the 
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Thatcher government adopted this ostensibly monetarist strategy as a way to 
rediscover ‘automatic rules or pilots to manage the economy’. By reducing the 
problem of inflation to a single monetary aggregate, which could only be controlled 
by expert manipulation of certain key economic variables, ‘economic management 
was depoliticized’ and thus solely became the prerogative of an insulated elite cabal 
(ibid). Furthermore, MTFS represented ‘the deliberate abdication of power to the 
financial and exchange rate markets’ (Thain, 1985: 269). By basing its 
macroeconomic strategy upon a select few monetary targets, the government was 
committing itself to transform policy if changes in financial conditions meant that 
the targets were in danger of being missed. This policy straitjacket would nullify the 
‘need for an incomes policy and with it, direct and continuous political negotiations 
with trade unions’: ‘[w]orkers who continued to demand wage rises above the rate 
of inflation would be automatically forced to change their expectations or price 
themselves out of a job’ (Flinders and Buller, 2006: 305). MTFS, then, was expected 
to depoliticise the government’s restoration of profitable capital accumulation 
through severe economic contraction. 
While the policy had its detractors, its political character was widely 
recognised.160 Discussing MTFS in early 1980, Sir Kenneth Berrill, head of the 
Cabinet Office’s Central Policy Review Staff, summarised what was at stake in 
implementing this policy: 
                                                        
160 Governor Richardson urged Thatcher and Howe against the adoption of MTFS 
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March 1980). 
 261 
 
This battle (which has only just begun) is between the irresistible force 
(trades union power) and the immovable object (the money supply). Given 
British conditions, it could be a very bloody battle indeed with interest 
rates, exchange rate, reduced investment, bankruptcies, at unknown levels. 
By declaring its determination to plough on with its monetary targets 
regardless the Government is giving itself very little elasticity … This is 
one of the many decisions which is, in the end, more a matter of political 
than economic judgement.161 
 
Yet this lack of elasticity, which concerned Berrill, was exactly what attracted 
Lawson. He argued that this reduction in the government’s ‘room for manoeuvre as 
circumstances changed … was the point of the whole exercise. MTFS was intended 
to be a self-imposed constraint on economic policy-making’ (Lawson, 1992: 67). It 
was a mistake to think, as many cynical Conservatives did, that previous Labour 
governments ‘foolishly over-expanded the money supply simply out of ignorance 
or sheer perversity’ (ibid: 70). Rather, Lawson emphasised, it was ‘political 
pressures’ that blew these governments off course (ibid). By committing itself to 
four years of economic stringency, MTFS would insulate the government from these 
political pressures. This represented, as Howe (1994: 163) observed, ‘a natural 
follow-through from the sensible lesson that the IMF had imposed upon our 
predecessors’. Indeed Tim Lankester, Thatcher’s Private Secretary, wrote to 
Treasury Chief Secretary Biffen, Wass, and Thatcher in March 1980: ‘the way the 
policy works implies that they [markets] need to be given clear indication of the 
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limits within which we intend to manage public spending and the money supply’.162 
The 1980/81 Financial Statement and Budget Report thus stated that ‘there would 
be no question of departing from the money supply policy, which is essential to the 
success of any anti-inflationary strategy’ (HM Treasury, 1981). As Thatcher (1993: 
97) insisted, rather than resting on a solid relationship between economic variables, 
MTFS depended upon a downward reappraisal of economic expectations that would 
only occur if the government was seen to be committed to strict and continued 
financial discipline: ‘MTFS would only influence expectations in so far as people 
believed in our determination to stick to it: its credibility depended on that of the 
Government – and ultimately, therefore, on the quality of my own commitment … 
[that] I would not bow to demands to reflate’. 
The Thatcher government’s monetarist experiment should be understood as 
a statecraft strategy of depoliticised discipline, whereby the government would lock 
itself in to a contractionary programme that would limit policy-makers’ ability to 
fold in the face of popular outcry. This would allow the government to discipline 
domestic social relations in line with a system of global value relations in deep 
crisis. This strategy was predicated upon the achievement of certain technical 
monetary objectives, which would in turn justify the painful economic restructuring. 
However, as will be examined next, the practical shortcomings of this programme 
would ultimately push it to the brink of collapse.  
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When the rubber hit the road, 1980-82 
 
In order for MTFS to successfully depoliticise the government’s disciplining 
strategy in response to the profitability crisis, Conservative politicians needed to at 
least be able to demonstrate that the policy was working in its stated goal of tackling 
monetary growth. This would be the symbolic victory that would justify the 
government’s contractionary agenda and help them resist political pressures to 
reflate the economy. However, this plan foundered immediately upon 
implementation, devastating the government’s disciplining strategy. 
In 1980, Britain entered the worst recession since 1921. Razor thin company 
profits shrank even further, as they were squeezed by both a pound priced at over 
$2.40 and interest rates that stood at 17 per cent (Needham, 2014: 154; Britton, 
1994: 53). Manufacturing investment fell by 26 per cent, GDP dropped by 4.6 per 
cent, and unemployment climbed above two million for the first time since the 
1930s (ibid). Facing the possible decimation of non-oil industry, the Director 
General of the CBI promised a ‘bare knuckle fight’ with the government if they did 
not make some efforts to ease the contraction (Needham, 2014: 155). Richardson 
explained the problem in stark terms to Thatcher, Howe, and Lawson in October: 
‘Profitability was at an appallingly low level: although pre-tax rates of return had 
fallen in all countries, in the UK it was only about half of what it was elsewhere … 
there was a danger [in some sectors] that the UK would lose industrial capacity 
altogether’.163 This was exactly the kind of ‘bloody battle’ that Berrill had warned 
of. In the context of this unprecedentedly deep recession, it was essential that the 
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Thatcher government could at least point to the success of MTFS in meeting the 
money supply objectives. Yet the monetary aggregates showed no sign of 
responding to MTFS. In contrast to the target range of 7-11 per cent, £M3 grew by 
19.1 per cent between February 1980 and April 1981, while inflation averaged 18.1 
per cent throughout 1980 (Cobham, 2002: 43, 12). By September 1980, Thatcher 
was expressing ‘serious concern that the money supply would be seen to be out of 
control’.164  
MTFS was being torn apart at the seams. Its disciplining effects had been 
even greater than expected, as the monetary tightening had caused a further 
appreciation of sterling, which was imposing an extreme contraction upon British 
businesses. Furthermore, the ensuing recession could not be justified by pointing to 
the government’s success in meeting the monetary objectives, as £M3 was well 
above the target range. Confronted with this dilemma, the Thatcher administration’s 
resolve was weakened. MLR was reduced from 17 per cent to 16 per cent in July 
1980 and then to 14 per cent in November, in spite of the £M3 and inflation 
numbers, so as to allow ailing businesses to access cheaper credit and to assuage the 
important Conservative constituency of mortgagors (Tomlinson, 2007: 9). The 
political sensitivity of increases in MLR meant that the government had to rely on 
other mechanisms to attempt to meet the MTFS targets. As such, the March 1981 
Budget announced a series of sharp cuts in public expenditure as well as indirect 
and income tax increases, in an attempt to combat the government’s contribution to 
the growth in the money supply and shift resources from the personal to the 
corporate and state sectors (Dow, 2013: 12). This in turn allowed Howe to reduce 
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MLR to 12 per cent and thus ease the pressure on companies and the mortgage 
market. As Needham (2014: 153) notes, MTFS came to resemble much more a 
fiscal, rather than monetary, strategy. 
The recession bottomed out in early 1981, with output reaching its lowest 
point in spring (Britton, 1994). Consequently, the economic outlook began to 
improve: GDP rose for the first time since 1979, sterling reached a four-year low of 
$1.76 in August, £M3 rose by 13.7 per cent (which was still well above the 6-10 per 
cent MTFS target), and inflation averaged 11.9 per cent (Cobham, 2002: 43, 12). 
However, by the start of 1982, bank lending had begun to grow rapidly. Driven 
chiefly by a desperate company sector as well as house buyers, this sharp 
acceleration in bank lending threatened to throw the MTFS targets into chaos just 
when the government seemed to be getting to grips with the economic situation 
(Dow, 2013: 198). Combined with the stubborn continued rise in unemployment, 
which began to approach three million, this represented a worrying challenge to the 
Conservatives’ chances in the 1983 election.  
In order to preserve the presentational coherence of MTFS, it was crucial 
that bank lending be restricted without further increasing unemployment, 
jeopardising the timid recovery in business investment, or alienating mortgagors. 
As Richardson and Howe both acknowledged, ‘for the sake of the corporate sector, 
there would have to be some reduction in interest rates; but it was questionable 
whether this could be reconciled with sticking to the figures in the medium-term 
financial strategy’.165 Furthermore, not only had MLR increases been deemed too 
politically sensitive, but the government had very few methods for tightening 
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monetary policy left at its disposal, having abolished exchange controls on capital 
movements in 1979 and ‘corset’ controls on bank lending in 1980. The success of 
MTFS as a statecraft strategy of depoliticised discipline required the discovery of a 
more politically neutral instrument that could give the government some measure 
of control over the money supply. 
 
 
Overfunding and the stock exchange, 1982-83 
 
This monetary instrument was discovered in a practice called overfunding. 
Overfunding was a ‘peculiarly British practice’ which involved the government 
selling more debt than it needed to fund its expenditure in order to absorb money 
that would otherwise have been held by banks (Lawson, 1992: 449). This aided in 
reducing the money supply without politically difficult increases in MLR. In 
broader terms, overfunding would allow the Thatcher administration to meet their 
monetary targets, which would in turn justify the pain of the government’s 
depoliticised disciplining strategy to purge stagflation from the British economy. 
Goodhart, Bank Chief Advisor during this period, observed that because ‘the 
government [had] shrunk from the option of pushing up interest rates high enough’, 
they were forced to rely on large sales of gilt-edged securities to pick up the slack 
(Goodhart, 1995: 106). The government’s fiscal tightening was proving insufficient 
to counteract the rise in bank lending, as the Bank’s Rachel Lomax argued in 
November 1981: ‘If bank lending continues to grow rapidly, the task of meeting the 
MTFS target will be difficult, even if the PSBR falls relative to GDP, as planned. 
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We may only be able to restrain the growth in £M3 by persistently overfunding the 
PSBR’.166 Overfunding became an increasingly crucial tool in the Thatcher 
administration’s arsenal, with the government selling an excess of £2.5 billion in 
debt more than needed to fund the PSBR in 1981-1982 (Bank of England, 1982: 
201). Indeed, Lawson (1992: 72) wrote that the MTFS objectives for 1982 and 1983 
‘were met only after the targets had been raised, and then by somewhat artificial 
means (the technique known as “overfunding”)’. Similarly, former Bank advisor 
Christopher Dow noted the importance of this method of monetary control when he 
commented that the increase in bank lending in 1982 ‘would have had to be 
accompanied by even more rapid growth of bank deposits – and hence of £M3 – 
than in fact occurred had we not sold debt on an enormous scale’ (Dow, 2013: 198). 
The centrality of overfunding to the government’s macroeconomic strategy was 
explained in May 1982 to Howe by Treasury Deputy Secretary Middleton in a 
revealing letter: 
 
The abolition of exchange controls has greatly restricted our ability to do 
anything about one counterpart – the growth of bank lending. If direct 
controls are imposed the banking system would continue to expand 
offshore beyond our control. We have a completely free banking system 
for the first time in living memory … We have not thought it either feasible 
or desirable to attempt to reduce bank lending over the medium term by 
letting short term interest rates rise … So, for a given fiscal policy, we are 
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left with only one instrument to control £M3 and the wider aggregates – 
funding in all its forms.167 
 
The need to use government debt sales to control the money supply increased even 
further in July, when the hire purchase controls on bank lending were abolished 
(Britton, 1994: 62).  
This heavy intervention in the gilts market created a greater necessity for a 
functioning stock exchange. As a result, interest in pursuing the exemption of the 
LSE from the RPC revived within the Treasury and DoT in 1982, after little 
attention had been paid to the issue since autumn 1979. Wass wrote to Bank Deputy 
Governor McMahon in March, arguing that the problem was not simply that a 
negative ruling by the RPC could create a temporary disruption in the sale of 
government debt. Rather, there was an additional problem that meant an 
unconditional exemption which maintained the status quo would also be 
unworkable, namely that the LSE’s outdated and monopolistic practices had 
rendered the existing stock market too small to adapt to the government’s 
overfunding requirements: ‘The jobbers, as you have often told us, are not highly 
capitalised, and could not be expected to run sizeable books, particularly of long-
dated stock … [T]his lack of capital base imposes a serious constraint on our 
freedom to experiment with new techniques of selling’.168 Governor Richardson 
urged Howe in late June that ‘the Court proceedings ought to be stopped and 
replaced by a rapid independent enquiry’.169 Furthermore, he assured Howe that he 
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had ‘obtained Mr Goodison’s informal and confidential assurance that he 
[Goodison] would be prepared to work for the implementation of the findings of 
any such enquiry’.170 By the end of June, Howe decided to take action to accelerate 
the process by asking ‘for a speedy paper from Treasury officials to consider inter 
alia a forum other than … Restrictive Practices Court for examining the Stock 
Exchange’s restriction’.171 
Political considerations concerning a visible U-turn on competition policy, 
which had stopped the government from exempting the LSE in 1979, had still not 
faded completely from sight. By August 1982, Howe had arrived at the ‘provisional 
conclusion’ that ‘primary or secondary legislation to interrupt the case would be 
very difficult politically’.172 As such, ‘the best of an unpromising range of options 
may be to encourage “without prejudice” discussions with a view to settlement out 
of Court’.173 Secretary of State for Trade Cockfield, Biffen’s successor, shared the 
same sentiment, explaining to Howe that he ‘thought it impossible to withdraw or 
block the case: and that the only possible way out was for the Stock Exchange to 
put its house in order and for what amounted to a consent judgement to be given on 
that basis’.174 Similar developments took place in the Bank during this period. David 
Walker was appointed Executive Director for Industrial Finance and consequently 
started to investigate ways to circumvent the RPC (Vogel, 1996: 104). Walker began 
corresponding with Philip Brown, DoT Deputy Secretary, on the topic of a possible 
exemption. Considering the political sensitivity, Brown insisted that the DoT 
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believed ‘the right way to talk is “talks about talks”’ – yet Walker commented that 
‘even “talks about talks” will be difficult to launch’.175 Furthermore, Cockfield was 
wary of the Treasury taking the lead on the case, as they ‘could not be relied upon 
to adopt a wholly independent posture on Bank proposals’ due to the fact that that 
‘Treasury perceptions would be dominated by the likely effect of any proposals 
upon the gilts market’.176 
Growth in monetary aggregates slowed in the second half of 1982, possibly 
dampening the sense of immediacy about exempting the LSE, which is reflected in 
a period of quiet in the archival record. Yet in early 1983 the situation worsened. 
From March to May, £M3 grew by 15.7 per cent, flouting the 7-11 per cent MTFS 
target range (Bank of England, 1983: 173). The most important reason for this 
monetary growth was a sharp and unexpected increase in the PSBR and mortgage 
lending. In order to counter this, the government sold £3.1 billion in gilt-edged 
securities between March and May, which was still not enough to offset the 
borrowing requirement.177 In early May, Howe, Cockfield, and Richardson met and 
decided that the ‘next step should be for the Treasury and DOT officials, in 
consultation with the Bank, to produce, as a matter of urgency, a draft negotiating 
brief’.178 The reason for this urgency, in the words of Treasury Under Secretary for 
Home Finance Nick Monck, was that the government required ‘an efficient market 
for gilts not only as a source of finance but as an instrument of monetary control’.179 
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In order to maintain (or rescue) the appearance of MTFS as an economically sound 
strategy, rather than a device to depoliticise disciplining measures, the government 
desperately needed ‘to be able to control monetary growth by varying quantity of 
debt sales to the non-bank private sector’.180  
The Conservatives’ election victory on 9 June spurred the process further, 
as Lawson became Chancellor and Parkinson was appointed as Secretary of State 
for Trade and Industry. Parkinson was strongly opposed to the RPC case, a position 
that was motivated by his fear that the ‘Stock Exchange would become a peripheral 
institution on the world financial scene’ (Parkinson, 1992: 244). Ironically, 
Parkinson argued, the LSE was being ‘prevented from changing by a legal action 
designed to promote change’ (ibid). Eager to maintain the momentum that had been 
built up before the election, Parkinson looked to arrange a meeting with Lawson 
and Richardson to discuss the next steps. In preparation for this meeting, Monck 
emphasised to Treasury officials – including Middleton, the new Permanent 
Secretary – that the ‘Treasury has an interest in the subject both because of the 
macro-economic importance of an efficient and effective capital market and because 
of our interest in an effective and cheap mechanism for marketing gilt-edged stock 
as a means of controlling the growth of the broad monetary aggregates’.181  
In addition to the energy injected by the new post-election appointments, the 
political considerations surrounding the exemption of the LSE had changed 
significantly. The fear of damaging political repercussions if the government was 
seen to contradict its competition rhetoric had subsided after the election victory. 
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Furthermore, a new political concern was emerging, namely that if the case went all 
the way to court it could expose a deep division between the Treasury and Bank. On 
22 June, Monck told Lawson:  
 
Apart from the argument of substance, continuation of a Court case could 
produce severe embarrassment. The Bank feel that if they had to give 
evidence, they would have to support the status quo … There would be a 
choice between the Treasury giving evidence in favour of the status quo 
and a more or less public disagreement with the Bank. It would be 
preferable to avoid this and the Department of Trade proposal offers a way 
of doing so.182  
 
As such, at a meeting between Parkinson, Lawson, and Richardson on 24 June, a 
plan of action was set out, which would include speaking first with the OFT and 
then beginning negotiations with Goodison: ‘The aim would be to move as fast as 
possible with the Stock Exchange Council’.183 Less than one month later, after 
negotiations with both Goodison and Borrie, a deal was struck: the 
Goodison/Parkinson agreement was announced on 19 July 1983 (Vogel, 1996: 106). 
In sum, the exemption of the LSE from the RPC became a political priority 
for the Thatcher government following the calamitous implementation of their 
depoliticised disciplining strategy – itself a response to the global profitability crisis. 
MTFS was designed to lock the government into a four-year policy straitjacket, 
whereby severe economic contraction could be pursued without the government 
                                                        
182 TNA T 486/12, Monck to Lawson, 22 June 1983.  
183 TNA PREM 19/1005, Record of Discussion, 24 June 1983. 
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being blown off course by legitimacy concerns. In order to justify this disciplining, 
it was crucial that MTFS be seen to successfully meet its stated objective of reducing 
the money supply. However, due to the Thatcher government’s unfamiliarity with 
monetary aggregates and dismissal of the Bank’s advice, they selected an aggregate 
– £M3 – that was notoriously difficult to control. As such, MTFS pushed the British 
economy into an unprecedentedly severe recession without a commensurate fall in 
£M3. In response, the Thatcher administration loosened monetary policy, in order 
to provide relief to companies and mortgagors; yet this left the problem of how to 
reduce £M3 so as to maintain MTFS’s presentational coherence. The government 
discovered this strategy in overfunding, whereby excess liquidity would be soaked 
up through the sale of government debt on the LSE and consequently the money 
supply would be reduced. By applying the bandage of overfunding to MTFS, this 
deeply flawed strategy of depoliticised disciplining could stagger on without being 
branded a total failure. For this reason, it became essential for the government to 
ensure that their enormous debt sales were not interrupted by the RPC’s case, which 
in turn led to the eventual exemption of the LSE.  
 
 
Conclusion 
 
The Big Bang constituted a decisive move towards the financialisation of the British 
economy. The LSE’s cartelistic practices were disturbed, the City was opened up to 
global operators, and the sheer scale of the UK financial sector expanded rapidly. 
Yet conventional explanations of the state’s role in financialisation are unable to 
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grasp the governing motivations that resulted in this historic deregulation. Against 
the expropriation approach’s claims, the Big Bang was not the consequence of City 
lobbying nor the Thatcher government’s desire to boost the global competitiveness 
of the British financial sector. Similarly, the crisis resolution approach’s focus on 
financial deregulation as a functional response to the crisis of industrial capital also 
proves inadequate. The Big Bang must be understood as part of a broader state 
response to both the impersonal domination of global value relations in a period of 
crisis and the persistent claims by civil society that concrete needs be met regardless 
of the dynamics of capital accumulation.  
In 1979, the decision by the RPC to examine the LSE presented the 
government with a dilemma: the scrutinising of this monopolistic financial cartel 
was consistent with the Thatcher administration’s competition rhetoric; yet it could 
jeopardise government debt sales. While the sale of government debt for the purpose 
of monetary control was important, considering the rate of inflation, Thatcher, 
Lawson, and Nott believed that it could not be prioritised at the expense of the image 
of the government’s competition agenda – especially considering that this 
competition rhetoric was crucial in justifying the abolition of exchange controls. As 
a result, the Thatcher administration decided against exempting the LSE from the 
RPC in 1979.  
However, this balance of objectives changed significantly in the following 
years. The government’s strategy to tackle the seemingly interminable profitability 
crisis head on was going to entail a ‘bloody battle’ with businesses, unions, and 
political opponents. This necessitated a depoliticisation device that would lock the 
government into a deflationary path and thus insulate it to some degree from 
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political pressures to change course. MTFS was designed to fulfil this role, by 
setting out a four-year plan of declining targets for the money supply and public 
spending, which had to be met at all costs. The success of this strategy of 
depoliticised disciplining required that the government be able to meet these 
monetary targets, which would justify and legitimate the hardship of contraction. 
Yet this objective proved elusive: after choosing a questionable monetary aggregate 
– £M3 – in the context of an increasingly liberalised financial sector, the severe 
economic contraction imposed by the government did not result in a commensurate 
fall in the money supply. The Thatcher administration’s resolve to stick to MTFS 
thus buckled, and interest rates were lowered in order to provide relief to struggling 
companies and homeowners and thus maintain political legitimacy. The interest rate 
weapon was thus ruled out as an instrument for tackling monetary growth. In its 
place, the sale of gilt-edged securities became the government’s key method of 
monetary control, in turn requiring that no interruption take place in the LSE’s 
normal operation. This created a powerful pressure on the government to exempt 
the LSE from the RPC, which was complemented by the declining importance of 
political considerations after the Conservatives’ 1983 election victory. 
Consequently, the government agreed in June 1983 to negotiate an exemption with 
the LSE and OFT.  
This chapter thus supports the claim made by Bellringer and Michie (2014: 
132) that there is no evidence to suggest that the Big Bang was ‘the product of City 
influence with the deliberate intention of making London into a global financial 
centre’. Neither can this landmark deregulation be explained by reference to chance 
or legal path dependency alone. Instead, the Big Bang must be understood as 
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resulting from an attempt by the Thatcher government to rescue their ailing 
statecraft strategy of depoliticised discipline during the latter years of the global 
profitability crisis. 
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CHAPTER NINE 
The Financial Services Act 
 
 
The last major deregulation in the City was in banking – Competition and 
Credit Controls [sic] in 1971. It was followed by the property boom of 
1972-73, the market collapse of 1974, and then the fringe bank crisis of 
1974-75. Might not something similar happen following the deregulation 
of the securities industry? 
 
Brian Griffiths and David Willetts to Margaret Thatcher, 11 April 1986.184 
 
 
Introduction 
 
The 1986 FSA regulation stands in stark contrast to its counterpart, the Big Bang, 
in terms of how it has been understood both in the literature and popular 
consciousness. In fact, it may be more accurate to state that there is no popular 
conception of FSA, and that most academic interrogations of this financial reform 
have remained at the level of description. A striking example of this is the latest 
volume of The Oxford Handbook of Banking and Financial History, which confuses 
                                                        
184 TNA PREM 19/1718. 
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the Big Bang and FSA as one and the same.185 Yet the lack of attention paid to FSA 
belies its impact upon the British economy. As this chapter will explain, FSA 
spurred financialisation in two ways.186 Firstly, FSA allowed Britain to take full 
advantage of the Big Bang deregulation, by providing a clear, non-preferential legal 
framework for foreign financial actors to follow – propelling the globalisation of 
the City, with its attendant increases in scale and fragility. Secondly, FSA’s form – 
particularly its arm’s-length approach, whereby the state delegated its regulatory 
responsibilities to a private body – ushered in an era of light-touch regulation that 
created a breeding ground for dubious financial practices, culminating ultimately in 
the 2008 crisis. This colossal policy change was thus central in propelling the 
expansion of the UK financial sector out of all proportion to the productive 
economy.  
This chapter will demonstrate that the formulation and passing of FSA 
cannot be understood through the lenses of the expropriation or crisis resolution 
approaches to financialisation. The arm’s-length, light-touch form of this system of 
regulations did not result from the lobbying power of the City or from the Thatcher 
government’s ideological support for the financial industry. Neither was FSA a 
response to economic crisis, designed to allay capital flight by boosting profitability 
and expanding credit markets. In fact, this policy transformation is also 
                                                        
185 This book claims that ‘the “Big Bang” financial deregulation (officially the 
Financial Services Act of 1986) … opened up the London Stock Exchange to 
international competition’ (Fohlin, 2016: 156). 
186 Wainwright (2012: 103) argues that FSA contributed to the growth of mortgage 
securitisation in the UK, by allowing financial institutions other than building 
societies to move into the mortgage market. Yet this can only be fully 
comprehended in relation to the 1987 Building Societies Act, which it is beyond the 
scope of this chapter to discuss.  
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fundamentally different from the previous cases examined in this thesis. FSA was 
deliberated upon and passed into law at the tail end of the profitability crisis, when 
the economy was in a nascent but definite recovery phase. As such, FSA should not 
be conceptualised as part of a statecraft strategy for governing during crises. Instead, 
this chapter will argue that this reregulation must be understood as a form of 
regulatory tidying up, whereby a new form of financial governance was instituted 
that was appropriate to the liberalised financial order bequeathed by the previous 
fifteen years of deregulation. FSA was thus not a statecraft strategy designed to 
reconcile the conflicting imperatives of a global system of abstract domination in 
crisis and the tangible demands of the electorate; yet it was an attempt to manage 
the economic and political fallout of previous deregulations that had constituted 
such strategies. 
In 1981, the DoT commissioned Professor Laurence Gower to review 
Britain’s financial regulations. This chapter will argue that Gower’s first publication 
– his 1982 Discussion Document, advocating self-regulation within a statutory 
framework – was met with near-universal scepticism by the government, Bank, and 
City practitioners alike. Yet this attitude changed with the signing of the 1983 
Goodison/Parkinson agreement, which set the stage for the rapid globalisation of 
the City, and thus forced these actors to recognise the necessity of some statutory 
intervention.  
Gower’s next publication – his 1984 Report, which suggested that existing 
self-regulation be supplemented by the DTI’s direct supervision and statutory 
backing – caused the government more concern. By placing the DTI at the centre of 
this framework and invoking statutory law – created by an Act of Parliament – the 
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Prime Minister’s office worried that government ministers would be held politically 
responsible for future financial crises – crises that they felt unable to prevent 
following the cumulative liberalisations studied in this thesis. Such a regulatory 
failure could shatter the government’s legitimacy. As such, Thatcher and her 
advisers set out to depoliticise Gower’s proposals by convincing the DTI, who were 
in charge of formulating a new regulatory structure, to insulate the government from 
direct financial oversight. Simultaneously, the Bank set up a group of City 
practitioners to devise recommendations to put to the DTI. The Bank used the 
findings of this group, which stressed the City’s dislike of government intervention, 
to push its own institutional agenda. That is, the Bank lobbied to create a private 
intermediary body lying between the government and the City, to which the DTI 
would delegate its public powers and over which the Bank could exert its influence. 
This would allow the Bank to maintain its autonomy from government and its 
network of informal regulatory relationships, despite the onset of statutory 
regulation. The Bank’s proposals chimed perfectly with Number 10’s 
depoliticisation agenda, and both these powerful groups pushed the DTI to devise a 
new regulatory framework based on these principles. The resulting 1985 White 
Paper successfully depoliticised Gower’s original proposals, by erecting a three-tier 
system of regulation that allowed the government to maintain a sizeable distance 
from City activities and which gave the Bank a veto over important decisions. After 
certain deft political manoeuvring, the government was able to overcome 
Conservative backbench opposition to this unprecedented outsourcing of state 
power to a private body, and FSA became law in late 1986.  
 281 
This chapter will conclude that neither the expropriation nor crisis 
resolution approaches to financialisation explain the depoliticised form that FSA 
assumed. The City did not successfully capture the government and force its hand, 
yet neither was the government responding to any immediate crisis. Furthermore, 
FSA cannot be adequately theorised as a statecraft strategy to govern the 
contradiction between the crisis of the value form of wealth and popular tangible 
demands – rendering this case different from the other cases studied in this thesis. 
Instead, this policy change must be understood as a strategy to craft a form of 
depoliticised financial regulation appropriate to a financial sector that had been 
transformed by the accumulated deregulations of the preceding 15 years – 
deregulations which were elements of crisis governance strategies. 
 
 
FSA and financialisation 
 
Prior to 1986, British financial services were regulated by a fragmented combination 
of self-regulation, informal supervision by the Bank, and weak legal protections for 
investors. The securities industry was ostensibly subject to the 1958 Prevention of 
Fraud (Investments) Act, which was designed to protect investors in the buying and 
selling of securities and which required securities dealers to obtain a license. This 
act was enforced by the DoT and then the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) 
after 1983. However, the most important market actors – clearing banks, large 
merchant banks, the LSE etc. – were exempt from this regulation (Pimlott, 1985: 
143-5). Instead, the largest banks were supervised by the Bank, which relied on 
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informal meetings with leading bankers, observation of market indicators, and self-
regulation on the part of the practitioners, while ‘second tier’ banks were overseen 
by the Treasury (Vogel, 1996: 97). The LSE, on the other hand, was self-regulating 
– it policed its own members according to its rulebook, which became the subject 
of the RPC case discussed in the last chapter. The Bank and DoT/DTI formally 
oversaw this self-regulation. Those directly subject to the DTI’s legal scrutiny via 
the Prevention of Fraud Act were fringe market actors, such as building societies 
and small securities brokers (ibid). Overall, self-regulation was dominant amongst 
the big City players, supplemented by informal relationships with Bank officials, 
outdated statutes, and a great deal of faith in City practices on behalf of the state.  
In contrast, FSA introduced a coherent and extensive statutory framework 
for regulating the securities industry. In other words, it brought statute law – which 
requires the approval of both Houses of Parliament as well as Royal Assent – to 
bear on City affairs, instituting formality where informality had previously reigned 
supreme. FSA produced three institutional layers. Firstly, actors in the securities 
industry were grouped into five organisations called Self-Regulatory Agencies 
(SRAs). These SRAs required that all investment firms within their branch of the 
industry were authorised and acted according to that SRA’s rules (Laurence, 2001: 
87). Secondly, these rules, created and enforced by individual SRAs, had to comply 
with the general directives set by a broader body: the Securities and Investments 
Board (SIB). The SIB was a limited company and was comprised of City 
practitioners, yet it exercised public authority in carrying out the following tasks: 
authorising the SRAs, creating broad rules for these SRAs to follow, supervising 
their registration of businesses, and policing and prosecuting offences (Moran, 
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1991: 59). Finally, these public powers were delegated to the SIB by the Secretary 
of State for Trade and Industry, who alongside the Bank Governor appointed the 
Chairman and members of this body. The Secretary of State was in turn subject to 
Parliamentary scrutiny (Singh, 2007: 11). As such, FSA replaced a muddled 
assortment of informal relationships and weak laws with a clear hierarchy of 
statutory control.  
This transformation heralded by FSA had tremendous implications for 
processes of financialisation, yet not in the same manner as the previous cases 
studied in this thesis. The 1971 CCC measures, the 1977-79 abolition of exchange 
controls, and the 1986 Big Bang all represented – to varying degrees – the state’s 
retreat from direct intervention in British financial markets and the granting of 
greater authority to market mechanisms. FSA, on the other hand, was possibly the 
most significant intervention of the state’s legal authority into financial markets in 
British history. However, this regulation in fact propelled financialisation in two 
ways. Firstly, by instituting a clear set of rules for global actors to adhere to, 
following the Big Bang, FSA replaced the pre-existing cartelistic regulatory 
relationships with a non-preferential statutory framework that bolstered 
competition. As Vogel (1996: 7) argues, within the financial industry, the disruption 
of nepotistic and cartelistic practices and the introduction of a greater degree of 
competition requires reregulation, rather than an absence of regulation. Indeed, 
Cerny (1993: 51) points out more broadly that ‘the very operation of market 
economies is dependent upon the existence of a priori rules, as well as of a range of 
mechanisms to deal with market failure’. This chimes with one of this thesis’ key 
contributions to IPE debates, namely that states actively forge and reproduce 
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capitalist social relations – yet this thesis further elaborates, following the value-
form reading of Marx, that these relations become autonomised and in turn 
dominate states. FSA’s introduction of a clear statutory system indicating the rules 
of play let global actors operate without prejudice in London, allowing the City to 
exploit its newfound potential (following the Big Bang) of attracting transnational 
financial capital (Thatcher, 1993: 311-12).  
Secondly, and perhaps more importantly, the form that this regulation took 
engendered an enduring ‘light-touch’ approach, which ensured that regulatory 
power remained with City practitioners rather than the state. The creation of the SIB 
created an arm’s-length relationship between the state and the City, while the SIB 
itself was made up of City practitioners, which ensured a high degree of self-
regulation. As Engelen et al. (2011: 143) argue, FSA was ‘discredited by successive 
regulatory failures, and above all by the massive failure of light-touch regulation to 
foresee and forestall the crash of the House of Baring in 1995’. Moreover, although 
this framework was significantly changed by New Labour’s transformation of the 
SIB into the Financial Services Authority in 1997, the new system of regulations 
built upon the 1986 FSA’s system of delegation of public powers to non-state 
intermediaries – which perpetuated, as the 2008 financial crisis revealed, serious 
institutional fragilities (Daripa et al., 2013).  
While FSA had a profound impact on financialisation, it did not emerge 
preformed, but was instead the result of a period of deliberation that spanned 1981-
6. This deliberation took the form of three phases. Phase 1: In July 1981, following 
several fraud scandals in the City (HM Treasury, 2002: 228), the DoT was tasked 
with commissioning company law expert Professor Gower to review the existing 
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securities regulations. Gower, who had recently retired from the post of Vice 
Chancellor of Southampton University, had published his seminal work Principles 
of Company Law in 1954 and had previously participated in Wilson’s Royal 
Commission on the Press. Gower’s first publication as part of the DoT’s 
commission, a Discussion Document released in January 1982, condemned the 
existing system and proposed a fusion of self-regulation with a new system of 
statutory controls. Phase 2: In January 1984, Gower released his full Report. A 
number of SRAs would supervise day-to-day affairs within their particular sphere 
of financial services, while statutory powers would be delegated to these SRAs by 
an umbrella supervisory body, which Gower argued should be the DTI (Pimlott, 
1985: 153). Phase 3: After discussing Gower’s report for nearly one year, the DTI 
published a White Paper in January 1985. This White Paper accepted the broad 
thrust of Gower’s proposals with one major exception: the umbrella body would not 
be the DTI or any government agency, but rather two private bodies: the SIB and 
the Marketing of Investments Board (MIB). Following debates with Conservative 
MPs, the White Paper’s recommendations were amended so as to merge the SIB 
and MIB, and consequently grant the SIB powers to investigate and prosecute 
offences. These changes were crystallised in the 1986 FSA. Crucially, through these 
three phases of deliberation, FSA was transformed from a regulation administered 
by the government, to one that operated with a tremendous degree of autonomy 
from state authority. Therefore, the puzzle that this chapter will engage with has two 
aspects. First: why was FSA – a dramatic and unprecedented financial reregulation 
– deemed necessary? Second: why did this reregulation take an arm’s-length, light-
touch, quasi-governmental form?  
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Existing interpretations 
 
FSA has been subject to significantly less analysis than its deregulatory corollary, 
the Big Bang. Nevertheless, it has perhaps attracted more detailed examinations, in 
which the strategic political manoeuvrings between various government 
departments are brought to the fore. 
Coleman (2003: 281), in his analysis of global financial governance, 
understands the Thatcher government’s arm’s-length approach to regulation in 
terms of ‘ideology’: ‘The Anglo-Saxon liberal tradition encouraged a certain 
scepticism about the government’s competence in business affairs … It was 
assumed that only insiders would fully understand how markets work …  It followed 
that regulation should feature practitioners themselves in a prominent role’. The 
creation of the SIB as an intermediary between the government and the SRAs is 
thus explained by belief on the part of the DTI and other branches of government 
that they were ill-equipped to tackle the nuances of financial oversight. However, 
this ideational focus has generally been overshadowed by examinations of the 
political struggles over the makeup of FSA. Strange (1998: 155) hints at this point 
with her insistence that FSA was the result of a political bargain ‘in which, in return 
for deregulation, governments insisted on statutory reforms’. As such, the SIB 
maintained self-regulation in the face of the encroachment of democratic politics, 
and was designed by a Thatcher government presumably dedicated to enacting the 
wishes of financial elites. This broadly aligns with the expropriation approach to 
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financialisation, as well as IPE literature on the causes of neoliberal financial 
regulatory reform.  
Rather than the government simply acting on behalf of financial capital, 
Vogel (1996) paints a more nuanced picture of the SIB’s creation. Following 
Gower’s 1984 report, the Bank set up a group of senior City practitioners to 
deliberate on the Professor’s proposals. This group recommended that the umbrella 
body tasked with supervising the SRAs should be private, and – in an attempt to 
minimise the role of the DTI, which they viewed as ‘obsessed with political 
appearances and indifferent to the concerns of honest businessmen’ – advised that 
the Bank have a much greater statutory role in controlling this private organisation 
(ibid: 110). This proposal was greeted cheerfully by the DTI, who Vogel argues was 
not interested in directly regulating the City anyway. The Bank reacted to this 
group’s recommendations with greater caution, as they were wary to take too much 
formal control over financial regulation after their difficult experience attempting 
to regulate the fringe banks. The result was a political compromise in which the 
Bank and DTI jointly appointed the Board of the SIB – a private sector body. Moran 
(1991) also emphasises the government’s and Bank’s disinterest in directly 
controlling the reins of financial regulation. Gower’s proposal for a government 
supervisory agency were rejected in favour of a private body with public powers 
because there ‘was no interest inside the DTI or the Bank of England in taking on 
the horrifyingly complex task of creating and controlling the details of the new 
system’ (ibid: 73). The creation of the SIB as an intermediary was a panacea of 
sorts, as it gave City actors the hope that they could ‘preserve the political 
independence conferred by self-regulation’, keep ‘cost out of the public purse’, keep 
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‘the personnel recruited off the public sector manpower totals’, and hive ‘the 
appallingly complex detailed tasks off from central government’ (ibid: 78, 73). Both 
of these accounts therefore emphasise that the SIB appeared to be a middle-ground 
solution to appease the various interests at play, particularly the City’s desire to 
remain autonomous from state control and the government’s and Bank’s lack of 
interest in gaining responsibility for financial regulation.  
Building upon both of these accounts, Laurence (2001) gives perhaps the 
most detailed explanation of FSA’s peculiar form. The SIB’s ‘unusual hybrid 
nature’, Laurence writes (ibid: 88), ‘owes much to the uneasy compromise from 
which it was born’. While Gower favoured a centralised regulator ‘modelled along 
the lines of America’s SEC’, the Thatcher government was ‘ideologically hostile’ 
to the ‘creation of a big new bureaucratic agency’ that was entailed by this approach 
(ibid). Furthermore, the Bank’s advisory group (discussed above) accepted Gower’s 
notion of self-regulation within a statutory framework only if the Bank took a 
greater role in regulating the City. However, as Vogel also points out, the Bank was 
not keen to assume formal control of City affairs: ‘Many in the bank believed that 
future collapses and scandals were inevitable … Creating a new regulatory body 
with specific responsibility for oversight, but deliberately kept less powerful than 
the bank, would have been an ideal way to divert political criticism from the bank 
in the years ahead’ (ibid.). In Laurence’s account, then, it is the Bank that preferred 
to delegate its responsibility to an institutional scapegoat of sorts – the SIB – so as 
to deflect criticism during future crises.  
Taken together, these accounts provide compelling explanations for the 
specific form that FSA assumed. The most convincing analyses place emphasis on 
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both the City’s efforts to maintain its autonomy from political interference and the 
government’s and Bank’s reluctance (both ideological and practical) to directly 
regulate an increasingly complex and crisis-prone financial sector. Yet there is an 
overreliance on the same official government publications and a dearth of 
documentary substantiation for the key claims of causality regarding FSA’s 
formulation, which leads to certain mischaracterisations of departmental motives. 
This chapter will overcome the limits of the existing literature by drawing on 
recently released archival data. It will be argued that the government’s 
commissioning of the Gower Report constituted an attempt to create a systematic 
form of financial governance, in the wake of the cumulative deregulations carried 
out during the years of the stagflation crisis. However, by assuming control over the 
regulation of the City, the government feared that Gower’s proposals would mean 
that policy-makers would be held responsible for future financial crises. As such, 
the government and the Bank – the latter of which was concerned about the erosion 
of its autonomy – sought to depoliticise the new system of regulations by inserting 
a private body between the government and the City. FSA can thus be considered a 
strategy to govern the new liberalised financial order in a depoliticised manner. 
  
 
The depoliticisation of financial governance 
 
This thesis has thus far argued that the financial deregulations pursued during the 
profitability crisis must be understood as elements of broader statecraft strategies, 
designed to reconcile the conflicting imperatives of a global system of abstract 
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wealth mired in crisis and the persistent demands by citizens that their tangible 
demands be met regardless of economic constraints. FSA, however, is different in 
two ways. Firstly, this legislation was fundamentally not a financial deregulation, 
but instead created a more systematic framework of statutory regulations than had 
ever existed before. Secondly, much of the political deliberation that resulted in FSA 
took place during the recovery from the profitability crisis. This policy change, as 
such, cannot be understood as part of a statecraft strategy for governing through 
periods of crisis.  
Nevertheless, this is not to say that FSA’s passing was unrelated to the 
preceding profitability crisis. During the period examined by this thesis, an array of 
financial deregulations was enacted that fundamentally transformed the nature of 
Britain’s economic growth. CCC broke up the clearing banking cartel, scrapped the 
state’s preferential system for distributing credit to strategic sectors, and resulted in 
the marketisation of Bank Rate; the abolition of exchange controls dismantled the 
state’s controls over inflows and outflows of capital; and the Big Bang opened up 
the UK’s securities industry to global market actors. These cumulative changes 
spurred the growing divergence between the trajectories of the British industrial and 
financial sectors, leading to a pattern of growth increasingly dependent upon 
financial accumulation. As evidenced by the litany of banking scandals and 
financial crises that followed this raft of deregulations, Britain’s model of 
financialised accumulation has proven to be deeply volatile. FSA must therefore be 
understood as an attempt to create a system of financial regulation appropriate to 
Britain’s new financialised status quo – a status quo arrived at through preceding 
strategies to govern the dilemmas emerging from the profitability crisis, and 
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ultimately the contradiction between value and heterogeneous social wealths that 
lies at the heart of capitalist society. 
This chapter will argue that, following the July 1983 Goodison/Parkinson 
agreement studied in the previous chapter, whereby the government and the LSE 
agreed to the ‘Big Bang’ changes to the LSE’s rulebook that would be implemented 
in 1986, the Thatcher government faced a governing predicament. The impending 
liberalisation of the LSE necessitated a complementary system of laws for global 
actors to follow when operating in the City. Without clear, statutory regulations, 
there was the risk both that foreign financial firms would be discouraged from 
operating in London, and that dubious practices could result in a damaging scandal 
or full-scale financial crisis. On the other hand, by creating a system whereby the 
state directly regulated the City, governments would risk being seen as responsible 
for financial crises, thus endangering political legitimacy. The dilemma for the 
Thatcher government, thus, was how to govern a fragile, financialised pattern of 
accumulation – inherited from previous strategies to govern the profitability crisis 
– without risking the collapse of popular legitimacy during financial scandals. It is 
through this lens that the deliberations over FSA must be framed. 
 
I. Gower’s Discussion Document and the Big Bang, 1982-3 
 
Less than a year after being commissioned by the DoT to review British securities 
regulation, Gower published his initial Discussion Document in January 1982. This 
document was circulated amongst City practitioners and officials at the DoT, OFT, 
Treasury, and Bank. Although relatively vague on specifics, this document rejected 
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the principle of caveat emptor – that is, the buyer is responsible for their purchase 
– and insisted that some statutory system was needed to supplement existing self-
regulation. This document received an almost universally icy reception across the 
public and private sector. The City was opposed to legal intervention, the 
government was concerned about the impact of Gower’s proposals on the drawn-
out and expensive RPC investigation of the LSE, and the Bank was wary of 
forfeiting its informal regulatory networks. However, the impending globalisation 
of the City provoked by the Goodison/Parkinson agreement of July 1983 forced all 
parties to recognise the need for some form of statutory intervention. 
The City, unsurprisingly, had the coldest response to Gower’s document. At 
a meeting with Bank Governor Richardson on 5 January, the Chairman of the 
Accepting Houses Committee stated his total opposition to Gower’s proposed 
‘erection of a new tier of bureaucracy in the field of investment management’.187 It 
appeared that this sentiment was widely shared. DoT official Elizabeth Llewellyn-
Smith informed Secretary of State Biffen in March that ‘[o]pinion in the City seems 
to be hardening against Professor Gower’s scheme for a constellation of “self-
regulatory” bodies within a loose statutory framework’.188 Indeed, the following day 
Goodison, Chairman of the LSE, explained to Biffen that ‘Professor Gower’s 
proposals were unnecessarily elaborate. There was no occasion to interfere with the 
Stock Exchange procedures, which were working satisfactorily’.189 The City Capital 
Market Committee provided a clearer explanation of their anxieties about the Gower 
document. While they acknowledged that his proposals ‘might have merit in 
                                                        
187 BOE 7A15/4, Note of a meeting, 5 January 1982. 
188 TNA FV 73/215, Brief for a meeting, 17 March 1982. 
189 TNA FV 73/215, Note of a meeting, 19 March 1982. 
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theory’, they feared that the abolition of exchange controls ruled out a statutory 
approach, because ‘too tight a control might frighten people away’.190 
Despite commissioning Professor Gower to carry out this inquiry, DoT 
officials were also unconvinced by his initial findings. Of particular concern was 
the possibility that Gower’s overhaul of City institutions could overrule the OFT 
inquiry into the LSE’s rulebook. As OFT official Timothy Pratt observed, Gower’s 
likely recommendation that the RPC should drop its case against the LSE ‘could 
cause the Department [of Trade] some embarrassment’.191 This was especially the 
case, OFT Director General Borrie observed, due to the ‘time, money and thought 
[that] have been expended by the Stock Exchange and Government in preparing the 
case for the court’.192 The DoT also supported the Bank’s plans to update its 
traditional self-regulation, as a way to negate the necessity for statutory 
intervention. As Deputy Secretary Brown explained to Secretary of State Cockfield 
in November, ‘the attempt to improve the present self-regulatory structure is wholly 
desirable, and if it does produce a system which we can later recommend to 
Ministers as a reliable alternative to more statutory supervision, that is all to the 
good’.193 
The Bank’s response to the Discussion Document was both fearful and 
pragmatic. Walker, Executive Director for Industrial Finance within the Bank, 
explained to the Bank’s Court of Directors in April that Gower’s ‘statute-based 
framework … would involve unwelcome government intrusion, would require a 
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substantial administrative overhead and would not in the end be as flexible or 
effective as better self-regulation’.194 The task for the Bank to pursue in the coming 
months was to ‘strengthen the City’s self-regulating agencies, thus weakening or 
largely removing any case for extensive legislation’ and minimising the ‘risk of 
intrusion by statute’.195 Walker himself led this initiative, setting out his proposed 
alternative to the DoT in late March, which entailed self-regulation remaining the 
dominant form of City policing, with occasional licensing of fringe investors by the 
DoT.196 Yet while the Bank appeared confident that it could undermine Gower’s 
recommendations through its own efforts at self-improvement, Cockfield was less 
sure, warning Richardson in November that ‘it was quite possible Professor 
Gower’s next recommendations would be for a higher proportion of statutory 
regulation’.197 
However, while the government and the Bank displayed a clear opposition 
to Gower’s proposed statutory regulations, this sentiment began to change following 
the 1983 Goodison-Parkinson agreement that started the countdown to the Big 
Bang. As examined in the previous chapter, this agreement involved a compromise 
whereby the LSE agreed to abolish both fixed commissions on securities trading 
and barriers to the entry of foreign firms in return for the government exempting the 
LSE from an anti-monopolisation court case brought by the RPC in 1979. The City 
was thus preparing itself for a period of rapid liberalisation and globalisation, 
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characterised by massive increases in financial flows through London and the 
domination of Britain’s financial sector by transnational actors.  
As argued by Norman Tebbit, Secretary of State for Trade and Industry, the 
Goodison/Parkinson agreement ‘heaved a massive brick into the once tranquil 
waters of the City’.198 This ‘“financial services revolution”’, the DTI explained, ‘is 
rapidly altering the institutional structure of the City of London’, resulting in 
‘increasing international competition in the provision of financial services’.199 The 
City’s fragmented and club-like regulations were unsuitable for a globalised 
financial market, in which foreign actors, unschooled in informal British regulatory 
customs, would need clear rules to follow. As Moran (1991: 77) explains, ‘the 
Goodison/Parkinson agreement meant that new sources of regulatory authority were 
urgently required’. Faced with the prospect of the globalisation of a once cosy 
British market, the government came to recognise the necessity of a non-preferential 
infrastructure of statutes. In the words of Chancellor Lawson, the looming Big Bang 
‘underlined the need … for a new and improved regulatory framework’ (1992: 400). 
As such, the DTI argued that the ‘Government needs to take action now’ by 
introducing a ‘statutory framework’ which ‘inspire[s] investor confidence by 
ensuring that the UK financial services sector both is and is clearly seen as a 
competitive and “clean” place in which to do business’.200 Sentiment even began to 
change within the Bank. Treasury officials noted that four months after the 
Goodison/Parkinson agreement was signed, ‘the Bank, who were at an earlier stage 
strongly critical, have of late struck a more forthcoming note, without yet going so 
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far as to endorse the Gower package’.201 This, the Treasury observed, ‘may suggest 
that the [Gower] report’s main proposals could command more widespread 
acceptance than seemed likely earlier’.202 
While Gower’s 1982 Discussion Document met a wall of resistance, due to 
its proposals for statutory intervention in the City, the impending Big Bang forced 
the government and Bank to reconsider their opposition. The globalisation of the 
City implied by this liberalisation, building on the previous deregulations passed 
during the profitability crisis, made it necessary to institute a clear and unbiased 
legal framework within which global actors could operate in London. The next 
section deals with the political debates over what form this reregulation should take, 
following the publication of Gower’s 1984 Report. 
 
II. Depoliticising Gower’s proposals, 1984-85 
 
Gower’s full report, published in January 1984, outlined a comprehensive system 
of self-regulation within a statutory framework. SRAs, some of which would be 
based upon already existing City organisations, would regulate day-to-day financial 
activities, while the whole system would be overseen by a central organisation, 
which would delegate its statutory powers to these SRAs (Pimlott, 1985: 153). 
Politically, Gower’s proposals already ensured a significant degree of distance 
between the government and the City, due to the emphasis the report placed on self-
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regulation. Yet Gower was insistent that the central supervisory body should be the 
DTI – a government department.  
Four groups were tasked with assessing the Gower Report and advising 
Tebbit as to the form that a future financial services bill should take: the Gower 
Report Group (GRG), the Number 10 Policy Unit, the Bank’s City practitioner 
group, and Alexander Fletcher’s (Under Secretary of State for Trade and Industry) 
insurance industry practitioner group. These groups were not all clearly defined; for 
example, Fletcher set up the insurance practitioner group but was also instrumental 
in the GRG. Nor were these groups equally influential; there is little evidence of the 
impact of Fletcher’s insurance industry practitioner group on Tebbit’s thinking, and 
thus it is not analysed in this chapter. Finally, there is an unequal availability of 
archival evidence about these groups; there is no documentary record of the internal 
discussions of either practitioner group. However, these groups hint broadly at the 
networks of politicians and civil servants that transformed Gower’s proposals into 
the depoliticised 1985 White Paper. 
 
The GRG and the Number 10 Policy Unit 
 
The first group to begin digesting the Gower Report was the GRG. Made up 
primarily of DTI officials, with one Bank and one Treasury official (Dawkins and 
W. R. Pirie, respectively), this group met from December 1983 to June 1984. In its 
first preliminary meeting, Fletcher clearly expressed the DTI’s anxiety about the 
political implications of assuming extensive control over City activities. He 
acknowledged that a legal framework was necessary but noted that ‘[s]elf-regulation 
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was important as the government was not an enthusiastic regulator’.203 Furthermore, 
Fletcher was ‘opposed to the establishment of an independent Securities Exchange 
Commission’ because it ‘would lead to an extra layer of regulation, as the 
government would not be able to stand back entirely’.204 Expressing a similar 
sentiment, Pirie wrote in January 1984 that ‘[i]f regulation is imposed 
comprehensively, Ministers will be unable to avoid an enhanced degree of 
responsibility for regulatory arrangements, even when these are largely self-
regulatory’.205 Yet not all GRG members shared this anxiety about the politicisation 
of regulation. In fact, later in January, DTI official Reid expressed concern that the 
existing Gower proposals would take too much power out of ministers’ hands: the 
‘yielding of the necessary wide powers to a [US SEC-style] Commission would not 
be welcome either to MPs or to Ministers – who would wish to retain their control 
over such a crucial area of policy. Political reality in the UK was that direct 
accountability to Parliament, through a Government Department, was the most 
acceptable form of regulation’.206  
The next group to begin analysing the Gower Report was the Number 10 
Policy Unit. Of particular importance within this group was Director John Redwood 
and official David Willetts. Similar to the GRG, the chief concern of the Policy 
Unit, and of Thatcher herself, was the threat of politicisation. On 6 April, Redwood 
wrote to Thatcher, voicing his unease:  
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The intention behind Gower of setting up a series of self-regulatory bodies 
beneath an umbrella organisation with responsibility ultimately flowing 
back to the Department of Trade and Industry is a dangerous one. It would 
mean that the Government would start to assume responsibility for all the 
foibles and problems of the market place. People would expect the 
Government to offer them redress. People would expect the Government 
to make sure there were no crooked operators. It is not within the 
Government’s power to ensure either of these things.207 
 
Rather than directly intervening in City affairs, the Government should instead 
restrict its role to ensuring against fraud and embezzlement and guaranteeing that 
market operations were as transparent as possible. Thatcher annotated her 
agreement with Redwood’s points.208 Four days later, Number 10 informed the DTI 
of Thatcher’s concern: ‘She wonders just how closely the Government should 
become involved in taking responsibility for the proposed self-regulatory bodies as 
there is a risk that ultimately the Government could be blamed for any malpractice 
in the City’.209 During the remainder of April, Willetts drafted a paper that both 
critiqued Gower and put forward an ‘alternative minimalist approach’ to financial 
regulation. Redwood sent this paper to Fletcher on 4 May, in an effort to influence 
the DTI’s assessment of Gower. Willetts’ central criticism of the Gower Report was 
that: 
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it conflicts with one of the fundamental tenets of this Government – that 
Government should not appear to take on responsibility for matters which 
are not actually under its control. Under Professor Gower’s proposals, the 
DTI registers, directly or through SRA members, all those permitted to 
carry out investment business. This must inevitably become a seal of 
approval … If and when a registered investment business is found to have 
been engaging in criminal malpractices, it will be claimed that the DTI and 
the Ministers responsible have not been doing their job properly.210 
 
In contrast to Gower’s proposals, Willetts’ approach involved forgoing any 
registration of investment businesses, while supporting the principle of caveat 
emptor with tough legal enforcements, preferably through the creation of a new 
‘fraud squad’ with powers to prosecute ‘breaches of criminal law’.211 This approach, 
Willetts emphasised, ‘goes with the grain of the Government’s philosophy’ by 
entailing ‘no suggestion of government endorsement’ of any City firms.  
The GRG reacted to Willetts’ proposals to depoliticise Gower with 
scepticism. The group explained that the ‘Government would inevitably have some 
responsibility; if offences were created to influence City behaviour Government 
could not wash its hands of having created them’.212 Yet, interestingly, the group 
pointed out that ‘[i]f one was trying to limit political embarrassment the SRA 
approach might be rather useful’ – that is, they recognised that the self-regulatory 
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element of Gower’s approach already involved a significant depoliticisation of 
financial regulation.213  
Tebbit responded at length to Number 10’s concerns in July, via a DTI note 
on financial regulation. The paper set out five policy objectives that a future 
regulation must meet: the City must be ‘able to provide services to UK industry and 
commerce, private investors and the Government’ cheaply and competitively; 
market forces must be free to stimulate competition and innovation; the ‘regulatory 
framework must provide effective protection for investor[s]’, without becoming 
protectionist; regulation must ‘inspire investor confidence’ through transparency; 
and regulation must be predictable and flexible.214 Crucially, this regulation must 
also meet three political objectives: ‘the Government should not appear to take 
responsibility for the activities of City practitioners’; a regulatory body should be 
made up of ‘the minimum number of civil servants’; and this regulatory framework 
should entail ‘the minimum number of quangos’.215 Overall, Tebbit emphasised that 
‘[p]hilosophically I favour standing as close to reliance on market forces as we can 
defend politically’.216 The regulation would as such be made up of voluntary SRAs 
operating ‘at arms-length from the Government’.217 With regards to an intermediate 
umbrella body supervising these SRAs, Tebbit was ambivalent at this stage: ‘I leave 
that question open at the moment until I hear what the Governor’s Group may have 
to say’.218 Yet at a Treasury meeting the following day between Tebbit, Lawson, 
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Bank Governor Robin Leigh-Pemberton, and other officials, the attendees agreed 
that ‘it was becoming increasingly likely’ that the ‘most acceptable form could well 
be a number of SRAs plus an umbrella body’.219  
Number 10 received Tebbit’s note with measured enthusiasm. Willetts 
commented: ‘It is much closer to the Prime Minister’s thinking than the earlier work 
done by the DTI’.220 Furthermore, he wrote, ‘at least Mr Tebbit emphasises that the 
SRAs will operate at arm’s-length from Government’.221 He encouraged Thatcher 
to agree with Tebbit’s proposals, which she did.  
The Prime Minister’s office, and to a lesser extent several DTI officials 
within the GRG, expressed a clear and urgent desire to depoliticise the Gower 
Report so as to avoid blame for future financial scandals. This occurred months 
before the Bank put the recommendations of its practitioner group to the DTI – the 
event that most accounts of FSA point to as key in establishing its arm’s-length 
character (Vogel, 1996: 110; Laurence, 2001: 88). In the context of a radically 
deregulated financial system, following a decade and a half of cumulative 
liberalisations, the Thatcher administration intended to institute a depoliticised 
mode of financial governance that would insulate the government’s legitimacy from 
crises. However, while the government sought to depoliticise Gower’s proposals, it 
was not clear how this could be achieved. As the next section will demonstrate, it 
was the Bank that proposed that this objective could be attained through the creation 
of institutional shock absorbers between the government and the City. 
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The Bank’s practitioner group 
 
While certain figures within the Bank had reacted very negatively to Gower’s 1982 
Discussion Document – due to fears of government encroachment on their informal 
regulatory networks – Bank officials had a more conciliatory response to Gower’s 
full report. This compromising tone resulted from two factors: the impending Big 
Bang and the Bank’s fear that an oppositional approach to Gower’s findings would 
isolate them from the decision-making process. Indeed, in January 1984, Walker 
explained that if the Bank did not appear to be attempting to reform their networks 
of informal regulation, ‘there was a risk that the introduction of more intrusive 
structures would be precipitated’.222 
In May 1984, the Bank took the first concrete steps towards directly 
intervening in the debates surrounding the Gower Report. On 10 May, Bank 
Governor Leigh-Pemberton wrote to Thatcher, expressing his desire ‘to invite, on 
my own initiative and without committing Government, a small number of senior 
City practitioners … to form an advisory group’ on future financial regulation.223 
This request was not received warmly in the Treasury. Treasury official M. A. Hall 
expressed his distrust of the Bank’s initiative to Chancellor Lawson: ‘There has 
been no collective discussion by Ministers, yet the appointment of a group from the 
City implicitly rules out the statutory approach … And the recommendations of such 
a high powered group would be difficult to reject’.224 Thatcher’s Principal Private 
Secretary Andrew Turnbull alerted her to the Treasury’s displeasure and speculated 
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as to the Bank’s motives: ‘I detect some ill feeling in the Treasury about this letter. 
They feel that there has been a deal between the Bank and DTI without bringing 
them in … I suspect that the purpose [of the group] is that the Bank will provide the 
secretariat, enabling them to write the script’.225 This discontent must be understood 
within the context of the Bank’s long-standing desire, since its nationalisation in 
1946, to gain greater autonomy from government (see Burn, 1999). Indeed, this 
circumvention of the Treasury’s input may explain Lawson’s subsequent disavowal 
of FSA, which he described as ‘cumbersome and bureaucratic’ (Lawson, 1992: 
401). Nevertheless, Thatcher was encouraged by both Redwood and Tebbit to 
endorse the Governor’s plans, without associating the government with the group.226 
As such, Thatcher gave Leigh-Pemberton her blessing on 18 May, while insisting 
that the group’s ‘recommendations would in no way restrict the Government’s 
options in looking at a wider range of possible regulatory arrangements’.227  
For the following three months, the Bank’s practitioner group carried out 
private and undocumented deliberations, chaired by banker Sir Martin Jacomb 
(Vogel, 1996: 110). Before the group’s conclusions were unveiled, Walker began 
hinting that the Bank was moving ever closer to Gower’s proposals. He told the 
Court of Directors on 23 August that ‘it was hard to conceive any sensible way 
forward that did not involve both continuing self-regulation and statutory 
underpinning’.228 This sentiment was echoed weeks later, when Leigh-Pemberton 
announced the practitioner group’s findings to the Court on 6 September. He 
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referred to the ‘unreality of the so-called choice between self regulation and 
statutory regulation. In practice, neither represents a serious option on its own’.229 
Therefore, the Governor proposed a strategy for depoliticising the Gower proposal’s 
fusion of self-regulation and statutory control, through the insertion of a private 
body between the government and the City: ‘The preference of the advisory group, 
and one which I fully share, would be for securities regulation to be headed by a 
private sector body, recognised as the competent authority by government and, on 
being so recognised, left to get on with the job’.230 Yet even this depoliticisation of 
Gower’s plans did not allay City anxieties over government encroachment, due to 
the lack of Bank participation in this supervisory body: 
 
in the absence of the insulation that would be provided by the continuous 
prominent involvement of the Bank, there would be risk that Ministers and 
officials would persistently interfere in a way that would undermine the 
effectiveness of such a private sector body and the readiness of major 
practitioners to be committed to it. The [group’s] argument is that a 
structure for which the bank had a clear responsibility would largely 
eliminate this risk and would thus be very desirable.231 
 
However, while Leigh-Pemberton sympathised with this concern, he explained that 
Bank officials had ‘strong arguments against assumption by the Bank of a formal 
statutory responsibility for supervision in this area. In any event, I doubt whether 
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government and Parliament would be ready to give the Bank such power even if we 
ourselves sought it’.232 As Vogel (1996: 110) argues, the Bank was wary of 
assuming formal responsibilities due to the difficulties of governing this 
complicated array of financial institutions. In order to resolve this problem, he 
suggested that the Bank could be given greater veto power over the staffing of the 
private supervisory body: 
 
a structure could be put in place under which, with the power of 
appointment of the chairman and council of the regulatory body reposing 
in the Governor, and clear delegation by the government through 
recognition of the body as competent authority, the Bank would be in a 
position to exert influence in our conventional and informal way to the 
extent that this were necessary. I am planning to put advice on broadly 
these lines to Ministers in the near future.233 
 
Leigh-Pemberton thus used his practitioner group’s recommendations to advise the 
DTI to ensure that two principles were at the heart of a future system of regulations. 
Firstly, a private body should insulate the Bank and City from government prying; 
and secondly, the Bank should have a veto over the makeup of this body so as to 
maintain the Bank’s traditional autonomy. 
Drawing on the Bank’s recommendations, Tebbit began creating a fully-
formed framework for what would become the 1985 White Paper (Tebbit, 1989: 
296). He explained the makeup of the future regulation to Thatcher on 9 October. 
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Tebbit came down firmly in favour of Gower’s principle of self-regulation through 
SRAs within a statutory framework, yet he insisted that the government delegate its 
supervisory capacities to two non-state bodies with statutory backing, rather than 
one: the SIB and MIB.234 These bodies would be given statutory backing ‘on the 
condition that they satisfied basic principles of conduct to be laid down by 
Government’.235 These bodies’ decisions on licencing and disciplining of investors 
would need to be verified by an ‘independent tribunal whose members I would 
appoint’.236 This arm’s-length approach should also ensure against the DTI ‘being 
too closely involved in answering to Parliament’.237 Tebbit ended the letter by 
disclosing that he had discussed the matter with Lawson, who agreed with the plan.  
Within Number 10, Tebbit’s proposals were met with ringing endorsement. 
Willetts exclaimed to Thatcher on 10 October, in explicit depoliticisation terms, that 
‘Mr Tebbit’s particular solution is ingenious … [H]is supervisory bodies can check 
up on the performance of SRAs, whilst acting as a lightning conductor for City 
scandals so they are not blamed on the Government’.238 After requesting 
clarification on certain issues concerning Tebbit’s proposed framework later in 
October, Thatcher informed the DTI in November that she was ‘broadly content 
with the line your Secretary of State is taking’.239 Yet Thatcher continued to push 
for greater depoliticisation: ‘In her view, the role of the Government – and, indeed, 
the House of Commons – should be to satisfy themselves about the general conduct 
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of City regulation’, and as such ‘the Government should steer clear of involvement 
in individual cases, and should not be answerable for these in the House of 
Commons’.240  
The decision to depoliticise Gower’s proposals through the creation of the 
SIB (and the short-lived MIB) resulted from the coincidental harmonisation of 
interests between Number 10 and the Bank. The Prime Minister’s office was keen 
to ensure that government ministers were insulated against future crises, which were 
more likely to occur following the cumulative deregulations studied in this thesis. 
The Bank was keen to preserve its informal networks of financial regulation against 
the encroachment of government ministers, officials, and Parliament. These 
interests coalesced around the same depoliticisation agenda, whereby a ‘lightning 
conductor’ body would be erected between the government and the City, and the 
Bank would play a crucial role in deciding which people occupied this body. Tebbit, 
whose department shared some of the government’s concerns about the dangers of 
politicised financial regulation, heeded the demands of these powerful advisors 
during the creation of the 1985 White Paper. The following section will examine 
how this depoliticised reform became law. 
 
III. Defending depoliticisation, 1985-1986 
 
While the depoliticised approach contained in the 1985 White Paper satisfied the 
interests of Number 10, the Bank, and the DTI, it was heavily criticised in the House 
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of Lords, House of Commons, and even amongst the Conservatives’ own back 
bench. Lord Chancellor Quintin Hogg wrote to Tebbit on 9 January 1985, 
expressing that he feared Tebbit ‘may have underestimated the criticism which will 
be mounted against your proposal that the legislation should enable you to delegate 
your regulatory powers to the proposed Securities and Investments Board and 
Marketing of Investments Board’.241 This framework would mean these boards 
‘would be law-making bodies without any sort of Parliamentary accountability’ – a 
form of ‘sub-delegation to a quango’ that was ‘unprecedented’ except for ‘under the 
Emergency Powers (Defence) Act 1939’.242 Grey Gowrie, Chancellor of the Duchy 
of Lancaster, shared the same concern. Writing to Tebbit days later, Gowrie 
explained that ‘we may be vulnerable to criticism’ due to the lack of accountability 
to government entailed in the White Paper: ‘I wonder whether we can expect 
Parliament to sign so open a cheque’.243  
Upon presenting the core elements of the White Paper to the House of 
Commons on 24 April, Tebbit received backlash from both sides of the partisan 
divide. Conservative MP Anthony Beaumont-Dark decried the ‘constitutional 
outrage’ entailed by granting the Bank the power to overrule the Secretary of State’s 
decisions with regards to the SIB.244 Anthony Nelson, another Conservative MP, 
expressed his agreement with Beaumont-Dark about the growing power of the 
Bank: ‘There is great concern that the proposals for the SIB … effectively give a 
power of veto to the Governor of the Bank of England … Many of us are concerned 
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about the steady encroachment of the Bank of England in this area’.245 This 
sentiment was echoed by Labour politician John Smith, Shadow Secretary of State 
for Trade and Industry, who nevertheless put a party-political spin on his critique. 
Smith suggested that ‘the purpose of the Bank of England veto’, which was a 
‘monstrous proposition’, was ‘to guard against what a Labour Secretary of State 
might do’ in the future.246 The fear on the part of Labour, as such, was that by hiving 
off the government’s power to both the SIB and the Bank, the Thatcher 
administration was effectively foreclosing the future, by preventing a Labour 
government’s incursion into City affairs.  
The greatest formal challenge to Tebbit’s framework, however, was 
mounted by Conservative backbenchers during the Committee stage of the financial 
services bill, following Tebbit’s replacement as Secretary of State for Trade and 
Industry by Leon Brittan (September 1985 – January 1986) and Paul Channon 
(January 1986 – June 1987). Conservative MPs Nelson and Tim Smith made several 
amendments to the DTI’s proposals, including the scrapping of the MIB. Yet the 
most serious of these amendments gutted the regulatory framework of its 
depoliticising characteristics and effectively ‘made the SIB a conventional 
government agency – with its budget, staffing and powers under full departmental 
control’.247 In April 1986, Channon suggested to Lawson that these backbenchers 
could be appeased by granting a number of concessions related to the SIB. These 
concessions included solidifying the SIB’s regulatory capacities against accusations 
of being light-touch, by granting the SIB statutory powers to investigate and 
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prosecute illegal investment activities.248 Ironically, in an attempt to assuage 
Conservatives who were worried about the government’s loss of control over City 
regulation, Channon was advocating a further delegation of public powers to a 
private body. Thatcher recognised this point, writing: ‘This is a fundamental change 
… Are there any other private bodies with prosecuting powers?’.249 Yet Channon’s 
initiative was successful, as the concessions were accepted by Nelson and Smith in 
early May, paving the way for the bill to make smoother progress through the 
remaining stages of the legislative process.250 FSA finally gained Royal Assent on 
7 November.  
FSA constituted an attempt to create a system of financial governance 
appropriate to Britain’s liberalised and globalised financial order, yet in a manner 
that would shield the government from the political fallout arising from future City 
crises. Although the government and Bank were initially resistant to Gower’s 1982 
support for statutory regulation of the UK’s financial sector, the impending Big 
Bang underlined the necessity of a clear and firm system of rules for the City. 
Nevertheless, the Thatcher administration feared that Gower’s 1984 proposals 
would hold government ministers responsible for future financial crises, despite 
having less power to prevent them. Number 10 and the DTI endeavoured to 
overcome this dilemma by depoliticising Gower’s proposals. The Bank, desiring to 
protect its regulatory relationships from popular intervention, proposed that this 
depoliticisation could be achieved through the insertion of a private agency between 
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the Government and the City. This coalition of interests explains the transformation 
of the 1984 Gower Report’s proposals for direct government oversight into the 
arm’s-length, delegated oversight of the 1985 White Paper. While the resulting 
depoliticised framework met diverse opposition, the government was able to resist 
pressures to repoliticise the scheme after certain political manoeuvring, and this in 
turn outsourced even more regulatory power away from the British state.  
 
 
Conclusion 
 
FSA fuelled financialisation in two ways. Firstly, the introduction of statutory 
reregulation was a necessary corollary to the Big Bang deregulation, as it allowed 
the British financial sector to take full advantage of the latter policy’s global 
implications by setting out clear rules of play that could be followed by all actors 
regardless of country of origin. Secondly, the form that this regulation took, with its 
large degree of separation between the government and City, birthed a light-touch 
approach to financial supervision that allowed the expansion of risky financial 
activities throughout the late 1980s, 1990s, and 2000s. Both factors propelled the 
expansion of Britain’s financial sector out of all proportion to the growth of the 
productive economy. 
Despite FSA’s key role in furthering processes of financialisation, this 
policy transformation cannot be understood through the lenses of the expropriation 
or crisis resolution approaches. There is little evidence that FSA’s light-touch form 
resulted from the pro-finance ideology of the Thatcher government or politicians’ 
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capture by City elites. To the extent that FSA was designed to promote the City, this 
was because, as Redwood and Willetts explained to Thatcher, the City was ‘a 
successful, profitable area of the economy’ and the ‘Government should reap 
political benefits from associating itself with this success story’.251 Neither is there 
evidence that the government created this policy as a direct response to the 
stagflation crisis. In addition, the theoretical lens used to examine the other chapters 
in this thesis has less analytical purchase regarding FSA. This reregulation should 
not be conceptualised as a statecraft strategy directly responding to the 
contradictions emerging from the profitability crisis – a crisis from which the global 
economy was recovering by the time of the political deliberations over FSA. In this 
sense, this policy change differs from the previous three examined in this thesis. Yet 
this reregulation was fundamentally related to the crisis, as it constituted an attempt 
to create a form of financial governance appropriate to the new financial order that 
had been forged in the era of stagflation. CCC, exchange control abolition, and the 
Big Bang – deregulations that served as elements of broader statecraft strategies of 
crisis governance – had acted to boost the expansion and globalisation of Britain’s 
financial sector. It was thus crucial that the state introduce a complementary system 
of regulation that would both discourage financial malpractice and provide clear 
rules for international actors to follow when operating in London. It was for this 
reason that Gower’s initial proposals were met with begrudging acceptance by the 
government and the Bank once the radical implications of the impending Big Bang 
became clear in 1983.  
                                                        
251 TNA PREM 19/1461, Redwood and Willetts to Thatcher, 29 June 1984. 
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However, this need for a system of statutory regulations entailed a political 
danger. The cumulative liberalisations studied in this thesis had rendered the British 
economy increasingly reliant on financial accumulation, which heightened the 
fragility and volatility of UK growth. If the state was to directly regulate this 
emerging financial order, policy-makers could find themselves on the hook in case 
of financial crises, which could in turn shatter government legitimacy. As such, 
Gower’s 1984 proposals, which advocated a framework of statutory regulation 
overseen by a government department, were met with anxiety on the part of the 
government. Similarly, the Bank worried that such state intervention would disrupt 
their informal governance of the City. As a result, the Prime Minister’s office 
insisted on a depoliticised regulatory framework, whereby the government would 
not be responsible for City crises. The Bank put flesh on the bones of this sentiment, 
by advising the government to create a private regulatory body standing between 
the government and the City, which would be subject to the Bank’s influence. The 
resulting 1985 White Paper outlined a regulatory system that depoliticised financial 
governance in both directions: government ministers would be insulated from 
political backlash over financial scandals, and the Bank and City would be insulated 
from political pressures from ministers, MPs, and ultimately the electorate. This 
unprecedented depoliticisation alarmed both Labour and Conservative MPs, the 
latter of which tried to amend the financial services bill so as to reassert government 
control. Yet the Thatcher government was able to outmanoeuvre these attempted 
amendments by granting greater prosecuting power to the private regulatory body, 
and thus, ironically, further deepening the government’s outsourcing of its public 
powers.  
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The policy changes examined in this thesis all propelled the dual processes 
of financial expansion and productive stagnation in different ways. Yet FSA has an 
additional distinguishing characteristic. This regulatory change did not simply 
contribute to the advancement of financialisation in Britain, it also tied a bow of 
sorts on the preceding 15 years of deregulation. FSA constituted a state strategy to 
create an effective framework of financial governance appropriate to the newly 
liberalised and globalised City, in a manner that would insulate British governments 
from a collapse in legitimacy in case of future financial crises.  
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CHAPTER TEN 
Conclusion 
 
 
In The Making of the English Working Class, E. P. Thompson (2013: 12) wrote that 
he sought to ‘rescue the poor stockinger, the Luddite cropper, the “obsolete” hand 
weaver’, and so on, from ‘the enormous condescension of posterity’. These people 
had been dismissed by bourgeois historians as ‘backwards looking’, ‘foolhardy’ 
ideologues, intent on perverting the course of capitalist development for their own 
particularistic purposes (ibid). At the risk of heresy, it could be argued that 
contemporary progressives have replicated this form of unsophisticated, 
retrospective condemnation in their criticisms of Thatcher’s role in sparking 
processes of financialisation (see also Jamie Peck, 2013: 139). This ‘Queen Mother 
of global austerity and financialization’ (Hudson and Sommers, 2013) is accused of 
simultaneously dismantling the institutions of postwar productive capitalism and 
creating a new financialised pattern of accumulation. Her crimes are twofold, it is 
said, namely that she both willingly opened the government’s door to financial 
lobbyists and actively participated in rolling out an ideologically-driven project of 
financialised neoliberalism.  
This thesis has endeavoured to demonstrate that this approach is an 
analytical and political dead end. Critiques of the political origins of financialisation 
should not seek to superficially condemn nor ‘rescue’ the legacies of Thatcher, 
Callaghan, or Heath, but to properly situate their policies of financial regulatory 
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restructuring in the political economic context of their time; and, in turn, to 
understand their decisions in relation to the pressing dilemmas of this period. This 
thesis has argued that British policy-makers from the late 1960s to early 1980s were 
forced to govern a political economy that had entered a deep crisis: global 
competitive pressures intensified as Britain’s ability to compete continued to 
decline, national economic indicators became erratic and distorted, domestic social 
groups pressed their tangible demands upon the state in an increasingly militant 
manner, and the traditional Keynesian tools of macroeconomic management proved 
progressively more futile. In this context, British policy-makers attempted to craft 
strategies that would reproduce the state’s economic and political bases by both 
recreating the necessary conditions for the production of surplus value and ensuring 
the state’s appearance as a neutral referee between the partisan demands of civil 
society. The policies of financial de- and reregulation studied in this thesis 
constituted elements of these broader statecraft strategies of crisis governance.  
While the form that these strategies took was ideologically-inflected, 
influenced by factional political struggles, and defended publicly with rhetoric that 
connected them to greater blueprints for British prosperity; the archives reveal such 
policies to be quite consistent across Labour and Conservative governments, and 
fundamentally driven by pragmatic governing concerns. The historical record 
cautions us against explanations of the state’s role in financialisation that assign 
undue causal power to the ideologically-driven machinations of politicians or the 
nefarious power of financial lobbyists. Rather, the characters in this thesis appeared 
to struggle with impersonal forces that had escaped the control of even the most 
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powerful sections of society. It is such a ubiquitous form of domination that this 
thesis sought to theorise through the value-form Marxist lens. 
This concluding chapter will present the key findings of the thesis, 
emphasise the original contributions made by this research, and discuss the limits 
and prospects for future research entailed in this work. 
 
 
Domination, crisis, and changing financial 
governance 
 
The first part of this thesis sought to provide a novel characterisation of the literature 
on financialisation, subject this literature to critique, and offer a new 
conceptualisation of the state’s role in propelling financialisation processes. Chapter 
2 argued that despite the great breadth and diversity of financialisation literature, 
the most analytically precise accounts define this phenomenon as the interrelated 
development of both financial expansion and productive stagnation since the 1970s. 
Within this strand of the literature, two different explanations can be found of the 
causal relationship between financial expansion and productive stagnation. 
Expropriation accounts insist that the growth of financial markets and political 
ascendance of financial elites has resulted in the expropriation and consequent 
decline of productive capital (Faroohar, 2016; Crotty, 2000; Stockhammer, 2004; 
Duménil and Lévy, 2004). Crisis resolution accounts argue that the stagnation of 
the productive economy preceded and indeed triggered the expansion of finance 
(Arrighi, 1994; Crouch, 2009; Baran and Sweezy, 1966; Brenner, 2006). Within 
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these accounts the state’s role in propelling financialisation is conceptualised in a 
pluralist/instrumentalist or functionalist manner. While expropriation explanations 
claim that policy-makers pursued financial liberalisation because of the lobbying 
pressures of financial capital and the ideological hegemony of laissez-faire norms; 
crisis resolution approaches insist that state managers reacted quite automatically 
to the crisis of productive capital by deregulating finance in an attempt to produce 
a new pattern of accumulation. The exception to this pluralist and functionalist 
tendency is the work of Krippner (2011) and Streeck (2014), who emphasise the 
strategic, political character of states’ financial regulatory measures during the 
stagflation crisis.  
This thesis has contributed to Krippner’s and Streeck’s strategic 
conceptualisation of the state’s role in mediating financial expansion and productive 
stagnation, and sought to further this analysis by grounding these scholars’ 
observations in a theoretically-consistent framework. In Chapters 3 and 4, this thesis 
set out its theoretical scaffolding. The form of social domination peculiar to 
capitalism, it was argued, does not emanate from a particular sociological class or 
institution, but rather derives from the very social relations that constitute capitalist 
society; that is, monetised exchange relations (Rubin, 2010). By equating the 
products of labour on the market as different quantities of money, people 
unknowingly equate their labour as different quantities of the same abstract labour 
(Heinrich, 2012). Averages of labour productivity come to dominate market 
participants, pressuring them to produce more in less time. Through the process of 
market exchange, money – ostensibly a mere means for particular social purposes – 
becomes an end in itself and these social purposes become instrumentalised as a 
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mere means for the expansion of money (Postone, 2003). The world of purposeful 
human action is turned on its head. This dynamic creates powerful pressures for the 
classification of society into flexible, dependent producers of surplus value 
(Holloway, 2002), while simultaneously creating a tendency towards falling 
average profitability and thus crisis. Faced with impersonal domination by abstract 
quantities, people reject the dictates of value as wealth and assert tangible, 
substantive forms of social wealth. The actual course of capitalist history is thus 
characterised not by the unfolding of value-logic, but by the violent struggle 
between a decentred form of domination and the everyday affirmation of alternative 
forms of social valuation.  
Within this unruly system, states are not external regulators, but rather 
constitute global value relations through the establishment and governance of 
national currencies and international exchange rate regimes (Bonefeld, 1993; 
Kettell, 2004). The pressures of world money relations in turn force national policy-
makers to ensure average profitability within their territories or face a range of 
economic sanctions. Yet these same state managers must also maintain their 
political legitimacy by being seen to respond to the wishes of their domestic polities. 
The contradiction between the abstract domination of value and the daily assertion 
of human need is thus expressed as a contradiction between the material and 
political reproduction of the state system. Policy-makers, this thesis argues, manage 
this dilemma in times of profitability crisis by employing statecraft strategies that 
fall on a spectrum between palliation (delaying the effects of the crisis to rescue 
political legitimacy) and depoliticised discipline (directly confronting the crisis in a 
manner that insulates governing legitimacy). The financial de- and reregulations 
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studied in this thesis must be understood as elements of these broader crisis 
governance strategies.  
The second part of this thesis sought to apply the preceding theoretical 
discussion to the case of the British stagflation crisis and the restructuring of UK 
financial regulation between 1967 and 1986. Chapter 5 provided a broad historical 
overview of this period and examined the governing strategies employed by Labour 
and Conservative governments to manage dilemmas generated by the crisis. The 
British experience of the global profitability crisis, it was argued, can be split into 
two periods. The first, from 1967 to 1977, was characterised by falling profitability, 
rising inflation, and recurring currency crises that resulted from balance of payments 
deficits. The second, from 1977 to 1983, was characterised by a strong pound 
alongside extreme recessionary domestic conditions. Chapter 6 analysed the first 
major financial deregulation in the postwar era, namely the 1971 CCC measures. 
While this policy change was a brainchild of the Bank, it nevertheless needed to 
gain approval from the Treasury. This chapter argued that the government 
conceived of CCC as a useful instrument to navigate the contradictions entailed by 
the accelerating profitability crisis. In the aftermath of the 1967 sterling devaluation, 
the government sought to launch a sustained recovery in the balance of payments 
by depressing domestic consumption and boosting exports, ultimately in order to 
bring UK social relations in lines with the abstract dictates of a global system of 
value that was mired in crisis. By allowing credit to be allocated not by state 
direction but by marketised interest rates, CCC offered the government a 
mechanism that would allow money resources to be transferred from persons to 
exporting companies in a manner that would veil the state’s hand in the process. In 
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this sense, the government endorsed CCC as a strategy to extend palliative relief to 
capital and to discipline personal consumption in a depoliticised fashion. Chapter 7 
tackled the abolition of exchange controls in the years 1977, 1978, and 1979. 
Following the IMF’s seal of approval on UK government policy and the sale of 
North Sea oil, the pound rapidly rose in price, which helped to combat inflation 
while further exacerbating the squeeze on profitability. With the UK’s export sector 
facing disaster, this chapter demonstrated that both Callaghan and Thatcher 
governments endeavoured to depreciate sterling through exchange control 
relaxation. However, while the Callaghan government was ultimately impeded by 
their tense relations with the TUC and the possibility of a run on sterling 
orchestrated by flighty currency markets, the Thatcher administration was able to 
fully abolish exchange controls by emphasising that this policy was not a beggar-
thy-neighbour attempt at currency manipulation, but was rather motivated by 
laissez-faire convictions. The dismantling of exchange controls can thus be 
understood as a palliative measure to stave off the worst effects of the profitability 
crisis, masked with free market rhetoric. 
Chapters 8 and 9 were concerned with the de- and reregulation of the LSE. 
An anti-monopolies court case had been brought against the LSE in 1979 for its 
restrictive practices. Despite requests from the LSE’s Chairman, Thatcher refused 
to exempt it from this case, due to how this would be perceived to clash with the 
government’s pro-competition agenda. However, Chapter 8 argues that the 
government’s stance changed following the implementation of the MTFS 
monetarist experiment. MTFS, launched in 1980, was an attempt to defeat inflation 
and reignite profitable capital accumulation by locking the government into a 
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radically disciplinary policy straitjacket. However, this strategy of depoliticised 
disciplining was reliant on a deeply ideological faith in the government’s own 
ability to reduce the monetary aggregate £M3, which in reality proved nearly 
impossible. As such, MTFS resulted in an extremely deep recession without the 
commensurate fall in the money supply that would justify this economic pain. In 
order to rescue this strategy, the Thatcher administration relied on increasingly large 
debt sales on the LSE in order to soak up liquidity and artificially reduce the money 
supply. This in turn required that the normal functioning of the LSE was not 
interrupted by the anti-monopoly case. As such, in 1983, the government exempted 
the LSE from this case, on the condition that they voluntarily abolish certain 
restrictive practices – thus beginning the countdown to the 1986 Big Bang 
deregulation. The Thatcher government’s liberalisation of the LSE, then, was 
chiefly a desperate attempt to rescue their failing strategy of depoliticised discipline. 
The final empirical chapter examines the 1986 FSA. Following a series of City 
scandals, the government commissioned legal expert Gower to assess the UK’s 
securities regulations. His initial proposals for a statutory system of self-regulation, 
presided over by a government body, was received with anxiety by the government 
and Bank due to the increased political intervention in financial affairs that it would 
imply. However, following the 1983 decision that set in motion the Big Bang, it 
became clear to the government and Bank that the impending globalisation of the 
City required a commensurate system of clear and impartial regulation. The fear 
remained, nevertheless, that in case of a financial crisis in the City, a statutory 
regulatory system would leave the government on the hook for this crisis, 
potentially shattering their political legitimacy. The government and the Bank thus 
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endeavoured to depoliticise Gower’s proposals by inserting a non-governmental 
body between the government and the City, which would both absorb the blame for 
future financial crises and impede political intervention in informal Bank-City 
relations. The resultant FSA was thus not a direct strategy of crisis governance – 
which differentiates it from the other cases studied in this thesis – but should rather 
be understood as an attempt to institute a form of depoliticised financial governance 
appropriate to the preceding fifteen years of financial liberalisation.  
 
 
Original contributions 
 
The study of financialisation, however defined, is perhaps an example of a true 
attempt at constructing an interdisciplinary research agenda. Scholars from a great 
range of disciplines have examined the causes, processes, and effects of the 
increasing dominance of financial logics in contemporary life. This thesis 
contributes to a more precise conceptualisation of financialisation, namely literature 
that examines the relationship between financial expansion and productive 
stagnation. More specifically, this research addresses the state’s role in mediating 
these processes – an area that has received insufficient attention to date.  
 This thesis proposed that the British state pursued policies of financial 
regulatory restructuring in the 1970s and 1980s as a part of broader pragmatic 
strategies to reconcile the immediate governing dilemmas arising from the 
profitability crisis. Policy-makers found themselves pressed, on one side, by the 
impersonal forces of a system of global wealth mired in deep crisis, and, on the 
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other side, by the tangible demands of domestic groups that immediate needs be 
met. Financial de- and reregulations served as elements of statecraft strategies 
designed to navigate these contradictory pressures, by either postponing this 
contradiction into the future or directly restructuring domestic social relations in 
line with global value imperatives in a manner that protected governments’ 
legitimacy. This thesis ultimately insists that the state’s role in propelling 
financialisation was not an inevitable outcome of capitalism’s deep tendencies, but 
was rather a strategic attempt to govern the crisis-prone and struggle-ridden social 
relations that constitute capitalist society. 
 These findings act as a powerful disconfirmation of existing explanations of 
state involvement in financialisation. Against crisis resolution explanations, the 
British state’s response to the global profitability crisis was far from automatic, nor 
is there evidence of an attempt by politicians to construct a new pattern of financial 
accumulation to replace the postwar Fordist model (Tabb, 2010; Kotz, 2011). The 
politics of financial regulatory restructuring were messier, more ideologically 
inflected, and more concerned with the management of immediate governing 
dilemmas than this literature allows. However, the expropriation approach is 
perhaps even less suitable for explaining the British state’s propulsion of 
financialisation (Davis and Walsh, 2016; Palley, 2013). Firstly, while some of the 
policy-makers who were instrumental in these regulatory transformations were 
committed neoliberal ideologues, the governing dilemmas they were seeking to 
address were not imagined but instead very real. Indeed, the decisions that such 
ideologues made, while resulting in profoundly unreasonable outcomes, appeared 
strikingly reasonable in the context of the profitability crisis. In addition to 
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examining the negative consequences of particular policy decisions, analysts of the 
state’s role in financialisation must also address a more troubling question: what is 
it about our society that made such damaging decisions appear necessary? It is this 
question that this thesis’ conceptualisation of impersonal domination sought to 
address. 
Secondly, the emphasis on the lobbying power of financial elites has been 
greatly exaggerated (Talani, 2012; Duménil and Lévy, 2004). The imperatives that 
pressed British policy-makers to act in a way that favoured financial capital did not 
emanate from any particular elite group, but rather appeared to derive from the cold 
logic of the world market – an appearance that this thesis argues veils what is 
actually the self-imposed domination of a society in which human interaction is 
mediated by monetised commodity exchange. Critiques of financialisation that 
identify the political origins of financial expansion with the hegemony of the 
financial capitalist class thus commit a categorical error: they personalise a form of 
domination that is ultimately impersonal; they concretise that which is 
fundamentally abstract.  
This thesis makes a related contribution to IPE understandings of 
state/market relations. It has become quite commonplace in IPE to claim that states 
and markets are mutually constitutive social phenomena (Underhill, 2000; Block 
and Evans, 2005; Aitken, 2007). Open Marxist IPE approaches have given this 
claim more analytical depth and historical specificity by insisting that both states 
and markets should be understood as forms of capitalist social relations, and, as 
such, are not locked in contest but rather together constitute the totality of capitalist 
society (Burnham, 1994). This thesis engages with Open Marxist IPE scholarship, 
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and attempts to integrate cutting edge research from the value-form reading of 
Marx’s writings.  
 The international political economy is not characterised by a struggle 
between the automatic logic of the price mechanism, on the one side, and the 
purposeful actions of states, on the other. Rather the price mechanism and the world 
of economic abstractions are underpinned by the force of state power. The 
foundational elements of market society – private property, money, etc. – are 
political constructs that are policed by states and state-delegated political 
authorities. Nevertheless, according to Marx’s notion of fetishism, these political 
creations become autonomised, acquire a rhythmic, directional development 
pattern, and come to dominate their creators (Rubin, 2010; Postone, 2003). The 
state’s enforcement of property rights and sound management of money appears 
not as the root of capitalist domination, but as an essential condition for the 
economic survival of a political territory within a global system of mobile capital. 
States thus contribute to the ties that bind them, just as these ties seem to be imposed 
from without by a natural or transhistorical economic logic. In this way, the value-
form reading builds upon the observation of state/market mutual constitution by 
explaining a) how states accidentally reproduce a system of impersonal self-
domination, and b) how this system gives rise to the illusion that states and markets 
are locked in a bitter struggle and that economic forces are quasi-natural 
phenomena. 
Finally, this thesis contributes to IPE literature on neoliberal financial 
regulatory change. Within this literature, the liberalisation of financial regulation in 
the neoliberal epoch has generally been explained with reference to two causal 
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factors: dynamics of competitive deregulation and the ascendance of laissez-faire 
economic ideas. The first factor refers to the pressures upon advanced capitalist 
states to enact financial liberalisation in order to stave off the threat of damaging 
capital outflows and to gain the reward of transforming their national financial 
industry into a global financial centre (Andrews, 1994; McNamara, 1998; Cerny, 
1994; Green, 2016). The second factor refers to an ideational change, both at the 
national level and within international organisations, whereby Keynesian 
governance norms came to be replaced by laissez-faire notions of economic 
management – often with a distinctly monetarist bent (Best, 2005; Chwieroth, 
2010). The British case, particularly Thatcher’s deregulatory agenda, is said to 
exemplify the manner in which this combination of factors propelled financial 
regulatory restructuring (Helleiner, 1994; Germain, 1997).  
This thesis challenges this IPE consensus by putting forward empirical 
evidence to the contrary and advancing an alternative conceptual framework. The 
British state’s pursuit of financial regulatory restructuring did not primarily result 
from a desire to advance the City as a global financial centre nor from the growing 
dominance of laissez-faire, monetarist thinking. Instead, these policies of regulatory 
transformation constituted elements of broader strategies designed to navigate the 
British economy through the tumultuous crisis that struck the global capitalist 
economy in the late 1960s and lasted until the early 1980s. Faced with the national 
manifestations of a global crisis of capitalist wealth, the British state pursued 
statecraft strategies of three varieties: palliation, which delayed the effects of the 
crisis in order to assuage political constituencies; depoliticised discipline, which 
attempted to restructure British social relations in line with global averages while 
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avoiding the political backlash; and hybrid strategies that incorporated both 
palliative and depoliticised disciplining measures. As such, this thesis 
reconceptualises the causes of neoliberal financial regulatory change by pointing to 
the reactive, ad hoc, and strategic nature of the British state’s actions, and by 
demonstrating that neoliberal financial liberalisation cannot be understood 
separately from the crisis that ravaged the global capitalist system in the late postwar 
period.  
 
 
Limits and prospects 
 
The four transformations in British financial regulation examined in this thesis 
constitute the British state’s most important actions in propelling financialisation 
during the critical years of the 1970s and 1980s. Nevertheless, towards the end of 
the 1980s, and accelerating in the 1990s and 2000s, Britain’s pattern of financialised 
accumulation assumed a distinctly housing-led character. Rising house prices have 
become, in many respects, the backbone of UK growth, while houses as financial 
assets and mortgages as revenue streams have become increasingly integrated into 
the circuits of global finance.  
 The emergence of housing-led financial accumulation did not represent a 
natural evolution of Britain’s increasingly financialised economy, but rather this 
trajectory was directly spurred by state policies. The 1980 Housing Act introduced 
‘Right to Buy’, whereby social housing tenants were given the option, and indeed 
incentivised, to purchase their homes (Mullins and Murie, 2006: 39). The 1986 
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Building Societies Act allowed building societies to diversify their portfolios in 
order to compete with other mortgage lenders, leading many of these institutions to 
merge, demutualise, and branch out into other financial services (Cowan, 2011: 41-
2). The 1997 Building Societies Act further loosened the restrictions on building 
societies’ activities, allowing them to carry out any form of commercial activity 
within their remit unless it was explicitly prohibited (Ellinger, et al., 2011: 22). 
These policy changes both encouraged private homeownership and greatly 
deepened the liquidity of the UK mortgage market.  
There is a significant degree of debate over precisely why such policy 
transformations were pursued. The deregulation of mortgage markets in Britain has 
been explained as part of a broader ideological blueprint to construct an ‘ownership 
society’ (Ansell, 2014); as one element of a strategy to institute a new 
macroeconomic growth regime of ‘house-price Keynesianism’ (Watson, 2010); and 
as a directly political mechanism to manipulate working-class political preferences 
in line with the Conservative Party’s agenda (Ginsberg, 1983). Yet this thesis’ 
archival examination of the governing motivations underpinning deregulatory 
policies warns against narratives that place undue emphasis on the intentionality and 
functionality of such policies. Therefore, future archival work that intends to 
strengthen and extend understandings of the British state’s role in propelling 
financialisation would examine i) the potential slippages between official 
government rhetoric surrounding the creation of an ‘ownership society’ and the 
underpinning governing motivations; ii) the relationship between deregulatory 
housing policy and other areas of macroeconomic management; and iii) ultimately 
whether the liberalisation of British mortgage markets should be conceptualised as 
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the result of an intentional blueprint or a consequence of ad hoc, pragmatic policy-
making.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 332 
Annex 
 
 
List of names 
 
Allen, Douglas  HM Treasury, Permanent Secretary, 1968-1974 
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Jenkins, Roy HM Treasury, Chancellor of the Exchequer, 1967-
1970 
Joseph, Keith Department of Industry, Secretary of State, 1979-
1981 
Lanchin, Gerry  Department of Trade, Under Secretary  
Lankester, Tim Prime Minister’s Private Secretary for Economic 
Affairs, 1978-1981 
Lawson, Nigel HM Treasury, Financial Secretary, 1979-1981; 
Chancellor of the Exchequer, 1983-1989 
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Leigh-Pemberton, Robin Bank of England, Governor, 1983-1993 
Liesner, Hans   Department of Trade, Chief Economic Adviser 
Llewellyn-Smith, Elizabeth Department of Trade 
Lomax, Rachel  Bank of England 
Lovell, Arnold  HM Treasury, Monetary Policy Division, 1965-1970 
Mason, Graham  CBI, Deputy Overseas Director 
McMahon, Kit Bank of England, Executive Director of External 
Finance, 1973-1980; Deputy Governor, 1980-1985 
Middleton, Peter HM Treasury, Under Secretary, 1976-1980; Deputy 
Secretary, 1980-1983; Permanent Secretary, 1983-
1991. 
Monck, Nicholas  Under Secretary, 1977-1984  
Neale, Alan   HM Treasury, Deputy Secretary, 1968-1971 
Nelson, Anthony  Conservative Member of Parliament 
Nott, John   Department of Trade, Secretary of State, 1979-1981 
O’Brien, Leslie  Bank of England, Governor, 1966-1973 
Painter, R. J.   HM Treasury 
Parkinson, Cecil Department of Trade and Industry, Secretary of State, 
1983 
Pirie, W. R.   HM Treasury 
Pliatzky, Leo Department of Trade, Permanent Secretary, 1977-
1979 
Posner, Michael  HM Treasury 
Pratt, Timothy   Office of Fair Trading  
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Redwood, John  Chief of Policy to the Prime Minister, 1982-1987 
Rees, Peter   HM Treasury, Minister of State, 1979-1981 
Reid [first name unknown] Department of Trade and Industry, Companies 
Legislation Division 
Sangster, John   Bank of England, Deputy Chief Cashier, 1975-1977 
Seebohm, R. H.  HM Treasury 
Smith, John Shadow Secretary of State for Trade and Industry, 
1984-1987 
Smith, Tim   Conservative Member of Parliament 
Stowe, Kenneth Prime Minister’s Principal Private Secretary, 1975-
1979 
Tebbit, Norman Department of Trade and Industry, Secretary of State, 
1983-1985 
Thatcher, Margaret  Prime Minister, 1979-1990 
Turnbull, Andrew  Prime Minister’s Private Secretary, 1983-1985 
Varley, Eric Department of Industry, Secretary of State, 1975-
1979 
Walker, David Bank of England, Executive Director for Industrial 
Finance, 1981-1988 
Wass, Douglas HM Treasury, Under Secretary, Deputy Secretary, 
1968-1973; Second Permanent Secretary, 1973-
1974; Permanent Secretary, 1974-1983 
Willetts, David  Prime Minister’s Policy Unit, 1982 
Wilson, Harold  Prime Minister, 1964-1970, 1974-1976 
 337 
Archival sources 
 
The National Archives, Kew 
 
T 326: Treasury: Finance, Home and General Division, 1953-1974 
T 326/791 Credit control of banks, 1968 
T 326/961 Credit control of banks, 1968 January – 1969 December 
T 326/962 Credit control of banks, 1969 January – December 
T 326/963 Credit control of banks, 1969 January – December 
T 326/966 Working Party on Control of Bank Credit, 1969 January – December 
T 326/1109 Credit control of banks, 1970 January – April 
T 326/1261 New approach to credit control and the banking system, 1971 
January – December 
T 326/1262 New approach to credit control and the banking system, 1971 
January – December 
T 326/1263 New approach to credit control and the banking system, 1971 
January – December 
T 326/1352 Credit control of banks, 1970 January – 1971 December 
T 326/1702 New approach to credit control and the banking system, 1971 
January – 1973 December 
 
T 338: HM Treasury: Economic Assessment Division, 1966-1975 
T 338/39 Monetary policy: Economic Section interest; new approach to credit 
control, 1971 January – December 
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T 381: Treasury: Overseas Finance Sector, Balance of Payments, 1970-1984 
T 381/143 Exchange control relaxations: general papers, 1979 January – 
December 
T 381/145 Exchange control relaxations: Treasury analysis of economic effects, 
1978 January – 1979 December 
 
T 386: HM Treasury: Home Finance Division and Successors, 1973-1985 
T 386/684 The Stock Exchange and restrictive trading agreements, 1978 
January – 1981 December 
 
T 388: Treasury: Overseas Finance Sector, Finance Economic Unit, 1974-1981 
T 388/59 Monetary policy and forecasting, 1979 January – December 
T 388/154 The balance of payments and the exchange rate in the medium term, 
1977 January – 1980 December 
T 388/202 Exchange control: possible relaxation, 1979 January – December 
T 388/203 Exchange control: possible relaxation, 1979 January – December 
T 388/204 Exchange control: possible relaxation, 1979 January – December 
T 388/207 Relaxation of exchange controls II, 1979 January – December 
T 388/208 Relaxation of exchange controls II, 1979 January – 1980 December 
 
T 471: HM Treasury: Domestic Economy Sector, Industry and Agriculture 
Group, Industry and Employment Division, 1981-1987 
T 471/171 Gower Report on Investor Protection, 1983 Jan 01 - 1984 Dec 31 
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T 486: HM Treasury: Domestic Economy Sector, Home Finance Group, 
Financial Institutions Division, 1981-1990 
T 486/12 The Stock Exchange and the Restrictive Practices Court, 1983 
January – December 
 
T 520: HM Treasury: Domestic Economy Sector, Home Finance Group, 
Financial Institutions Division, 1981-1987 
T 520/117 Banking Act 1979 and the Gower Review of Investor Protection, 
1983 January – 1984 December 
T 520/118 Banking Act 1979 and the Gower Review of Investor Protection, 
1984 January – December 
 
T 521: HM Treasury: Domestic Economy Sector, Home Finance Group, 
Financial Institutions Division, 1981-1982 
T 521/42 Changes in the securities market and monetary policy, 1981 January 
– 1982 December 
T 521/44 The Stock Exchange and the Restrictive Practices Court, 1982 
January – December 
 
PJ 1: Department of Trade: General Division, 1975-1982 
PJ 1/91 International action to deal with bribery and extortion in 
international trade, 1978 January – 1979 December 
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PJ 1/92 Exchange control: proposals for adjustment, 1977 January – 1979 
December 
PJ 1/93 Exchange control: proposals for adjustment, 1979 January – 
December 
PJ 1/94 Exchange control: proposals for adjustment, 1979 January – 
December 
PJ 1/95 Exchange control: proposals for adjustment, 1979 January – 
December 
 
FV 73: Department of Trade and Industry and successors, Fair Trading 
Division, 1963-1989 
FV 73/146 Stock Exchange: exemption from Restrictive Trade Practices Act 
1976, 1979 January – December 
FV 73/147 Stock Exchange: exemption from Restrictive Trade Practices Act 
1976, 1979 January – December 
FV 73/148 Stock Exchange: exemption from Restrictive Trade Practices Act 
1976, 1979 January – December 
FV 73/214 Restrictive trade practices: the Stock Exchange, 1980 January – 1982 
December 
FV 73/215 Restrictive trade practices: the Stock Exchange, 1982 January – 1983 
December 
 
 
 341 
FV 89: Department of Trade and Industry and successors, Central Secretariat, 
1973-1984 
FV 89/2 Economic strategy: including policy on exchange rate controls, 1977 
January – December 
 
PREM 16: Prime Minister’s Office, Correspondence and Papers, 1973-1979 
PREM 16/2108 Industrial policy, 1978 March – 1979 April 
 
PREM 19: Records of the Prime Minister’s Office, Correspondence and 
Papers, 1976-1993 
PREM 19/29 Economic policy: 1979 Budget; part 1, 1979 May – June 
PREM 19/177 Economic policy: Domestic monetary policy; monetary 
control; medium term financial strategy; part 3, 1980 January 
– May  
PREM 19/178 Economic policy: Domestic monetary policy; monetary 
control; banking figures; part 4, 1980 May – September 
PREM 19/179 Economic policy: Domestic monetary policy; monetary 
prospects; part 5, 1980 September – October 
PREM 19/1005 Economic policy: Restrictive Trade Practices Act 1976: 
exemption of Stock Exchange, 1979 May – 1983 November 
PREM 19/1461 Economic policy: Financial services: position of Stock 
Exchange etc., 1983 November – 1985 September 
PREM 19/1718 Economic policy: Financial Services Bill: Stock Exchange 
deregulation etc., 1986 February – September 
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Bank of England, Threadneedle Street 
 
3A161: Committee of Treasury Files, 1922-1998 
3A161/199  The Council for the Securities Industry, 1976 December – 
1985 May 
 
6A385: Stock Exchange: General, 1966-1990 
6A385/12  Stock Exchange: General, 1979 January – April 
6A385/13  Stock Exchange: General, 1979 May – June 
6A385/14  Stock Exchange: General, 1979 July – December 
 
7A15: City Committee on Capital Markets and Company Law, 1979-1994 
7A15/4  1982 January – December 
 
13A173: Housing Finance, 1979-1986 
13A173/3  Bank Lending for House Purchase Provision of Statistics, 
1979 October – 1981 December 
 
15A91: Operation and Structure of the Stock Exchange: Post Restrictive 
Trade Practices (RTP) – inc. Big Bang, 1981-1988 
15A91/6  1984 July – 1985 September 
 
Other 
G4/211 
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Hansard, UK Parliament 
 
House of Commons Debate, vol. 64, cc49-114, 17 July 1984 
House of Commons, vol. 77, cc885-964, 24 April 1985 
House of Commons, vol. 968, cc235-264, 12 June 1979 
 
Modern Records Centre, University of Warwick 
 
Confederation of British Industry, Papers of the CBI Director General 
MSS.200/C/3/DG2/22 Correspondence with the Treasury and Chancellor of 
the Exchequer, Anthony Barber, 1971 September – 
November 
MSS.200/C/3/DG2/23 Correspondence with the Treasury and Chief 
Secretary, Patrick Jenkin, 1972 February – August 
 
Confederation of British Industry, Directorates 
MSS.200/C/3/ECO/2/7 Financial Policy Committee: Committee papers, 
incl. minutes, circulars and correspondence, 1973 
August – November 
MSS.200/C/3/ECO/2/29 Domestic monetary policy, 1969 – 1971 
MSS.200/C/3/ECO/11/24 Overseas Investment Committee, 1977 – 1978 
MSS.200/C/3/ECO/11/26 Overseas Investment Committee, 1977 July – 
November 
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Trade Union Congress, Economic Committee Minutes 
MSS.292D/462/3  Investments, 1976 – 1978 
MSS.292D/40.2LPMR/2 Minutes, reports and correspondence relating to the 
meetings of the TUC – Labour Party Liaison 
Committee, 1977 – 1978 
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